

BEHIND GLOBAL BRITAIN: PUBLIC OPINION ON THE UK'S ROLE IN THE WORLD

EMBARGOED TO 00:01 TUESDAY 30TH APRIL

REPORT OVERVIEW

This report consists of two analysis papers, whose findings are based around a survey designed with and conducted by BMG Research¹ on behalf of the British Foreign Policy Group and the Centre for Social and Political Risk.

The first part of this report is a paper by Edward Elliott from the British Foreign Policy Group, which provides an overview of public opinion in the UK towards the UK's role in the world. It covers the level of engagement people in the UK have with the country's international affairs, examines the preferences around issues, priorities, and specific roles for the UK to be carrying out internationally, and looks at the degree to which the public desire to fund these ambitions. This paper builds on the survey developed by the British Foreign Policy Group and BMG Research in 2017, enabling comparative analysis of some key trends over time.

The second part of this report is a paper prepared by Sophia Gaston of the Centre for Social and Political Risk, which particularly explores the role that citizens' mobility, networks and lived experiences of international engagement play in their attitudes towards Britain's role in the world, and the formation of their own identity and conception of citizenship.

This report will be followed by a series of shorter articles exploring some of the other case studies on divisions in the UK around public opinion on foreign policy.

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Edward has an international background, having worked in France, Spain, UK, and Slovakia before joining and helping establish the BFPG in 2016. He is a Durham and SciencesPo graduate in International Relations, French, and Law.

Edward has published previous pieces on polling on British public opinion towards UK foreign policy including : 'Brexit and Beyond – Public Views on UK Foreign Policy' (2017) and 'A 'Brexit Election' that shied away from Foreign Policy' (2017). Other reports on how the UK can build greater engagement internationally include 'Revitalising UK-Latin America Engagement post-Brexit' (2018) and 'The UK and the Commonwealth – Where are we at and where can we go?' (2018).

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Sophia was formerly the Deputy Director and Head of International Research at Demos think tank. She holds a First Class Honours master's degree in political communication and is a Fellow of the Royal Society of the Arts.

Her relevant previous publications include: 'Out of the Shadows - Conspiracy Theories on Immigration (UK and US)' (2019) 'At Home in One's Past: Nostalgia as a Cultural and Political Force in England, France and Germany' (2018); 'Mediating Populism: The Media and the Rise of Populism in the UK and Germany' (2018); and 'Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself? The Rise of a Culture and Politics of Fear in Europe' (2017).

PART ONE: BEHIND GLOBAL BRITAIN

EDWARD ELLIOTT

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY GROUP

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Our survey findings show that whilst there has been an increase in engagement on foreign policy issues in the UK in the past 1.5 years, there is still a significant number of Britons uninterested and uninformed on what the UK does internationally. The UK public hold a pragmatic view on the role the UK should take on the world stage. They prioritise a foreign policy led by the UK's economic and strategic interests that puts its own people first, but still see an important role for promoting UK values and multilateralism. However, there is still a reluctance from many to increase the spending to match the ambitions, particularly around diplomacy and international development.

This survey is a continuation and expansion of previous polling done in June 2017, also with BMG Research, and provides an extensive overview of public opinion on UK foreign policy along with a deep-dive case study of the divides in the UK around mobility, geography, and networks and how that shapes Britons' mind-sets. For this study, 1,514 British adults aged 18+ from across the UK were surveyed on a range of foreign policy issues. Results were weighted to reflect the profile of all GB adults aged 18 and above. Targets were Age/Sex (interlocking), Government Office Region (GOR), Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD), 2015 General Election results and the 2016 EU Referendum results. All targets are based on Official Statistics from the ONS that are awarded National Statistics status, as well as the BBC's published election results. Non-response from different demographic groups was taken into account during the fieldwork phase and in the post-fieldwork adjustments. A sample size of 1,514 has a margin of error of +/- 2.5%. Caution should always be taken when interpreting sub-samples, which will be subject to a larger error.

Interest in the UK's International Engagement

- 65% of the British public is interested, to some degree or other, by what the UK does internationally. This is an increase of 7% from when the British public was asked the same question 1.5 years ago.
- 43% of the British public felt informed about UK foreign affairs, an increase of 5% on 1.5 years ago.

The UK's Role in the World

- Over half of Britons view Brexit (56%) as one of the most important international issues facing the UK.
- Immigration (42%), international terrorism (39%) and Climate Change (38%) are also considered important. Issues such as war (16%) (ie. Syria) and territorial disputes (4%) (ie. Gibraltar) are not given as much importance.
- Around a third (33%) of people think that Britain's interests should be driven more by what is in the UK's economic and strategic defence interests.
- Only 14% say it should be driven more by values such as human rights and democracy.
- Nearly 2 in 5 (39%) think that Britain's interests should be driven by an equal balance of the two.
- Over three quarters (76%) of people think that the UK should stay in the United Nations (UN), with other popular organisations include the Commonwealth (73%), the WTO (71%), and NATO (69%). The IMF (59%) and World Bank (54%) are less popular but fewer participants have heard of these organisations and more stated that they didn't know whether the UK should stay or leave.
- The EU has the lowest level of support (46%), with a clear 40% in favour of leaving. Whilst low, it still shows more support for staying than the 2016 referendum on the same question.

- Nearly half (49%) of respondents think that the UK should be seen as a country that puts the interests and welfare of its own people first.
- Roughly 2 in 5 (40%) people think that the UK should be a promoter of free trade.
- Being a leading country in the Commonwealth (31%) is more popular than being a leading country in the EU (24%).
- Also, it seems that people would rather the UK stay out of foreign conflicts (19%) than intervene to resolve them (9%).

Foreign Policy Spending

- The UK currently spends around 2.75% of GDP on its foreign policy. This includes spending on Defence, Diplomacy, International Development (Aid) and Trade.
- Just over a quarter (27%) of people think the UK should spend more on foreign policy whilst just under a quarter (24%) think it should spend less.
- Half (50%) think it should stay the same or they do not know.
- When asked about which aspect of foreign policy the UK should spend the most on, trade (44%) and defence (31%) ranked highly with respondents,
- Diplomacy (16%) and international development (9%) were seen as lower priorities

BACKGROUND

Foreign policy in the UK has not traditionally been heavily shaped by public opinion. Yet one of the results of the vote to leave the European Union was a realisation that this was changing. The British Foreign Policy Group, set up in the wake of the 2016 referendum vote, has been at the forefront of work to build engagement across all of the UK on foreign policy, with its National Engagement Programme running now for 2 years. There has been an understanding of this need and a reaction from areas of Government and Parliament who have followed suit. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) have been increasing their efforts to communicate the work they do to all parts of the UK, and the Foreign Affairs Select Committee have held consultations in several locations across the country. It isn't only the UK that is adapting to this shift, South Korea are building a "participatory diplomacy"ⁱⁱ approach too for example.

Despite much of the surrounding negativity, one of the things Brexit has achieved is to broaden and increase the number of conversations in the UK around foreign policy and how it relates to communities and individual citizens. Declining media coverage of foreign policy issues has been one of the challenges for public engagement over the last few decades and whilst there isn't data currently available, few would argue against the fact that Brexit has gone some way towards reversing this trend.


Aside from the Brexit negotiations, there has been much discussion around 'Global Britain'. About a year ago, many in the policy world were voicing concerns about whether there would be a strategy behind what was initially often seen as little more than a branding exerciseⁱⁱⁱ to "resist any sense that Britain will be less engaged in the world in the next few years". Some progress has since been made to provide some of that substance, including through the development of a UK soft power strategy. Amidst all of this, there are important questions about what UK citizens actually want from the UK's role of the world, and this polling aims to provide some insights.

As this report shows, there is still an appetite for the UK to be a leading global nation, but this is not necessarily matched by willingness to spend more money on it. Yet UK foreign policy faces several challenges on the funding front as it is. The Ministry of Defence is said to have a £7bn black hole in plans for equipment^{iv}, and the FCO has had its relatively tiny budget fairly consistently cut back over past years^v. Without public support for increased spending it becomes harder for these departments to make their case to the Treasury.

We should not expect the public to fully understand all the complexities present in foreign policy, nor should we expect policy makers to follow public opinion to the letter. On the other hand, a healthy engagement between a well-informed public and a government that listens should facilitate more sustainable, effective foreign policy, and a clearer understanding of the choices to be made, including related to resources.

ENGAGEMENT IN THE UK'S INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES

At the core of the BFPG's work is "to promote greater national engagement on foreign policy". National because it covers all of the UK, whilst we define engagement as the combination of active interest and knowledge on UK foreign policy^{vi}.



65 per cent of the British public is interested, to some degree or other, by what the UK does internationally. This is an increase of 7 per cent from when the British public was asked the same question 1.5 years ago, representing a very positive trend. 43 per cent of the British public felt informed^{vii} about UK foreign affairs, a 5 per cent increase on 1.5 years ago.

Levels of Interest

The most plausible reason for the increase in levels of interest is Brexit itself and the consequences it has had on national discussions. People across the UK have been flooded with daily Brexit news stories, on the negotiations themselves, but also the nature of future trade deals and "Global Britain". The public will have had many chances to learn more about our foreign policy – for example we see on another question that the number of people who didn't know about the WTO dropped from 7 per cent to 4 per cent in this 1.5 year period. Such has been the prominence of Brexit in the media though that it is perhaps surprising not to have seen a bigger increase. It could also be argued that the boringness^{viii} and omnipresence of Brexit might have turned people off having an interest in foreign policy because, despite the added attention UK foreign policy has had, 35 per cent of the British public are still not interested.

Levels of Knowledge


The British public has also felt more informed, but this increase has been smaller, and still leaves the same question as to why a bigger number do not feel informed. It is not only those who are uninterested who are uninformed. 22 per cent of the population are interested in what the UK does internationally but do not feel informed. The prevalence of misinformation and the unreliability of 'news', especially online, means that people might hear more about the UK's international affairs, but may not feel like they know more. This could explain in part some of the divergence between interest and knowledge and is a sign that accessible and reliable information on foreign policy is still much needed in the UK.

THE UK'S ROLE IN THE WORLD

There are a number of fundamental questions around the UK's role in the world which the country as a whole has had to revisit in light of the fairly seismic shift in the UK's foreign policy following the vote to leave the European Union. Some of this thinking has already been taking place, including through the BFPG's National Engagement Programme across the country, but the bulk of the decision making on this front is yet to come.

Public opinion around the UK's role in the world is complex, so as well as just asking the public what kind of role people they want to the UK to carry out, we also asked their opinion on 3 additional aspects: key issues, the purpose of UK foreign policy, and support for internationalism.

Key International Issues



Over half of respondents view Brexit^{ix} (56 per cent) as one of the most important international issues. Immigration (42 per cent), international terrorism (39 per cent) and Climate Change (38 per cent) are also considered important – whilst issues such as war (16 per cent) (ie. Syria) and territorial disputes (4 per cent) (ie. Gibraltar) are not given as much importance.

Unsurprisingly, Brexit was seen as one of the most important international issues. However, given both the extensive media coverage and the fact that Brexit covers a range of foreign policy issues, the number of people that picked Brexit as one of their top 3 issues was surprisingly low. Indeed, for 46 per cent of the British public there are more pressing international issues than Brexit. This reinforces the narrative that whilst getting Brexit 'right' remains the UK's foreign policy priority over the coming years, there is significant public support for the UK to focus on other issues too.

Of these issues, immigration, international terrorism, and climate change are the three that stand out as priority issues for 4 in every 10 Brits. Immigration is arguably the most complex of these, not least because the reasons as to why it is seen as a priority vary – some people want to curb immigration, and others want to protect current levels or increase them. The majority of the UK population consistently fails to support increases in immigration from most major economies – even if it is critical to securing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA)^x- yet a quarter of the public will consistently support increase in immigration regardless of the country of origin. In this, immigration differs from climate change and international terrorism, two issues where support is wholly about combatting these issues as opposed to a combination of opposing and supporting them. FTAs, and the potential trade-offs around areas such as immigration, show that there are very real compromises around our future choices. An honest conversation around these need to take place in order to align public opinion and policy.


Public opinion towards international terrorism is more straightforward. 2017 saw a wave of terrorist attacks hit the UK, making it an issue closer to home for many British citizens. Despite this, the latest National Security Capability Review (NSCR) shows that in recent years, there has been “a resurgence in state-based threats”^{xi}, such as from Russia and North Korea, which has become a higher priority than terrorism.

One area where the UK could be potentially doing more in terms of matching policy to public opinion is around climate change. The 2008 Climate Change act “was one of the first comprehensive climate laws adopted globally and became the basis of a sustained international campaign on climate change by the Foreign Office”^{xii}. This has allowed the UK to be a leader on the global stage on climate change but its subsequent failure to meet its own targets^{xiii} will erode this status as well as public support in the UK.

Of the 89 commitments made in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, only one mentions climate change: “We will increase UK climate finance for developing countries by at least 50 per cent, rising to £5.8 billion over five years”. This is not the extent of the UK's work in combatting climate change, where a large part relates to domestic policy, but given that the SDSR is the closest thing the UK currently has to a foreign policy strategy, its relative absence sticks out.

Wars and territorial disputes did not get as much support as the other options given to the respondents. One of the reasons for this could be the relatively low profile and activity of the UK's current deployments, which in part consist of NATO and UN missions, with a range of other training and advisory deployments, notably in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Operation Shader, combatting IS^{xiv}. The relatively low profile and activity of the UK on these fronts might be a reason for this currently featuring lower down on the list of priorities.

Values vs. Interests



Around a third (33 per cent) of people think that Britain's interests should be driven more by what is in the UK's economic and strategic defence interests, with only 14 per cent saying it should be driven more by values such as human rights and democracy. Nearly 2 in 5 (39 per cent) think that Britain's interests should be driven by an equal balance of the two.

One of the ever-present challenges of the UK's foreign policy is whether its primary purpose is to promote the country's values or interests. Whilst both are essential to a successful foreign policy, the degree to which the UK leans one way or the other is often a defining aspect of the country's foreign policy.


In current-day foreign policy terms, an important example that embodies this challenge is the UK's relationship with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia's poor human rights record and military operations in Yemen casts a long shadow over the UK's important economic and security ties with the country^{xv}. Striking the right balance between these different aspects represents one of the UK's current foreign policy challenges.

In 1997, then foreign secretary Robin Cook talked about adding "an ethical dimension" to UK foreign policy, a policy which the 2017 Labour manifesto calls for a "return" to. Yet even Cook was not talking about putting economic and strategic defence interests behind values. Cook listed 4 goals of UK foreign policy in the following order: security, prosperity, quality of life in Britain, and then proceeds to talk about values^{xvi}.

The most popular answer was for an equal balance between the two, but only by 5 per cent more than those who thought that interests should to some degree come first. This might suggest that Government policy, to promote values but not at the expense of the UK's economic and strategic interest, is relatively in line with public opinion on this issue. There are still visible challenges to this approach though, particularly when the affront to UK values is higher, as seen in protests against arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

Ultimately though, 70 per cent of the British public think that values should play a fairly important part of the UK's foreign policy. Whilst a 'values-first' approach may not be a popular option, the British public is on the whole supportive of a foreign policy that consistently considers maintaining and promoting key values in its decisions. This demonstrates a certain pragmatism, a feature that plays an important role in the public view and aspirations for the UK in the world.

Internationalism – Stay or Leave?



Over three quarters (76 per cent) of people think that the UK should stay in the United Nations (UN), with other popular organisations include the Commonwealth (73 per cent), the WTO (71 per cent), and NATO (69 per cent). The IMF (59 per cent) and World Bank (54 per cent) are less popular but fewer participants have heard of these organisations and more stated that they didn't know whether the UK should stay or leave. The EU has the lowest level of support (46 per cent), with a clear 40 per cent in favour of leaving.


Compared with the BFPG and BMG survey carried out in 2017, there has been no significant change in the public's support for the UK's position in international organisations. This would appear to suggest that Britons are still interested in playing a global role, even with the relatively low support for the EU. Even here there hasn't been major changes in the past few years. Attitudes towards wanting to leave the EU have only mildly fluctuated in the past few years, with 49 per cent saying they would vote to leave in 2012, 39 per cent in 2015, and 52 per cent voting to leave in 2016^{xvii}.

International finance and economics organisation such as the IMF and the World Bank are the ones with least support. This doesn't necessarily mean that people want to leave. The World Bank for example only has 12 per cent of the public wanting to leave. An explanation for this is that issues around international finance are extremely complicated, and therefore many people will not be willing to actively commit their support to something they don't quite understand. They do not necessarily view UK membership of these organisations as a bad thing and as a result do not actively want to leave. Results for this question follow a trend where the more people know about the organisation, the more likely they are to support it. There has been little notable change in the last 1.5 years, suggesting that most people's views on international organisations are fairly stable, reflecting the stability of the organisations themselves.

The two organisations with the most support, the UN and the Commonwealth are defined in large part by a charter of values^{xviiiix}. As shown in the previous section, participants are slightly more likely to prioritise economic and strategic defence priorities over UK values. Yet perhaps there is a view that international organisations are marginally better suited to promoting UK values than they might be at promoting UK economic and defence interests. Whilst there is

much more to these organisations than just promoting values internationally, this observation could hint at what aspects of participation in international institutions best help the UK.

UK'S ROLE ON THE WORLD STAGE



With all of the aforementioned data and results in mind, we were able to ask about specific roles on the world stage that citizens might want the UK to have and piece together a broader picture of the reasoning behind this. Nearly half (49 per cent) of respondents think that the UK should be seen as a country that puts the interests and welfare of its own people first. Roughly 2 in 5 (40 per cent) people think that the UK should be a promoter of free trade. Being a leading country in the Commonwealth (31 per cent) is more popular than being a leading country in the EU (24 per cent). Also, it seems that people would rather the UK stay out of foreign conflicts (19 per cent) than intervene to resolve them (9 per cent).

UK citizens see the country's main foreign policy role as something that is there to protect and benefit them directly. When asked to select one priority, a country that puts the interests of its own people first still remained the top option with 40 per cent selecting it as their choice. What this shows is that for most people who view this as a policy priority, it is also the top priority.

However, it is perhaps surprising not to see this number much higher than it currently is. David Goodhart, former Director of Demos previously said:

"I would guess that it remains the common sense assumption of 90 per cent of British citizens that public policy should give preference to the interests of citizens before non-citizens should the two conflict: that does not mean you cannot be an internationalist, or believe that it is a valuable part of our tradition to offer a haven to refugees, or believe that all humans are of equal moral worth and if they are in British space are entitled to certain basic rights. But it does mean that the first call on our resources and sense of obligation begins with our fellow citizens."^{xxx}.

Yet for half the population this is not seen as a priority foreign policy outcome. Indeed, they view the UK's international role as more than a zero-sum game.


Another popular option when people were given 3 options was "a promoter of free trade", but few of them selected it as a top priority issue suggesting that free trade is seen as important, but not the driver of UK's role in the world. It was a similar case for those who had chosen the option of "a leading country in the Commonwealth". Contrary to the role of "putting the interests of its own people first", these issues can be seen to be important to a large percentage of the British public, but not above some of the other roles for the UK in the world.

"A leading country in the EU" is the third most popular choice when participants had to select just one option. Whilst there are still many that view it as a top three but not top one issue, it still fares slightly better than many of the other options on this front suggesting that there is a relatively firm core of staunch support for the UK being a leading country in the EU.

Intervention or non-intervention is not seen as a priority question for the UK's role on the world stage. This is much like the earlier questions around specific issues, where war was not seen as a priority international issue for the UK. Were the UK to find itself facing significant involvement in an armed conflict, these figures could well be higher. Only 6 per cent of people saw either non-intervention (4 per cent) or intervention (2 per cent) as the defining priority for the UK's role in the world.

FOREIGN POLICY SPENDING

Degree of Expenditure




The UK currently spends around 2.75 per cent of GDP on its foreign policy. This includes spending on Defence, Diplomacy, International Development (Aid) and Trade. Just over a quarter (27 per cent) of people think the UK should spend more on foreign policy whilst just under a quarter (24 per cent) think it should spend less. Half (50 per cent) think it should stay the same or they do not know.

It is notoriously hard to measure opinion on spending as it is a difficult topic to fully understand. The numbers and percentages involved often do not mean much in real terms to the public, and indeed are frequently opaque to policy makers themselves. This question grouped the different aspects of UK foreign policy together to use the 2.75 per cent GDP figure in order to slightly simplify this. However, even when using this comprehensive figure, the answers could well have been factoring in opinions on what other aspects of public spending people think we could be cutting or boosting. What this set of data gives us is a balanced picture, suggesting that the British public are, on average, happy with the current spending on foreign policy.

Despite this, there are strong arguments for the UK to be spending more on its foreign policy. This argument is made in the BFPG report, "The Price of Freedom"^{xxi}, which highlights some of the gaps between objectives and capabilities and sets out a target of 3 per cent of GDP for UK spending on foreign policy. This is particularly important post-Brexit as many of the objectives set out by the Government's "Global Britain strategy" will require additional funding to be successfully carried out. Yet the public are not totally convinced of this. Surprisingly, Leave voters were 20 per cent more likely to actively want to cut back on foreign policy spending, and 10 per cent less likely to want to increase spending.

This is another prime example of the need for further conversations around the compromises required. Advocating support for greater internationalism and for the UK to have a prominent role in the world can only go so far if simultaneously public opinion is not supporting increased funding. An informed discussion around what is possible on a low budget and what funding is required for the desired objectives could better match expectations to resources.

Spending Priorities



When asked about which aspects of foreign policy the UK should be spending the most money on, trade (44 per cent) and defence (31 per cent) ranked highly with respondents, whilst most see diplomacy (16 per cent) and international development (9 per cent) as lower priorities^{xxii}.

This is unsurprising given the results of some of the other questions in this polling. If we look back at several of the questions around the UK's role in the world, people prioritised "Economic and defence strategic interests" as well as the idea of "as a country that puts the interests and welfare of its own people first". Defence and Trade are the two areas which can be most easily linked to these two outcomes, with the benefits of diplomacy and international development often harder to quantify, and in the case of international development, also often viewed as primarily helping other countries.

The 0.7 per cent GNI allocation for Aid spending has proven fairly controversial and perhaps as a consequence, international development does not attract as much comparative support. Given the volume of the aid budget and the contrast it has with public opinion on this issue, more of a case needs to be made as to why aid is also delivering key national security and foreign policy objectives. For example, by strengthening tax systems or stabilising conflict overseas the UK can create better conditions for trade, or reduce the threat of terrorism. A public informed on these issues is therefore likely to see some of these values that are perhaps not immediately visible. As the Secretary of State for International Development, Penny Mordaunt, said: *"It's not legislation that protects the 0.7 per cent, it's the attitude and commitment of the British public."*^{xxiii}

In the case of diplomacy and the FCO this data tells an interesting story. Out of the total UK spending on the 4 main areas through which the UK's international interests are promoted – trade, diplomacy, security and international development, the Foreign Office accounts only for 3.5 per cent - pitifully small considering diplomacy remains the principle route to influence in world politics. Whilst it would be unrealistic for it to be the highest funded department of the 4, there is a chronic underfunding of the FCO that needs to be addressed, including in relation to public opinion.

The comparison between the data surrounding the UK's role on the world stage in comparison to spending preferences highlights the wider point that the public is not fully informed or aware of the connections between different parts of UK foreign policy. The FCO network for examples, plays an important role in negotiating the vast majority of FTAs. DfID and in particular the FCO are also the biggest champions for the UK on global political issues such as human rights, with embassies also playing an important role in coordinating and advising on development aid. With only 43 per cent of the public feeling informed on the UK's international role this lack of awareness of how UK foreign policy is formed and delivered is not surprising, but does show how there is space for Government and others to better make the case for spending on areas of foreign policy traditionally less appealing to the public. The BFPG will shortly be publishing a paper which looks at the history of the FCO budget and highlights how a small increase in budget could make a significant difference.

The fact that there was a 44 per cent chance that trade was the highest spending priority for respondents indicates a strong support for spending money on trade. It also may suggest a misconception that somehow trade itself (in addition to trade facilitation and promotion) requires government funding. Overall however these results support the narrative of a country willing to trade internationally despite its departure from the European Union.

CONCLUSION

This survey shows that on the whole there is support for the UK to remain an important international actor. The UK's economic and defence interests remain a priority, but there is support for values to play an important, if not quite equal part. Despite the public supporting an international UK, they did not view policy on intervention or non-intervention as a defining priority of our foreign policy.

Yet on the whole people are not willing to spend more to support these goals. On the one hand people want to continue to be international post Brexit – a 2016 poll by Ipsos MORI showed that 78 per cent of Britons wanted Britain to either keep or increase its role in the world^{xxiv} - but on the other hand public opinion does not support increased funding. Already, the UK can be said to be punching above its weight in the international arena in that it has been outperforming given its resources^{xxv}. For the UK to continue to hold an important international role post-Brexit, we cannot rely on this always being the case and need greater awareness of the value that our foreign policy brings to the UK in order to better make the case for the necessary increase in spending.

Across most of the datasets, there is a strong correlation between interest and knowledge and support for foreign policy objectives and spending. The more engaged (interest + knowledge), the more support. This report shows that ambitions for 'Global Britain' may be thwarted because Government has not invested in educating people about foreign affairs at a time of rising interest. The march for a second EU referendum on March 23rd 2019 was estimated to have had a million people join, the biggest protest since the Stop the War march against the Iraq War in 2003^{xxvi}, giving an idea of the strength of opinion around UK foreign policy at present. This goes to show the value of the work being done on this by the BFPG and other, including efforts to make foreign policy understandable and accessible such as the recent behind-the-scenes documentary shown on the BBC about the work of the FCO "Inside the Foreign Office".

This survey shows that there are also divisions across the UK on public opinion, whether it be geography, gender, age, education, Leave or Remain voters, or voters of different political parties. The different divides in the UK towards these foreign policy opinions will be explored in a series of articles for the BFPG in the coming weeks and addressing these will be an equally important aspect of being able to have a successful post-Brexit foreign policy supported by public opinion.

PART TWO: MOBILITY, NETWORKS AND INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

SOPHIA GASTON

CENTRE FOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RISK

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Our survey findings emphasise the critical role that mobility, geography and networks play in the shaping of Britons' social and political mind-sets, their policy interests and priorities, and their international engagement.

We find consistent disparities between citizens, based on age, geography, socio-economic background and political affiliation, with – broadly – those who are younger, based physically proximate to the European Continent, degree-educated, with higher socio-economic backgrounds, and a tendency to support left-leaning parties, considerably more likely to be mobile, hold multiple identities and enthusiastically embrace the world at large than other citizens. In turn, those who are older, based in Northern towns and cities, without further education, of lower socio-economic backgrounds, and a tendency to support parties on the right of politics, are much more likely to be rooted in communities and less physically mobile, to not hold social networks across borders or see themselves as 'global citizens', and to prioritise immigration as an issue of importance.

Mobility and Networks

- 31% of Britons live in the same town or city where they were born, with those from lower socio-economic backgrounds considerably less likely to have been mobile than those from wealthier demographics.
- 40% of Britons did not travel for leisure at all in 2018. This number rises to 61% of those living in social housing, but falls to just 30 % of those living in higher socio-economic households.
- A quarter of Londoners travel abroad frequently, compared to just 3% in the West Midlands, and 5% of those in the East of England. 46% of Leave voters did not travel at all in 2018, compared to 32% of Remain voters.
- 60% of those who did not travel abroad for leisure in 2018 describe themselves as 'very uninterested' with the UK's international engagement. 44% of non-travellers consider immigration to be one of the UK's most significant international issues, compared to only 6% of those who travel abroad frequently, and 48% believe the country's international spending should be cut, compared to just 7% of those who travel frequently.
- 60% of Britons spoke to friends or family overseas in 2018, and 40% did not – rising to 52% of over-55s, and 47% of Leave voters, compared to just 25% of under-35s, and 35% of Remain voters.
- 52% of residents in the North West and 48% of those in the North East and Yorkshire do not hold international social or familial networks, compared to just 18 % of Londoners.

Identity and Citizenship

Global Citizens

- 44% of Britons see the term 'global citizen' positively, with 12% regarding it negatively and 36% as neutral.
- It is seen positively by 60% of Gen Zs (18-to-24-year-olds), 52% of those from higher socio-economic backgrounds, 61% of those with a degree, 59% of BAME Britons, and 61% of Londoners – compared to just 36% of over-65s, 30% of those from lower socio-economic backgrounds, 38% of the non-degree-educated, 41% of White Britons, and 32 and 33% respectively of those in the North West and Yorkshire and the Humber.
- 68% of Liberal Democrat voters and 56% of Labour voters see 'global citizen' as a positive term, compared to 38% of Conservative voters and just 8% of UKIP voters. While two-thirds of Remain voters (66%) believe 'global citizen' is a positive term, just a quarter (25%) of Leave voters agree.

- The same number of Britons (44%) who see the term positively also identify as 'global citizens'. Around a third of citizens do not see themselves in this way, and a fifth are unsure.
- Those who self-identify as 'global citizens' are more likely to be young, of BAME backgrounds, of higher socio-economic status, and degree-educated. Londoners are almost twice as likely as those in the North to see themselves as global citizens.
- Only 12% of UKIP voters identify as global citizens, compared to 41% of Conservatives and 58% of Labour voters. However, 44% of Conservative voters definitively reject this identity, compared to just a quarter of Labour voters. Only 27% of Leave voters feel they are global citizens, compared to 64% of Remain voters.
- Those who see themselves as global citizens are considerably more interested in climate change (58% to 25%), the threat of global wars (52% to 27%) and humanitarian crises (59% to 18%) than other Britons, who are much more likely to see immigration as their priority concern (47% to 29%).

Patriotism

- Over half (56%) of Britons identify as 'patriots', although a not-insubstantial 27% of the population do not see themselves as such.
- 78% of those aged over-65 describe themselves as patriots, compared to just a third of those aged 18-to-24.
- Patriotism is one of the few identity markers that does not elicit any stark division between socio-economic groups, with those in both high- and low-socio-economic households fairly evenly split. 66% of White Britons describe themselves as patriots, compared to 58% of BAME Britons.
- Londoners are one of the most patriotic groups in the country: 59% describe themselves as patriots, behind only those from the South East (62%) and South West (61%).
- 82% of UKIP voters and 78% of Conservative voters call themselves patriots, compared to just over half (53%) of Labour voters and Liberal Democrats (51%). Of all the parties, SNP supporters are the least likely to see themselves as patriots (36%), and those who do not vote in elections are the least patriotic overall (29%).
- Three-quarters (75%) of Leave voters identify as patriots, compared to around half (54%) of Remain voters.
- Around 60% of those who see themselves as global citizens also see themselves as patriots, and 60% of those who see themselves as patriots do not see themselves as global citizens. As such, these terminologies must be seen as neither inherently symbiotic nor mutually exclusive.

European Identity

- 49% of Britons see themselves as European, and 41% do not. The strength of feeling is stronger on this identity question, with only 10% of citizens unsure.
- Those from higher socio-economic groups (56%), with higher incomes (59%), and with degrees (63%), are more likely to see themselves as European than those from lower socio-economic groups (38%), lower incomes (43%), or without degrees (42%). More than three-quarters of those who see themselves as 'global citizens' also identify as European.
- 58% of Londoners see themselves as European, compared to 40% of residents in the West Midlands and 41% of those in the South West.
- 74% of Liberal Democrats and 64% of Labour voters hold a European identity, compared to 42% of Conservatives, and 24% of UKIP voters. Predictable distinctions can be observed between Leave and Remain voters, with 73% of Remain voters subscribing to a European identity, compared to just 29% of Leave voters.

Commonwealth Identity

- Half (50%) of Britons consider themselves to be Commonwealth citizens, a third (33%) do not, and 17% are unsure.
- As opposed to other international identities, just 39% of 25-to-34-year-olds and 35% of 35-to-44-year-olds hold Commonwealth identities, compared to two-thirds (66%) of over-65s.

- 53% of White Britons see themselves as part of the Commonwealth, compared to 33% of BAME Britons.
- Conservative voters stand distinct in their high levels of support for the Commonwealth, with more than two-thirds (67%) believing they are Commonwealth citizens, compared to 53% of Labour voters, and 43% of UKIP voters. Leave and Remain voters in the EU Referendum are almost evenly split at 59% of 57% respectively.

Identity and Allegiances

- When asked, if ‘people move from another country where they were born and come to live/work in the UK on a permanent basis’, how they should be expected to conceive their national identity, 10% of Britons believe they should feel ‘exclusively British’, and a further 11% felt they should feel ‘more British than the nationality of the country of their birth’ – meaning around a fifth of Britons favour a degree of identity assimilation.
- Older Britons, Conservative voters and UKIP voters are the most likely to support migrants holding an exclusive British identity, as are those who do not see themselves as ‘European’ or as ‘global citizens’.
- The largest proportion of support across the country falls behind the notion of a split, even sense of allegiance between Britain and their country of birth, with 34 % of citizens expressing this preference.
- It is clear that there is a specific sub-set of the population who favour the notion that migrants should retain an exclusive sense of identity with their original nationality. These Britons tend to be non-degree-educated, from a lower socio-economic group, from a White British background, and Leave voters – perhaps reflecting a certain exclusionary view of migrants’ fundamental capacity to assimilate or to become ‘truly British’.
- When asked about the ‘Tebbit Test’ of whether Britons born in other countries should or should not bear any specific national allegiance to their country of birth during sporting events, half of Britons (49 %) make clear that the issue is of no importance to them. A further 18 percent expect them to support both equally, 14% believe they should solely support the British team or athlete, and 12% expect that their place of birth should retain their sporting allegiance.

Conclusion

Overall, we conclude that policy-makers must be attuned to the significant demographic and geographic distinctions in attitudes towards both citizens’ and the nation’s role in the world, and caution that it will be difficult to conjure a greater degree of support for a more globalised Britain without vastly extending opportunities for international engagement across a wider range of communities

INTRODUCTION

The social and political significance of Britain’s geography is well recognised. The issue of proximity feels especially pertinent in a country that is one of the most highly centralised in the developed world^{xxvii}, in terms of its hyper-concentration of economic, cultural and political power. ‘Westminster’, for example, is used freely throughout the country as a pejorative term, to denounce an intransigent and remote ruling class. The research field of political geography^{xxviii} emphasises the critical role that an individual’s place of birth can play in their life circumstances, and particularly the interactions between place, economic success, and inter-generational mobility^{xxix}.

It is also clear that there are geographical dimensions to the disparities in political engagement and trust across the British population, with profound consequences for the nation’s democracy^{xxx}. Moreover, that place plays a critical function in the formation of identities beyond the local domain, extending towards an individual’s conception of the nation and their own attachment and allegiances^{xxxi}.

Successive UK governments have sought to address these geographic disparities through a range of well-intentioned but deeply unevenly realised initiatives – whether it be the Blair Government’s National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal^{xxxii} in the Noughties, or former Chancellor George Osborne’s ‘Northern Powerhouse’ in 2014^{xxxiii}. There is

evidence to suggest that geography had become an even more important identity marker than many traditional social dividing lines in advance of the European Referendum in 2016^{xxxiv}. However, it was the shocking outcome it produced – fought so clearly across tremendous disparities of economic circumstance across towns, cities and regions – that has rendered the issue of geography so political consequential.

This paper seeks to extend understanding of identity, citizenship and belonging in contemporary Britain, to explore its intersection with international engagement, global mobility, and immigration. As Britain seeks to forge a bold new future outside of its regional neighbourhood, these questions become increasingly critical to the nation's sense of cohesion and confidence.

The paper begins by examining the social and political implications of individual, physical mobility within and outside of the UK, as well as the depth and breadth of social and familial networks, and citizens' interactions with other cultures and their languages. In doing so, it considers the impact that exposure to international opportunities and connections plays in shaping Britons' world views, particularly in the context of the 'open vs. closed' debates that have played such a critical role in academic and media analysis since the Referendum.

The paper then moves to assess citizens' receptiveness and attitudes towards a range of different identities carrying international dimensions – namely, whether Britons consider themselves to be 'global citizens', 'European', 'Commonwealth citizens', or 'patriots'. Moreover, it identifies the demographic, geographic and social characteristics associated with the adoption or rejection of these identities, and the positive and negative correlations between them.

Finally, the paper explores public opinion at the complex intersection between identity and citizenship, soliciting citizens' views on the controversial question of migrants' assimilation, national pride and belonging. The survey compels respondents to express their expectations for the country's foreign-born population, in terms of their national identities and even – evoking the infamous 'Tebbit Test' – their sporting allegiances.

MOBILITY, NETWORKS AND INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ROOTEDNESS

Our survey finds that 31 per cent of Brits live in the same town or city of their birth, with a further 32 per cent living within a two-hour commute from their place of birth. Those from a lower socio-economic group (ie. C2DE) are substantially less likely to have been mobile, at 39 per cent, compared to 27 per cent of those in the ABC1 category. The gap lengthens to 14 percentage points between those with and without degrees.

Regional differences are also significant – 43 per cent of those in the North West of England, and 42 per cent of those in Scotland live in the same area of their birth, compared to just 13 per cent of those in the South East of England.

The findings of our survey comport with existing literature on inter-regional and national mobility within the UK. For example, a survey conducted in 2017^{xxxv} found that Britons, on average, now live around 100 miles from the place where they were born – a dramatic increase over the course of a generation. Employment opportunities and quality of life were found to be the biggest drivers of internal migration within the UK, with those who have stayed immobile largely motivated to remain close their family or to preserve the 'connection' they hold with their place of birth.


Research conducted by the Centre for Cities, also in 2017, found that the drivers of choice around where to live differ considerably between the generations, with young people motivated by leisure facilities, culture, transport and jobs – all found in cities – and older Britons favouring the countryside and a sense of space^{xxxvi}.

A survey conducted by Pew Research Center in 2008 found the overall dynamics of mobility, geography and demographics are broadly similar to those operating within the United States^{xxxvii}. A relatively high degree of movement is embedded within the younger, educated generations, while a still-sizeable group of citizens remains fixed in their place of birth. As in our survey, there are clear distinctions to be observed between socio-economic groups, with those holding tertiary education degrees considerably more likely to have been mobile than those without.

It is clear that there is also a geographic dimension to Britain’s political economy, with distinct patterns of behaviour to be observed between different voting groups. For example, 35 per cent of Labour voters live where they were born, compared to 26 per cent of Conservatives. Moreover, only 14 per cent of non-voters live more than two hours’ drive from their place of birth, less than half (31 per cent) of the percentage of Conservative voters. Turning to voting behaviour in the 2016 EU Referendum, we can see that Leave voters are five percentage points (33 per cent) more likely than Remain voters (28 per cent) to have continued to live in their place of birth.

Two other previous studies of mobility and voting behaviour, particularly with regards to the European Referendum, offer worthy points of comparison. In 2016, Demos’ research into the network effects behind voting behaviour found those with social networks spread outside of their own community, who had experienced physical mobility in their lifetimes and travelled abroad in the previous 12 months, were considerably less likely to have voted Leave – even when controlling for a host of other demographic factors^{xxxviii}. Similarly, Lee et. al’s analysis (2018)^{xxxix} of the Understanding Survey data-set found that, even controlling for a range of demographic, psychological and cognitive characteristics and abilities, those living in their county of birth at the time of the Referendum were seven percentage points more likely to favour a Leave vote. This tendency was especially pronounced in those areas that had undergone wage depreciation and with noticeable increases in the non-White British population.

Distinctions can also be observed in our survey results in the issues of the UK’s international engagement that are important to citizens, depending on their lifetime mobility patterns. In particular, immigration is considered the most important issue for 35 per cent of those who continue to live where they were born, compared to 22 per cent of those who have moved more than two hours’ drive away during their lifetime. The same phenomenon can be observed on the issue of international trade – deemed a priority for 35 per cent of ‘rooted’ citizens and only 25 per cent of ‘mobile’ citizens.



By contrast, those who have moved away from their place of birth are considerably more likely to cite humanitarian issues as their primary concern in UK foreign policy (31 per cent), compared to those who have not (24 per cent). Overall, those who have not been mobile in their lifetimes are more inclined to support cuts to the UK's spending on international issues (37 per cent) than those who have moved (27 per cent).


Sociologically, David Goodhart's provocative and timely 2016 tome, *The Road to Nowhere*^{xi}, employed this framing of rootedness and mobility to emphasise the increasingly polarised distinctions between two principal groups, which he rather controversially termed 'Somewheres' and 'Anywheres'. It was a trend that Stephen Shakespeare of polling firm YouGov had identified in 2005, describing a burgeoning chasm emerging in British society between those who favoured 'drawbridge up' and 'drawbridge down' mentalities^{xii}, and which former Prime Minister Tony Blair had reflected on two years later as a 'dividing line' between open and closed mind-sets^{xiii}.

Analysis by Jonathan Wheatley has found that the traditional 'capital vs. labour' dichotomy of 20th Century political conflict has been superseded by a form of cultural conflict, which is heavily informed by social background and status than economic security. Wheatley finds that age, education and – crucially – physical proximity to London, Britain's global hub, are "very strong determinants" of an individual's positioning on this axis^{xiiii}.

Political events over recent years have called into question the future direction of government policy around globalisation – an economic and political ideology that favours connectivity and challenges geographic rootedness. Nonetheless, the doctrine of mobility and internationalism that it has promoted has clearly found success amongst certain segments of the population. These findings emphasise the role that these issues have come to play in defining Britain's contemporary social groupings and suggest the practical political consequences this could hold for the country's international policy-making.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GLOBAL MOBILITY

A significant figure from this survey is the finding that almost 40 per cent of Britons did not travel abroad for holidays and other leisure activities at all in 2018. This figure rises to 61 per cent of those living in social housing, and 53 per cent of those with lower socio-economic backgrounds – compared to only 30 per cent of those in higher socio-economic households. Similarly, 46 per cent of those without a degree did not travel for leisure, compared to just 27 per cent of the degree-educated.



There are a number of factors that would have contributed to the decision-making of the financially conscious in 2018, including the record-breaking heat wave in the UK and the falling international value of the Sterling currency, following the vote for Brexit. Data from the Office of National Statistics suggests that UK visits to Europe were down two per cent in 2018, compared to the previous year^{xliv}. Nonetheless, these trends align with a large evidence base regarding the tendency of those in lower socio-economic groups, and living in lower socio-economic areas, to have considerably less time to spend undertaking leisure activities than those from higher socio-economic groups^{xlv}.

Age is also an important determinant of mobility. Britain’s youth are significantly more inclined to be frequently mobile than their older counterparts, with those aged between 18 and 34 twice as likely (15 per cent) to have travelled abroad for holidays more than five times in the past year than older Britons.

Ethnicity also plays a considerable role in this question. Those with BAME backgrounds, and therefore likely to have family living abroad, were much more likely to have travelled. Only 17 per cent of BAME individuals did not travel for leisure in 2018, compared to 43 per cent of White British.

Londoners are clearly the most mobile Britons, with a quarter of the capital’s residents having travelled frequently for leisure, compared to five per cent in the East of England, and just three per cent of those in the West Midlands. Almost half (47 per cent) of those in the East of England did not travel for leisure at all, compared to just 17 per cent of Londoners – a 30 percentage point difference.

Turning to party affiliations, Liberal Democrat voters were the most mobile in 2018, with 17 per cent having travelled frequently, compared to only seven per cent of Conservatives and 10 per cent of Labour voters. 56 per cent of UKIP voters did not holiday abroad at all.

Given the significance of the ‘open’ vs. ‘closed’ narrative that has framed much scholarly analysis of the 2016 Referendum result, it is important to note that 46 per cent of Leave voters did not travel for leisure at all in 2018, compared to 32 per cent of Remain voters – a 14 percentage point difference.

These findings are similarly reflected on the question of international work travel – undertaken by 16 per cent of the population. Broadly, those who travelled for work in 2018 tended to be wealthier, male, degreed-educated, and from

more culturally diverse backgrounds. London was also vastly over-represented, with more than a third of the adult population having travelled overseas for work last year.

Our survey shows that the UK's domestic travel patterns are significantly less exposed to inequalities than international travel, with a much higher proportion of lower socio-economic citizens visiting other cities throughout the country for leisure and holidays. That said, almost twice as many Britons in low socio-economic households (22 per cent) did not travel outside of their own town or city at all throughout 2018 than those from wealthier backgrounds (12 per cent). In contrast to international travel, Conservative voters were most likely to have travelled within the UK for leisure, with SNP and UKIP voters the least likely. Overall, the English travelled considerably more than the Scottish, with those from Yorkshire and the East Midlands the most frequent travellers within the UK.

As with the lifetime mobility patterns explored above, international travel also appears to play a significant role in shaping citizens' broader sense of involvement with, and curiosity towards, the world at large. 60 per cent of those who did not travel abroad for leisure in 2018 describe themselves as 'very uninterested' with the UK's international engagement. By contrast, those who travelled the most either tended to describe themselves as 'very' or 'fairly' interested in the UK's role in the world.

International travel also appears to be consequential in shaping citizens' tendency to rank certain issues as important. 44 per cent of those who did not holiday abroad last year consider immigration to be one of the UK's most significant international issues, compared to only six per cent of those who travelled abroad frequently – a tremendous gap of 38 percentage points. In a similar vein, 48 per cent of those who did not travel internationally believe the country's international spending should be cut, compared to just seven per cent of those who travelled frequently.


The differences in world views and priorities between mobile and less mobile groups of citizens suggest there is some level of conditioning influence inherent in the act itself. Oishi (2010)^{xlvi} has suggested that mobility imposes a degree of flexibility on the mind, which can challenge received wisdoms and fixed mentalities. These findings suggest that mobility plays a role in shaping not only citizens' lived experiences, but the issues and values they develop throughout the course of their lives, and their relationship to the nation and the world at large.

It is also true that the characteristics that determine citizens' likelihood to fall into either group – namely, their socio-economic circumstances – will undoubtedly play a role in also shaping these perspectives. This reflects the argument Slater (2013) has made regarding the tendency within the field of neighbour effects research to focus on the impact of place on citizens' life chances, rather than exploring how citizens' life chances affect their choices and decisions around place^{xlvii}.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NETWORKS

As with international travel, we can see that international engagement in terms of social and familial relations does play a role in shaping public opinion on global issues. Overall, almost 60 per cent of Britons were in contact with a friend or relative living overseas in 2018, whether via phone, email or social media. Of these, a third of the population made contact on more than five occasions, rising to 41 per cent amongst Millennials (25 to 34-year-olds). By contrast, around 40 per cent of Britons did not speak with any friends or relatives overseas, including 52 per cent of Baby Boomers (55 to 64-year olds).

Some socio-economic disparities can be observed. 64 per cent of those in higher-income households (ABC1) were in contact with friends or relatives overseas, compared to 58 per cent of those in lower-income households (C2DE). Those with higher socio-economic backgrounds and the degree-educated were more likely to make frequent contact than other Britons – with 45 per cent of those with a degree making international contact on more than five occasions, compared to just a quarter of those without.



Nonetheless, one of the most significant demographic factors in the expansiveness of networks is ethnicity. 45 per cent of White Britons did not speak with any friends or relatives overseas in 2018, compared to only 12 per cent of those with BAME backgrounds, presumably making contact with their familial and social networks.

Geography is also crucial. 52 per cent of those in the North West, and 48 per cent of those in the North East and Yorkshire, made no contact with relatives and friends living overseas – compared to just 18 per cent of Londoners.

Turning to politics, some differences can be observed with regards to the relationship between European Referendum voting behaviour and international networks: almost half (47 per cent) of Leave voters do not hold international social networks, compared to around a third (35 per cent) of Remain voters.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, those with friends or relatives overseas – and therefore, who hold a stake in the stability, prosperity and security of other countries – are considerably more likely to describe themselves as interested in the UK’s international affairs, with two-thirds (66 per cent) of the globally connected interested, compared to just a third (34 per cent) of those who don’t hold international social networks. Once again, those without international connections are much more likely to cite immigration as a critical concern, and those with international connections are more likely to prioritise humanitarian issues and climate change.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LANGUAGE


During 2018, 46 per cent of Britons watched at least one film in another language – whether with or without subtitles – and 49 per cent only watched films in their native tongue. There is a strong education divide in play, with 60 per cent of those with a degree having watched an international film, while 60 per cent of those without a degree did not watch international films.

White British respondents were considerably more likely (55 per cent) to have only watched films in English than their BAME counterparts (22 per cent) were to have only watched films in their native tongue.

In terms of political affiliations, 57 per cent of Conservative voters did not watch any international films, compared to 39 per cent of Labour voters. This gap widens even further when considering past votes in the European Referendum: 62 per cent of Leave voters only watched monolingual films, compared to 39 per cent of Remain voters.

Once again, London is shown to be an outlier to the rest of England, with only a quarter of residents not having watched an international film, compared to more than half of citizens in all other areas of the country.

INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES



GLOBAL CITIZENS – A POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE TERM?

The term 'global citizen' has become especially politicised in the United Kingdom in the wake of the Referendum, however it also carries a long and complex history. Theresa May's now-infamous Conservative Party Conference speech in October 2016, in which she set out a vision for the country that emphasised a form of rootedness in opposition to 'citizens of nowhere', tapped into a fault-line in British society between those who saw globalisation as a liberating or destabilising force.

“... today, too many people in positions of power behave as though they have more in common with international elites than with the people down the road, the people they employ, the people they pass in the street.

But if you believe you're a citizen of the world, you're a citizen of nowhere. You don't understand what the very word 'citizenship' means.”

The use of this terminology at the time was the subject of some debate, due to the sensitive relationship between historical political conceptions of 'global citizens' and 'cosmopolitans' as an external, 'other' group distinct from the 'rooted' native population. In particular, the employment of this language as an anti-Semitic trope by fascist and nationalist forces during the 20th Century; for example, during the 1940s and 1950s, Soviet propaganda condemned the 'rootless cosmopolitanism' of the Jews^{xlviii}, extending Adolf Hitler's 1933 denouncement of Germany's Jewish population as a "rootless, international clique"^{xlix}.

As a form of identity, 'cosmopolitanism' carries ethical dimensions; as Erskine (2002) has suggested, it implies that "moral commitments extend beyond political borders as well as ethnic, ideological, socioeconomic and religious divides"^l. It is also highly related to the Enlightenment period, with Immanuel Kant positioning 'global citizenship' as a pathway to peace through universality^{li}. Critics of cosmopolitanism and globalism have tended to emphasise the importance of community, nationality and patriotism in both the construction of the individual and the citizenship. Philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre has connected 'rootless cosmopolitanism' and the aspiration to 'be at home anywhere' as having bred a new generation of 'citizens of nowhere'^{lii} – seen in fundamental opposition to the cultivation of a cohesive, engaged polity.

In our survey, the term 'global citizen' is in fact seen positively by 44 per cent of Britons, negatively by 12 per cent, and regarded as neutral by 36 per cent. Men are more likely to have firm positions either way than women, who are more inclined to see it as neutral or to be unsure about its meaning.

Dramatic distinctions can be observed by age and socio-economic status. The young are considerably more likely to regard the term 'global citizen' in a positive light, with 60 per cent of Gen Z (18 to 24-year-olds) seeing it favourably, compared to just 36 per cent of over-65s.

Similarly, 52 per cent of those with wealthier backgrounds see the term positively, compared to just 30 per cent of those from lower socio-economic households. The gap in opinion between those with and without a degree is also considerable, at 61 per cent to 38 per cent.

The term also carries more positive resonance amongst BAME Britons (59 per cent) than the White British (41 per cent), who are also three times as likely to regard 'global citizen' as a fundamentally negative concept.


61 per cent of Londoners support the idea of being a 'global citizen' – almost twice the percentage of those in the North West (32 per cent) and Yorkshire and the Humber (33 per cent).

Distinctions in attitudes are evident between Liberal Democrat voters (68 per cent positive), Labour voters (56 per cent positive) and Conservative voters (38 per cent positive). Just eight per cent of UKIP voters see the term in a positive light. The responses to this question also provide one of the most polarising dynamics around the country's Leave-Remain divide. While two-thirds of Remain voters (66 per cent) believe 'global citizen' is a positive term, just a quarter (25 per cent) of Leave voters agree, with almost as many Leavers (20 per cent) regarding the term as distinctly negative.

GLOBAL CITIZENS – PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION

Despite the contested nature of the term, 44 per cent of Britons also claim to personally regard themselves as 'global citizens'. Around a third of citizens do not see themselves in this way, and a fifth are unsure.

The young are significantly more likely to subscribe to this terminology – with around 60 per cent of 18-to-24-year-olds and 54 per cent of 25-to-24-year-olds seeing themselves as global citizens, compared to 36 per cent of over-55s.




Again, men are more likely to hold strong views either way – and are eight percentage points more inclined to either emphatically see themselves as global citizens, or to reject the term. Those with BAME backgrounds are also more likely to identify as global citizens than the White British (65 per cent to 40 per cent), although a similar proportion of both groups are unsure.

Substantial distinctions can be observed between social classes, with those in the ABC1 demographic (high socio-economic status) 18 percentage points (51 per cent) more likely to describe themselves as global citizens, compared to those in the C2DE group (33 per cent) of lower socio-economic status. The gap widens further when education is considered: 60 per cent of the degree-educated consider themselves global citizens, compared to 36 per cent of non-degree-educated Britons.

Londoners are most amenable to being global citizens, with 60 per cent of its residents considering themselves as such, compared to just 34 per cent of those in the North West and 36 per cent in the North East. The capital's geographic proximity to the continent may well play a role in cultivating this sense of connectivity to the world at large.

The term clearly carries some weight in terms of personal political identity. UKIP voters are the most inclined to reject the term, at 64 per cent, with only 12 per cent seeing themselves as global citizens. Of the two major parties, Labour votes are more likely to subscribe to this term (58 per cent) than Conservative voters (41 per cent), but the starker differences can be seen amongst those who definitively reject the term. 44 per cent of Conservative voters are clear they do not see themselves as global citizens, compared to just a quarter of Labour voters.

Dramatic gaps are also evident between Leave and Remain voters. Just 27 per cent of Leave voters see themselves as global citizens, compared to 64 per cent of Remain voters. Similarly, 52 per cent of Leave voters reject the term, compared to just 21 per cent of Remain voters. Remain voters are also more likely to be certain of their views on the term, with 15 per cent unsure compared to more than a fifth (22 per cent) of Leave voters.



Those who do see themselves as global citizens are also significantly more likely to be interested in the country’s international engagement (53 per cent, compared to 32 per cent of those who don’t). They are also considerably more interested in climate change (58 per cent to 25 per cent), the threat of global wars (52 per cent to 27 per cent) and humanitarian crises (59 per cent to 18 per cent) than other Britons, who are much more likely to see immigration as their priority concern (47 per cent to 29 per cent).

It is clear that the notion of ‘global citizenship’ represents more than simply a sense of self-determined identity, and rather captures something more substantial about an individual’s holistic world view. For example, exploring the relationship between ‘global citizenship’ and youth, Lilley et al. (2017) emphasise that, “being and becoming a global citizen is more than a technical efficiency; it involves a process of thinking differently”^{liii}.

In considering the construction of this form of identity, the dramatic shifts taking place in the construction of the public sphere in the digital age must also be acknowledged. Banaji and Cammaerts (2015) have found that demographic and geographic factors play a strong role in determining an individual’s engagement with politics and the media, ergo their perception of their civic and political identity – crucial to their lived experiences of citizenship^{liv}.

There is a practical dimension to the term ‘global citizen’: those who travel abroad frequently are more than twice as likely to see themselves in this light as those who do not travel at all, at 64 per cent to 30 per cent. Physical proximity to London, and London’s physical proximity to the Continent, plainly contributes to self-perceptions of international connectivity and belonging – as does socio-economic status and the privileges that it can offer to access international opportunities and experiences.

In many ways, we can therefore regard the absorption and adoption of this terminology as a form of identity as an intrinsic process, compelling an extrinsic response to citizens’ social and political behaviour.

PATRIOTISM – PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION

Similar to the identity of ‘global citizenship’, patriotic identity is constructed through both personal and environmental circumstances. Research has shown that patriotism and national pride are significantly shaped by an individual’s interpretation of contemporary social and political events – namely, “when people find themselves in political and social contexts that are rewarding and reinforcing given their own traits, values and civic orientations, they feel greater pride in the country where they live”^{lv}.

The extent to which an individual feels patriotic, and the nature of that patriotism, is also influenced by their civic participation. Those who practice what has been described as ‘blind patriotism’ – taking an uncritical view of the nation with a degree of zealotry – tend to exhibit distinct, considerably weaker patterns of social and civic participation to those who hold ‘constructive patriotism’^{lvi}. Nonetheless, patriotism is a complex, multi-dimensional concept, informed by a wide range of individual, societal and historical factors. In general, citizens in advanced economies tend to be less overtly patriotic than those in the developing world^{lvii}.

The topic of patriotism has again come to play a more decisive role in the UK’s political culture in recent years, particularly during the European Referendum campaign and in the debates the result has inspired regarding the fate of liberalism and globalism in an insecure age. A broader international conversation has also emerged in the West in light of the accelerating prominence of populist nationalist movements, which has positioned patriotism as either a force against nationalism – depicted as dangerous in its exclusionary tendencies – or as a related condition towards which some degree of hesitancy is also warranted^{lviii}.

While scholars have recognised that “identification with one’s nation is vital for a healthy democracy”^{lix}, the known relationships between nationalism and undemocratic preferences and behaviour^{lx}, combined with the fluidity between these two distinct but connected forms of identity, has undoubtedly contributed to politicians’ equivocation towards outwards efforts to foster a greater degree of patriotism.

Nonetheless, it is impossible to separate our understanding of the utility of the nation state from the citizenship and patriotism that underpins its foundations and boundaries. While recognising the muddled borders between historical expressions of patriotism and nationalism, William Galston nonetheless describes patriotism as “a necessary virtue” – critical to the formation of morally productive political communities^{lxi}. Similarly, philosopher Martha Nussbaum has argued that patriotism can be instrumental to community-building, critical not only to the health of the nation but also to its capacity to enact global justice. “A nation that pursues goals that require sacrifice of self-interest,” Nussbaum writes, “needs to be able to appeal to patriotism, in ways that draw on symbol and rhetoric, emotional memory and history”^{lxii}.

Patriotism is an especially complicated issue in the United Kingdom, being a union of nations, each also containing their own unique regional identities. Forms of patriotic expression, such as flying national flags, also carry a degree of emotional and symbolic weight – especially the St George’s flag in England, which became associated with an anti-social form of nationalism during the height of the football hooligan and street protest movements in the 1990s^{lxiii}.

While surveys find a majority of Britons regard the respective national and union flags as a benign symbol of patriotism, between a fifth and a quarter of the population vehemently rejects the flying of these flags as nationalist or uncouth^{lxiv}. Focus groups throughout England have made clear that many citizens, particularly those in older generations and in lower socio-economic groups, feel a degree of repression around their curtailed freedom of patriotic expression^{lxv}.

The complexity of national identities in the UK means that surveys regarding patriotism carry an especially ambiguous dimension: it is unclear as to whether, for example, an English respondent is exerting his patriotism as associated with England, or the United Kingdom. While these identities are concurrently held by around a third of the population^{lxvi}, and it is not unreasonable to assume that patriotism can manifest simultaneously between them, it is also true that long-term longitudinal studies suggest that there is a degree of dynamic movement within the population that is heavily

influenced by political events and broader levels of satisfaction with the union as a political construct^{lxvii}. As such, it is important to consider these results within the context of a changeable environment and carrying a high degree of subjectivity.

Our survey asked Britons whether they consider themselves to be 'patriots', and ultimately found that it is largely considered to be a benign concept. Over half (56 per cent) of citizens identify with this term, although a not-insubstantial 27 per cent of the population do not see themselves as such.

One of the most dramatic divides on this question appears to be age: 78 per cent of those aged over-65 describe themselves as patriots, compared to just a third of those 18-to-24. As in many of the other questions, women are also two and a half times more likely to be unsure about their opinion on this subject, with a quarter of women reserving judgement, compared to just 10 per cent of men.


These findings comport with other previous surveys, demonstrating a waning degree of self-identification with overt expressions of patriotism between generational groups. Researchers have previously also found that Britons tend to be considerably less patriotic than their American counterparts, but significantly more so than some of their European neighbours – particularly those in which historical events, and particularly the legacy of nationalist and/or fascist movements, continues to weigh heavily on citizens' minds^{lxviii}.

Interestingly, this question of patriotism in our survey is one of the few that does not elicit any stark division between socio-economic groups, with those in both high- and low-status households fairly evenly split. That said, those with incomes of greater than £60,000-a-year are 10 percentage points more likely to see themselves as patriots than the broader population.


Patriotism does appear to be affected to some degree by ethnic background, although the distinctions are relatively small compared to the differences between age cohorts. Those with White British backgrounds are eight percentage points more likely to see themselves as patriots – at 66 per cent, compared to 58 per cent of BAME Britons.

Despite their heightened tendency to see themselves as global citizens and to be the most internationally engaged of all Britons, Londoners are also one of the most patriotic groups in the country. 59 per cent of Londoners describe themselves as patriots, behind only those from the South East (62 per cent) and South West (61 per cent). Aside from the Scottish (47 per cent) and the Welsh (48 per cent), the least overtly patriotic Englanders are those living in the North East, at 48 per cent. This may reflect on the geography of political engagement and of citizens' uneven sense of engagement and representation in contemporary political processes. In the case of Scotland and Wales, we can see the complexity of multi-faceted national identities coming into play in this question, with 'patriotism' seen as inferring a patriotism to the United Kingdom or Great Britain, which may supersede national – and more closely felt – identities of national pride in the devolved nations.

Major differences are also evident based on party affiliations. 82 per cent of UKIP voters and 78 per cent of Conservative voters regard themselves as patriots, compared to just over half (53 per cent) of Labour voters and Liberal Democrats (51 per cent). Of all the parties, SNP supporters were the least likely to see themselves as patriots (36 per cent), and those who do not vote in elections were the least patriotic overall (29 per cent).



Three-quarters of Leave voters describe themselves as patriots, compared to just over half (54 per cent) of Remain voters. Britons who believe they are patriotic are more likely to care about almost all international issues than those who do not, however the issues that concern them are distinct from the responses observed in other questions where high degrees of interest are also in play. In particular, they appear to be especially concerned about immigration (61 per cent), Brexit (59 per cent), international crime (63 per cent), and terrorism (66 per cent). Similarly, those who do not see themselves as patriots are more likely to be concerned with the issues that disproportionately interest those who are more internationally connected; namely, climate change, humanitarian crises and global wars.




Interestingly, the percentage of those who see themselves as 'global citizens' and 'patriots' is almost evenly split with those who do not – roughly, 60 per cent of those who see themselves as global citizens see themselves as patriots, and the same percentage of those who see themselves as patriots do not see themselves as global citizens. As such, these terminologies must be seen as neither inherently symbiotic nor mutually exclusive.

EUROPEAN – PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION

Some three years following the EU Referendum campaign, the country is distinctly divided on the question of European identity. Overall, 49 per cent of Britons see themselves as European, with 41 per cent rejecting this identity. The strength of feeling behind this issue appears to be considerably higher, with only 10 per cent of citizens unsure either way.

Again, distinctions can be observed between age groups, although they are less dramatic than for some other questions. 67 per cent of 18-to-24-year-olds see themselves as European, compared to 41 per cent of 55-to-64-year olds and 46 per cent of over-65s. While the percentage of men and women rejecting a European identity is similar, there is a large gap of around 10 percentage points between the genders amongst those who do see themselves as European, with 54 per cent of men and 45 per cent of women identifying as such.




Those from higher socio-economic classes (56 to 38 per cent), with higher incomes (59 to 43 per cent), and with degrees (63 to 42 per cent), are considerably more likely to see themselves as European than other citizens. More than three-quarters of those who see themselves as 'global citizens' also identify as European.

The White British are less likely (47 per cent) to see themselves as European than those from minority backgrounds (62 per cent) – perhaps reflecting the fact that some of these citizens may indeed be 'European' by birth-right citizenship. It is also appears to be the case that there is something particular about European identity that is rejected by some groups of citizens who hold strong White British identities. Previous research focused on the South Asian communities in Britain, for example, found that European identity could be held in conjunction with British and other national identities, whereas the strong expression of national identity amongst the White British tended to be negatively correlated with European identity^{lxix}.

At 58 per cent, Londoners are the most likely to subscribe to a European identity. At 40 per cent and 41 per cent respectively, residents in the West Midlands and South West are the least inclined to identify as such.

42 per cent of Conservatives see themselves as European, compared to 64 per cent of Labour voters. Liberal Democrat and UKIP voters are distinctly polarised, with 74 per cent of Liberal Democrats believing they are European, compared to 72 per cent of UKIP voters who do not. Predictable distinctions can be observed between Leave and Remain voters, with 73 per cent of Remain voters subscribing to a European identity, compared to just 29 per cent of Leave voters.



It is important to note that the question of European identity is strongly determined by an individual’s conceptualisation of themselves as primarily ‘British’ or ‘English’, with a large body of research confirming that those who saw themselves as English first and foremost, were considerably less likely to see themselves as European, and considerably more likely to vote Leave in the EU Referendum^{lxx}.


More broadly, myriad previous surveys have demonstrated that Britons are much less likely than their counterparts in continental Europe to consider themselves to be ‘European’^{lxxi}. As Hanquinet & Savage (2018)^{lxxii} have argued, more than geographical proximity, this likely reflects the enduring influence of extra-European relationships, particularly in terms of those associated with the Anglosphere and the Commonwealth, which have fostered a sense of global openness but not European connectedness.

Theresa May drew on this ambivalent degree of European identity in her September 2017 speech in Florence^{lxxiii}, in which she cited Britons’ innate desire for “control and the direct accountability of their politicians”, as well as the country’s history and geography”, as reasons why “the United Kingdom has never totally felt at home being in the European Union”. The events over the course of the years since the Referendum itself indicate that polarisation around European identity has increased, having become more intrinsically related to political and values-based associations.

COMMONWEALTH CITIZEN – PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION

In considering the direction of Britain’s trading, cultural and defence relationships after Brexit, it has been suggested by some champions of the vote to leave the European Union that the country could pivot back towards a closer relationship with its Commonwealth partners^{lxxiv}. This notion is presented on the basis of enduring ties across a range of levels, although it is true that these ties are felt most strongly by Britons towards the Anglosphere nations within the Commonwealth.

These survey results demonstrate that for Britons, Commonwealth identity appears to be fundamentally distinct concept to other forms of global identity. Half of Britons (50 per cent) consider themselves to be Commonwealth citizens, a third (33 per cent) do not, and 17 per cent are unsure. Yet, as opposed to other international identities, the cohort most likely to see themselves as Commonwealth citizens are the over-65s, with the young considerably less likely to do so.



Those aged between 25-to-34 and 35-to-44 are the least connected to the Commonwealth, with only 39 and 35 per cent of them respectively subscribing to this identity, compared to two-thirds (66 per cent) of over-65s. Once again, women are more likely to be unsure about whether they subscribe to this identity (23 per cent to 12 per cent of men), and are henceforth less likely to see themselves as Commonwealth citizens (45 per cent) than their male counterparts (54 per cent).

Commonwealth identity is distinct from other forms of international identity in Britain, in that it is carried by all British citizens by law – enshrined in the British Nationality Act (1981). Nonetheless, it is clear from this survey that many citizens are either unaware of this fact, or simply do not choose to assume it – being inferred subjectively in the same way that Britons selectively consider themselves to be ‘European’ or otherwise. In this context, it is important to note that it is unclear as to whether respondents’ conception of their Commonwealth identity is based on the collective identity of the Anglosphere, a selection of individual specific countries, or the Commonwealth in its entirety as a membership.

No major distinctions can be observed between levels of education and income, although those from higher socio-economic groups are somewhat more likely to believe themselves to be Commonwealth citizens. Those who see themselves as global citizens, patriots, and European, are also all more likely to also hold a Commonwealth identity.

Across the population as a whole, no major regional differences are evident, although Londoners are somewhat less likely than average (41 per cent) to see themselves as Commonwealth citizens.

Those with White British backgrounds are considerably more likely to see themselves as part of the Commonwealth than BAME Britons – presumably as a result of the diversity of the origins of more recent waves of immigration. It is interesting to note that other research has found that citizens of Commonwealth countries living in the UK are considerably more likely than other migrants to hold a strong sense of belonging to Britain^{lxv}.

Conservative voters stand distinct in their high levels of support for the Commonwealth, with more than two-thirds (67 per cent) believing they are Commonwealth citizens, compared to 53 per cent of Labour voters, and 43 per cent of UKIP voters. Leave and Remain voters in the EU Referendum are, for once, almost evenly split.


IDENTITY AND ALLEGIANCES

Within the context of migration, issues of national identity and belonging have been extensively explored in both Eastern and Western scholarship^{lxxxvi}. The enduring nature of identities associated with previous regional and national forms of citizenship, as evident in, for example, the East of Germany, demonstrate the complex and multifaceted nature of these symbiotic concepts.

Migrant communities can establish expansive, segregated communities that can be detrimental their adoption of national allegiances; equally, their identities in their adopted home – especially if coming from a country holding a generally weak degree of cohesive national identity – can supplant their identities bestowed through their place of birth^{lxxxvii}. For many migrants, however, the process of mobility necessitates a fluidity around identity that generally allows for the compounding of both distinct and interrelated identities between residency, patriotism and culture^{lxxxviii}.

As concerns regarding immigration and integration grew in the United Kingdom over the past decade, the parameters of citizenship became the subject of much public debate^{lxxxix}. Successive governments have sought to demonstrate their responsiveness to these anxieties through the re-evaluation of barriers to British citizenship towards a stronger emphasis of its symbolic and cultural dimensions^{lxxx} – what Yuval-Davis (2011) termed ‘the politics of belonging’^{lxxxi}. Previous research has made clear the expectations that Britons hold in terms of migrants’ access to citizenship – namely, that they speak English and subscribe to the ‘British way of life’^{lxxxii}.

In this survey, we sought to explore the public’s views on the relationship between residence, citizenship and identity. We asked Britons whether, if ‘people move from another country where they were born and come to live/work in the UK on a permanent basis’, how should they be expected to conceive their national identity? Overall, 10 per cent of the population felt they should feel ‘exclusively British’, and a further 11 per cent felt they should feel ‘more British than the nationality of the country of their birth’ – meaning around a fifth of Britons favour a degree of identity assimilation.



Exclusive British Identity

At 20 per cent, UKIP voters are outliers in their support for migrants holding an exclusive British identity – twice the

overall national average. So too are residents in the North East and Yorkshire and the Humber, at 17 per cent and 16 per cent respectively. Those who do not see themselves as ‘European’ or as ‘global citizens’ are also twice as likely to support an exclusive British identity.

More British than Birth Identity

Britons over 55 years were around 10 percentage points more likely than Gen Z (18-to-24-year-olds) to prefer that migrants prioritise their British identity. Conservative voters (20 per cent) were also twice as likely than Labour (11 per cent), Liberal Democrat (11 per cent) and Greens (10 per cent) voters to favour this.

Equal British and Country of Birth Identity

The largest proportion of support across the country falls behind the notion of a balanced sense of identity allegiance between Britain and migrants’ country of birth, with 34 per cent of citizens expressing this preference. The degree-educated are 13 percentage points more likely to favour this option than the non-degree-educated (42 per cent to 29 per cent), and BAME Britons are 16 percentage points more likely to favour this than those with White British backgrounds (48 per cent to 32 per cent).

Londoners are the most likely to support equal national identity, at 44 per cent, with those in Scotland (25 per cent), Yorkshire and the Humber (28 per cent), and the West Midlands (29 per cent) the least likely to favour this.

Exclusive Non-British Identity

Few substantive demographic distinctions can be observed between those who do and don’t favour the notion of migrants having a ‘somewhat’ strengthened identity relationship with their country of birth. However, it is clear that there is a specific sub-set of the population who favour the notion that migrants should retain an exclusive sense of identity with their original nationality. These Britons tend to be non-degree-educated, from a lower socio-economic group, and from a White British background. In addition to Leave voters, as noted above, UKIP voters are also considerably more likely than others to favour this conception of identity, with a quarter of them agreeing with an exclusive non-British identity, compared to just nine per cent of Labour and Conservative voters.

EU Referendum Voting Behaviour

Overall, citizens’ EU Referendum voting behaviour offers fascinating and unusual insights on this question. While Leave voters are clearly more hostile to immigration generally as a group, on this question of national identity, we begin to see some distinct perspectives. For example, Remain voters are considerably more likely than Leave voters to favour a split British-country of birth nationality, at 44 to 28 per cent. However, Leave voters are also more likely than Remain voters to support an exclusive national identity around migrants’ country of birth, at 15 per cent to six per cent, perhaps reflecting a certain exclusionary view of migrants’ fundamental capacity to assimilate or to become ‘truly British’.


SPORTING ALLEGIANCES – THE TEBBIT TEST

In 1991, former Conservative Party Chairman Norman Tebbit argued that British Asians should express their ‘loyalty’ to Britain through supporting England in international cricket matches. This ‘test’ of patriotism and national pride has since been referred to as the ‘Tebbit Test’^{lxxxiii}.

Writing in the *Guardian* a decade later in 2001, Raj Kaushal – then the editor of *Snoop*, a British Asian lifestyle magazine – claimed that such a test was not extended to other Anglosphere migrants, and failed to take into account the racism and prejudice cricket supporters of Indian heritage experienced during the heated international matches. “Unlike the Americans, Australians and Europeans who have settled here, who still support the land of their birth at sport, but who never have their loyalties questioned,” he wrote. “Black and Asian Britons are still seen as ungrateful traitors if they do not cheer England”^{lxxxiv}.

More recently, the UK's Chief Rabbi Ephraim Mirvis revived the spirit of the 'Tebbit Test', arguing that religious minorities in Britain should ensure they are truly striving to be "totally British", while also maintain their culture and beliefs^{lxxxv}.

Despite the enduring nature of the public debate around this identified relationship between sporting loyalties and national citizenship, our survey finds that British population as a whole is largely ambivalent on this subject. Asked whether Britons born in other countries should or should not bear any specific national allegiance to their country of birth during sporting events, half of Britons (49 per cent) make clear that the issue is of no importance to them. A further 18 per cent expect them to support both equally, 14 per cent believe they should solely support the British team or athlete, and 12 per cent expect that their place of birth should retain their sporting allegiance.



Interestingly, this question provides a unique moment of alignment for Gen Z and Baby Boomers, who are collectively the most likely to be nonplussed about the issue. Moreover, younger Britons below 45 are more likely to assert that migrants should exclusively support British teams and athletes than their older counterparts.

Conservative and Labour voters are both equally likely to favour British sporting allegiance, at 16 per cent, with more than a fifth (21 per cent) of UKIP voters agreeing. Conservatives are five percentage points more likely than Labour voters to recommend an even split between nationalities, and Labour voters are eight percentage points more likely to say they aren't bothered either way.

Residents of the East of England (19 per cent) and the North East (17 per cent) are the most likely to favour migrants exclusively supporting the British team or athlete, while those in the East Midlands (24 per cent) and West Midlands (22 per cent) are the most likely to support an equal sporting allegiance.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This survey captures both the fixed and dynamic natures of identity in contemporary Britain. It is clear that an individual's lived experiences play a strong role in shaping their views about how they see themselves, their nation, and the world. It is also evident that the political environment – and particularly an event as seismic as the EU Referendum – can further shape and embed the distinctions between different groups of citizens.

Broadly, we find that Britons who are younger, living in or around London, and those with higher levels of education, income, and socio-economic status, are considerably more likely to feel connected to the world outside of Britain. This is then in turn expressed through their significantly stronger tendency to travel, work and hold friends and other social networks on a global scale, and to see themselves as 'European' or 'global citizens'. It is also manifest in their unique preferences around Britain's international engagement, broadly favouring increases to the country's foreign budget, including a greater emphasis on issues such as humanitarian crises and climate change.

We consistently find that those who are not physically, emotionally or socially connected to Europe or the world beyond Britain to the same degree favour reductions in foreign expenditure, and tend to be much more focused on the issue of immigration than other citizens – ie. perceiving an outwards-in, rather than inside-out, conception of foreign affairs. These groups of Britons also hold considerably more fixed forms of identity, rooted within the nation; however, this is not to say that they do not hold multiple identities as the globally-minded do, but rather that their layers of identity coalesce around local communities, regions, and the confines of their country (ie. England, Scotland) and the nation at large (ie. the United Kingdom).

As Britain seeks to forge a new path for itself outside of the European Union, these results emphasise the challenge the Government faces to conjure unity and consensus about the country's role in the world. With a population increasingly divided not just through class or socio-economic circumstance, but through a complex interplay of demographic and geographical characteristics underpinning entirely distinct world views and identities, it will be enormously difficult to strike a balance that ultimately speaks to 'the heart of the nation'.

Should the Government wish or feel compelled to pursue a more globalist, interconnected role for Britain, it must recognise the disparities of international opportunity that many citizens experience. There is a clear, direct line between these and the values they cultivate, which will only proliferate more widely throughout the population through redressing the profound gaps between those able to travel widely, learn international languages, and build expansive global networks, and those who are not.

Alternatively, we must recognise that, in an age where many aspects of the established status quo are being questioned, the received wisdom about Britain's moral, diplomatic, and military role in the world is also open to challenge. As with so many other aspects of governing our increasingly diverse democracies, the task of building harmony and accord around Britain's international future will present a meaningful test for our institutions, and our leaders.

APPENDIX A – IMMIGRATION AND FTAS

As part of this major survey, we also explored the question of whether Britons would be willing to see a significant or slight increase in the proportion of migrants from a range of priority trade countries for Britain’s post-EU future, making clear that increased migration may be essential to obtaining a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with these countries.

The findings revealed that the majority of the UK population consistently fails to support increases in immigration from most major economies – even if it is critical to securing an FTA. Only three countries – Canada, Australia and the United States – were able to find support amongst a majority of the population for an increase in immigration. And of those who were willing to accept higher numbers of arrivals from these countries, the majority were only open to slight increases in numbers – potentially scuppering the notion of a ‘freedom of movement’-style Anglosphere agreement.

In the case of many of the countries singled out as economic opportunities for the UK – including India – we found that Brits are either hesitant or unwilling to see any kind of increase in immigration, with more than a third of the country firmly opposed to higher numbers from India. Even Japan, which fares slightly better, has only just shy of half of Britons supporting increased in-flows.

Britons are most opposed to higher levels of immigration from Saudi Arabia, Russia and Turkey, with around half of all adults clear they will not accept further arrivals from these countries in exchange for a closer economic relationship.

Importantly - around a quarter of the British population consistently selected ‘don’t know’, indicating there is a high scope for influence in either direction on the issue of immigration and trade.

Countries with Highest Levels of Support for Increased Migration in Exchange for an FTA

	Willing to Accept Significantly Higher Levels	Willing to Accept Slightly Higher Levels	NET: Willing to Accept Higher Levels	Not Willing to Accept Higher Levels	Don't Know
Canada	24%	37%	61%	16%	23%
Australia	22%	38%	60%	17%	23%
The United States	18%	37%	55%	21%	24%
The EU	17%	33%	49%	26%	24%
Germany	13%	36%	49%	26%	25%
Italy	12%	36%	48%	26%	26%
France	13%	35%	47%	28%	25%
Japan	13%	32%	45%	29%	26%

Countries with Lowest Levels of Support for Increased Migration in Exchange for an FTA

	Willing to Accept Significantly Higher Levels	Willing to Accept Slightly Higher Levels	NET: Willing to Accept Higher Levels	Not Willing to Accept Higher Levels	Don't Know
South Africa	9%	29%	39%	35%	27%
China	9%	28%	37%	35%	28%
Brazil	8%	28%	36%	35%	29%
India	9%	26%	35%	39%	25%
Republic of Korea	9%	25%	35%	36%	29%

Argentina	9%	24%	34%	36%	31%
Mexico	8%	25%	33%	38%	29%
Indonesia	7%	23%	31%	40%	29%
Turkey	7%	20%	27%	45%	28%
Russia	7%	20%	27%	45%	27%
Saudi Arabia	7%	18%	24%	49%	27%

Focusing specifically on India, one of Britain’s most important future global economic markets, our survey finds significant disparities between different groups of citizens in their support for higher levels of immigration, in exchange for a Free Trade Agreement.

- **Willing to see any increase in immigration from India in exchange for FTA:**
 - 49% of Remain voters vs. 26% of Leave voters
 - 41% of ABC1 vs. 26% of C2DE
 - 41% of degree-educated vs. 33% of non-degree-educated
 - 47% of Labour voters vs. 31% of Conservatives

- **Willing to see a significant increase in immigration from India in exchange for FTA:**
 - 18% of 18-to-24-year olds vs. 7% of over-65s
 - 16% of Labour voters vs. 4% of Conservatives
 - 14% of London and the North West vs. 4% in West Midlands, 5% in Yorkshire

- **Not willing to see any increase in immigration from India:**
 - 48% of 55-to-64-year olds, 42% of over-65s vs. 26% of 18-to-24-year olds
 - 46% of C2DE vs. 35% of ABC1
 - 42% of non-degree-educated vs. 34% of degree-educated
 - 41% of White British vs. 28% of BAME
 - 51% of Conservatives vs. 27% of Labour voters
 - 35% of West Midlands residents, vs. 25% of England as a whole

These findings emphasise the challenge the Government will face to lead a sceptical British public towards accepting an economic argument in favour of immigration, and once again highlight the complex interplay between demographic and geographic identities and preferences on international engagement.

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^{vi} Other definitions could include how people act on their interests and knowledge, in this case in relation to foreign policy. However, aside from being very difficult to measure, that definition assumes that the value of engagement stems from the actions, whereas we view the main value as being informed and interested - which then provides the basis for a *capability* to act.

^{vii} In our initial studies on national engagement, we carried out basic knowledge tests on foreign policy issues as part of our polling and found that self-reported levels of knowledge on foreign affairs matched the levels shown when this knowledge was tested. Therefore for the purpose of this report, self-reported levels of knowledge can be interpreted as relevant representations of actual levels of knowledge.

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*See second section of report.

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