

THE DECLINE OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE CASE FOR SUSTAINED FUNDING



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He served as Permanent Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Head of the UK Diplomatic Service from 2010 to 2015. Before that he led the UK Department for Business and held a succession of senior roles in the British Government and the European Commission. He was also the UK Civil Service Champion for Inclusion and Diversity.

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Foreword by Sir Simon Fraser

- My views on Brexit are well known, but if the UK is to have any hope of restoring, let alone expanding its global influence as promised by the champions of Global Britain, it is clear diplomacy will play a central role. During my time as Permanent Under-Secretary at the FCO we made tough decisions in the face of funding cuts which bit deep for a department already stretched taut across the widening gap between sky high expectations of British diplomacy to project power globally, and the declining appetite (or capacity) to fund such a role.
- Despite the herculean efforts of many of my former colleagues, it is now painfully clear to our allies and adversaries alike that the FCO is way beyond any ability to do 'more with less' and is now drawing ever deeper on irreplaceable reserves of long nurtured capital — whether that be the sale of high status property around the world or simply the goodwill of our friends, and of course staff.
- Perhaps there was and is more we could do to make the case persuasively for investing in diplomacy which is after all, short of violence, the only tool we have to systematically secure the friends and deter the foes necessary to ensure the safety and prosperity of our country, and the world. So this report from the British Foreign Policy Group is very timely, offering for the first time a clear picture of the steady decline in investment in UK diplomacy by both Labour and Conservative governments, as well as a comparison with our French and German counterparts who have continued to invest and now significantly surpass UK capacity in a number of regions and capabilities.
- Tellingly, the report author finds that the UK used European Union membership as a 'crutch' to arrest declining global influence whilst our French and German counterparts have used their membership as a 'springboard' to support and enhance their global profiles and trade priorities.
- So it seems clear that continuing on the current trajectory, where core FCO spending is forecast to dip below 0.1% of GDP in coming years, raises significant questions regarding the credibility of the UK's global ambitions post-Brexit. The Treasury may, as it has in the past, brush aside such concerns, but our counterparts around the world, perhaps partly as a result of the cuts we have made, now often read our actions far more closely than we read theirs.
- This report compellingly highlights the challenge, as well as the ever-increasing urgency of identifying the solution in a world of growing threats to the UK both from home, and abroad.

The British Foreign Policy Group is an independent not for profit organisation established to improve the quality of national engagement on UK foreign policy, and generate new thinking around how the UK can pursue our common national interests from our international engagements. The group takes no institutional position and all views expressed are those of the authors. Established in Autumn 2016, the British Foreign Policy Group engages people across the UK and our Overseas Territories through events, accessible, reliable information and digital outreach.

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


Tom Tugendhat was elected the Conservative MP for Tonbridge and Malling in 2015. Since 2017, Tom has been Chair of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, which examines and scrutinises the work of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Before being elected Tom served on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for the British Army. He was an Arabic-speaking intelligence officer serving with the Royal Marines. His final appointment was as the military assistant for the Chief of the Defence Staff.

Foreword by Tom Tugendhat MP

- Not since the Second World War has Britain's foreign policy been more important to our future prospects.
- Since becoming chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee two years ago I have argued that today's circumstances mean that we need a more coherent, strategic and empowered foreign policy.
- The good news is that the UK starts from a strong position. We are a foreign policy heavyweight and soft power superpower. Our expert diplomacy, trusted BBC World Service, world-leading aid programmes and strong financial markets, give us unique influence. So too does the credible threat of force.
- But to make the most of these advantages, we need a clear strategy and effective coordination.
- The FCO should be at the heart of this process. But, as this report makes all too clear, it is now a shadow of its former self. Once one of the great offices of state, its role directing foreign policy has been gradually hollowed out, as new government departments responsible for aid and trade have been created, and it has faced a tug-of-war over key aspects of policy with the Cabinet Office. The FCO's entire budget now amounts to a rounding error — at barely 0.1% of Government spending.
- This report sets out the trajectory and impact of cuts to the FCO back to 1973, demonstrating the huge impact this has had on Britain's capacities, relationships and influence around the world.
- As the UK redefines its role in the world, it is more important now than ever that the FCO takes full strategic control over the full spectrum of resources that can give us worldwide influence.
- To do so our foreign policy needs properly resourcing. That is why this report calls for 3% of GDP, including 0.7% on development aid and 2% on defence, to be spent on securing the UK's international interests.
- We are at our best when both at home and abroad we boldly champion our values to meet and shape the defining challenges of our time. To do this we need to restore to the FCO the authority it once had and to invest properly in our diplomatic capabilities which are now critical to our security and prosperity in the years ahead. That is why this report is so very timely and welcome.



Sam Goodman is an Associate of the British Foreign Policy Group and the author of the *Imperial Premiership: The Role of the Modern Prime Minister in Foreign Policy Making, 1964-2015* (Manchester University Press: 2015).

He is currently working as a political adviser to Peter Dowd MP the current Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury and has previously worked for a variety of Labour Members of Parliament including: Julie Cooper MP, Sir Mark Hendrick MP, Michael Dugher MP, and Rt. Hon Jack Straw MP.

Sam has also spent time working in the US House of Representatives for Congressman Bobby L Rush from Illinois's 1st Congressional District.

Introduction

Running out of credit? The decline of the Foreign Office and the case for sustained funding

By Sam Goodman [@SamGoodman22](#)

Since the 1960s British foreign policy has been dogged by the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson's maxim that, 'Britain has lost an empire and struggled to find a role in the world'. This reflected Britain's declining influence in the world, and its lack of a clear defined role in global relations. It has been used by academics and policymakers alike to summarise the UK's inability to reconcile its past with a realistic foreign policy for the future.

To borrow the phrase, recently it appears all too evident that the Foreign Office itself has lost an empire and struggled to find its role in the 21st century. This 'empire' was built upon the Foreign Office's historic dominance across Whitehall on all matters related to international affairs as well as its vast diplomatic network abroad manned by a world class diplomatic corps. However, like Britain, the Foreign Office is a pale imitation of its former self. Its monopoly on foreign affairs has been eroded by globalisation, EU integration, and reorganisations that have moved trade and development aid to separate departments outside of its grasp. A generation ago it would have been unimaginable for a department to even dare to discuss areas of foreign policy without the Foreign Office being present, now it finds itself shut out of the biggest diplomatic crisis and foreign policy issue the UK has arguably faced since Suez: Britain's exit from the EU.

The Foreign Office has found itself a victim of the spending battles of Whitehall, neither benefiting substantially from the pre-financial crisis enhanced government spending, nor adequately protected from the spending cuts that have taken place since 2010. While diplomats have been ill-equipped and the institution itself too timid to fight its corner, the UK's overseas network has paid a heavy price losing 270 posts from 2012-2017 alone¹.

Of course, the reduced stature of the Foreign Office has not happened overnight but rather reflects a culmination of budgetary and resource decisions. Since the 1970s, governments of all political persuasions have presided over the slow erosion of staff numbers and the reduction of resources in the Foreign Office as a department, which inevitably has impacted on the articulation and advancement of British foreign policy aims.

The research in this report, which is based primarily on the FCO's annual departmental accounts², suggests that there is a distinct correlation between Britain's declining influence and the resources under the Foreign Office's direct control. Furthermore, with an up-coming departmental spending review, the report outlines why stable investment in our diplomatic infrastructure is paramount if Britain is to maintain its status on the world stage.

¹ See Table 8

² Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report & Accounts from 1972-73 to 2017-18 (most recent publicly available)



Despite public expenditure being roughly 27 times larger than it was in 1972³, the Foreign Office has found itself at the mercy of numerous reorganisations and cuts⁴.

In comparison with other government departments the Foreign Office core budget is substantially smaller, standing in 2017-18 at just £1.2 billion out of £306.1 billion worth of departmental expenditure⁵. To put this into context, former Foreign Secretary David Miliband stated that an entire year's spending from the FCO is spent on the NHS roughly every day. While former Foreign Secretary William Hague has noted that the department's spending was less than that of Kent County Council⁶.

Exacerbating this, Ministers have spending discretion on over less than half their total budget after various allocated subscriptions, and funding for the British Council, are taken into account⁷. This matters as ultimately it ties the hands of the Foreign Office and its Ministers, limiting the resources available to direct foreign policy and in turn ensures that there is little room for flexibility when it comes to foreign policy priorities.

This reduction in spending control internal to the FCO has taken place against the background of the establishment of separate departments for international development, exiting the EU, and trade, which has meant other departments taking a greater role in the field of international relationship building and its associated cost. Within this context the Foreign Office's ability to act independently to pursue British foreign policy priorities is greatly diminished. Instead the FCO finds itself increasingly having to

co-ordinate its work with other departments. This change in status and work practice was reflected by the creation of two joint junior ministerial posts sitting in both the Foreign Office and the Department of International Development in June 2017.

This diffusion of responsibility and requirement for different government departments to cooperate has in turn led to the creation of the National Security Council and cross-departmental pools of funding such as the Prosperity Fund and the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. In recent times the Foreign Office has increasingly drawn on both funds as a way of bolstering its meagre budget. In 2017, the Foreign Office received a third of the CSSF's total budget to spend on the UK's peacekeeping contribution to the UN and EU, as well as the majority of the £46 million Prosperity Fund which was earmarked for development projects⁸.

While the introduction of these cross-departmental pools of funding is welcome, the short term nature of them paired with the growing competition between departments for funding demonstrates why they are not an alternative to a stable long term funding model for the Foreign Office. Of course, this hasn't stopped the Foreign Office from including the funds in its yearly accounts, which has the impact of distorting its overall budget.⁹

While increased cooperation appears a welcome development within Whitehall, it has come at a cost. Without overarching strategic coordination, departments are left to compete rather than collaborate, for a limited pot of resources.

³ See Annexe Table 1

⁴ Notable cuts: in the late 1970s, early 1980s, 1990s, 2001-02, 2006-07, 2012-13, 2014-15, 2015-16, 2016-17 (see Annexe Table 1)

Notable reorganisations: creation of a separate Ministry of Overseas Development (1975-75), administration of UK passport offices transferred to Home Office (1982-83), transfer of Mi6 from the Foreign Office to its own department (1992-93 off books), creation of the Department for International Development transferring UK aid from the Foreign Office (1997), creation of the Department for Exiting the European Union transferring the Europe Directorate from the Foreign Office (July 2016), creation of the Department for International Trade transferring UK Trade and Investment from the Foreign Office (July 2016).

⁵ Spring Budget Report 2017, 8th March 2017, pg21: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/597467/spring_budget_2017_web.pdf

⁶ House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, The Role of the FCO in UK Government, 27th April 2011, pg23: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmfa/665/665.pdf>

⁷ House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, The FCO and the 2015 Spending Review, 20th October 2015, pg3: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmfa/467/467.pdf>

⁸ House of Lords & Commons Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, Conflict, Stability and Security Fund 30th January 2017, pg7: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201617/jtselect/jtnatsec/208/208.pdf> & Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual Report & Accounts 2017-18, 5th July 2018, pg57: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/722730/FCO1119_FCO_Annual_Report_2018_-_ONLINE.PDF

⁹ Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual Report & Accounts 2017-18, 5th July 2018, pg140: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/722730/FCO1119_FCO_Annual_Report_2018_-_ONLINE.PDF

The True Value of Diplomacy

The Foreign Office's under-funding rests heavily on the inability of the political class to explain to the public the true value of our diplomacy; the work of its front-line staff around the world; and, by extension, the impact British foreign policy has on the public's day to day lives. This in turn has left the Foreign Office vulnerable and an easy target for Treasury expenditure cuts, and has resulted in the proportion of funding available to the FCO to spend at its discretion being capricious and unstable. In one budget cycle alone (2014-15 to 2015-16) the Foreign Office's administration and programme expenditure was cut by £178 million (17.2%), and according to the FCO's own accounts, is yet to return to its 2014-15 level despite the department given additional money to prepare for Brexit¹⁰. Meanwhile its meagre capital budget lost £104 million (63%) from 2014-15 to 2016-17 and this year is projected to still be 25% smaller than in 2013-14¹¹.

The rationale is not inexplicable: after all, it is comparatively easy for the public to understand the direct link between a police officer and lower crime rates, or a nurse and improved healthcare. Although both nursing and policing have not been saved from the swinging axe of austerity, public opposition notably emphasises their importance. Similarly, the archetypal success of the Ministry of Defence in securing extra funding from the Treasury has in part been aided by an understanding in the public's mind that an increase in departmental budget will in turn produce a concrete outcome, for example new aircraft for the Royal Air Force. Even relatively young departments such as the

Department for International Development have succeeded in demonstrating their value. Although 'aid' to experts often means long term infrastructure support, or third party involvement in trade deals, the department has managed to project an image of concrete results that the public — and therefore the Treasury — can conceptualise: e.g. the provision of clean drinking water to a country in need.

The Foreign Office on the other hand has suffered from an inability to translate what are often abstract concepts into tangible assets or, for the concern of the Treasury, something that can be measured as 'good value for money'. Diplomacy is built upon the forging of relationships and the influencing of allies to develop and maintain soft power, which is both hard to quantify or evaluate. Relationships, intelligence, and presence may take years to pay off, leaving one government's Exchequer the bill for a future government's benefit. It also requires a stable level of funding and certainty of assets that the Foreign Office has rarely enjoyed.

And yet, due to an increasingly globalised and interconnected world, the UK's foreign policy capabilities are critically intertwined with the country's future economic prosperity and security. Diplomats and the consular infrastructure of embassies dotted across the world play a vital role in helping open up foreign markets, increasing inbound foreign investment, promoting cultural exchanges, and protecting citizens abroad and at home. The value, although intangible, is the thread that ties the legacy of the past to the potential of the future.

As Britain looks to the future it is clear there needs to be a more honest identification and assessment of our diplomatic resources and manpower. Errors in judgment must be accounted for, but equally the context which facilitated them must be questioned, if the Foreign Office is to be revitalised and its potential fully met.

“The value, although intangible, is the thread that ties the legacy of the past to the potential of the future.”

¹⁰ Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual Report & Accounts 2017-18, 5th July 2018, pg139: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/722730/FCO1119_FCO_Annual_Report_2018_-_ONLINE.PDF

¹¹ See Annexe Table 2



Closer to Home: the Foreign Office's Network in Europe

Lord Hannay, the former UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations, believes the question of available resources cannot be separated from perception of the UK as a declining power¹². Historically Britain could afford a relatively small diplomatic corps as countries would make the effort to beat a path to the Foreign Office's door, investing large amounts of their diplomatic resources in London. Now it is Brussels not London that has become a global diplomatic hub. Brussels has nearly twice the amount of diplomats than Washington DC¹³ and in 2017 recorded that 13,546 people were employed by international,

inter-governmental institutions or diplomatic missions (this includes staff employed by the 20 EU agencies headquartered in Brussels and the 4,578 staff employed by NATO)¹⁴.

While the Foreign Office spent a large portion of the ten years prior to the EU referendum (2016) cutting UK staff serving overseas¹⁵, the EU has invested in its newly created diplomatic service. Established by the Lisbon Treaty, the European External Action Service at the end of 2017 had 4,067 staff based at its headquarters in Brussels, 1,963 deployed overseas, and a further 3,616 Commission staff deployed to delegations

¹² House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Oral Evidence: The UK's Influence in the UN, 19th December 2017, pg17: <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-committee/the-uks-influence-in-the-un/oral/75940.pdf>

¹³ There was 5,400 diplomatic staff in Brussels in 2016 compared to 2,988 in Washington DC. See: Brussels-Europe the Figure 2016, Office of the Brussels Commissioner for Europe and International Organisations, 2016, pg31: https://visit.brussels/site/binaries/content/assets/pdf/figures_en_1.pdf

¹⁴ Brussels-Europe the Figure 2016, Office of the Brussels Commissioner for Europe and International Organisations, 2016, pg31: https://visit.brussels/site/binaries/content/assets/pdf/figures_en_1.pdf

¹⁵ See Annexe Table 5



ADOBE STOCK

The European Parliament building in Brussels.



ADOBE STOCK

Greece's Foreign Minister Venizelos, EU foreign policy chief Ashton and Britain's Foreign Secretary Hague talk before an informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in Athen.

across the world¹⁶. The opening of EU delegations across the world, particularly in areas where the UK has a smaller diplomatic presence (such as Africa where nearly a third of the European External Action Service are based¹⁷), has naturally led to the UK collaborating more with EU representatives and sharing resources, despite strong assurances from the Government that they would complement and not replace the UK's diplomatic network¹⁸.

The growing role of Brussels as an arena to settle diplomatic disagreements, negotiate trade deals, and forge fresh European consensus, has allowed the UK's European embassies to fall into metaphorical disrepair. The Foreign Office's Diplomatic List (released yearly until 2006) shows from 1972 to 2006 there were substantial cuts to UK diplomatic staff in key embassies across Europe. These include in Finland, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden¹⁹. While the Foreign Office has offset some of these cuts by opening new

embassies in Eastern Europe and increasing staff numbers in Turkey and Russia²⁰ looking at staff numbers published by the Foreign Office more recently indicates our European embassies have a fraction of the manpower they once enjoyed²¹.

Former Foreign Secretary William Hague confirms that cuts in key European embassies continued through his tenure in the Foreign Office²². Data provided by the Foreign Office shows that from 2012-13 to 2016-17 there were staff reductions in key European cities including Lisbon, Berlin, Madrid, Dublin, Vienna, and Stockholm²³, UK diplomatic posts were also closed in Dusseldorf, Munich, Milan, and Amsterdam²⁴. Perhaps just as worrying, UK embassies in Luxembourg, Lisbon, and Ljubljana have three or less UK, as opposed to local, staff²⁵.

“Historically Britain could afford a relatively small diplomatic corps as countries would make the effort to beat a path to the Foreign Office's door, investing large amounts of their diplomatic resources in London.”

¹⁶ European External Action Service, Human Resources Annual Report, May 2018, pg39: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2018_05_15_hr_report_2017_final.pdf

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Fourth Special Report of Session 2009-10, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2008-09: Government Response to the Committee's Fifth Report of Session 2009-10, April 2010, pg8: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmfa/538/538.pdf>

¹⁹ See Annexe Table 3

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Oral Evidence: The Future of UK Diplomacy In Europe, 31st October 2017: <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-committee/the-future-of-britains-diplomatic-relationship-with-europe/oral/72417.html>

²³ See Annexe Table 3

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.



The Spending Breakdown

Diplomatic Expenditure & Resourcing


Like many foreign ministries across the world, the Foreign Office's budget funds multiple facets of foreign policy ranging from soft power initiatives, such as the recent funding of mediation and conflict prevention training programmes in Turkey, to more traditional diplomacy. The Foreign Office directly funds the British Council, international scholarships, some grants for the BBC World Service, peacekeeping and conflict prevention programmes, as well as the UK's membership subscriptions to international organisations. It also creates and leads a number of cross-Government Prosperity Fund programmes designed to support the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals by promoting growth and prosperity in developing countries²⁶.

Core Diplomatic Spending

After taking account of this expenditure, the balance is spent on the UK's core diplomatic budget: the day to day running of the Foreign Office; diplomatic staff; and the diplomatic infrastructure of British High Commissions, embassies, and consulates outside the United Kingdom. This stands at just over half of total departmental spending.

Since Britain joined the European Economic Community in 1973, core diplomatic spending as a percentage of public sector current expenditure has fallen from 0.5% (1972-73) to 0.1% (2018-19); diplomatic core expenditure as a percentage of GDP has consistently been at 0.1% since 1973. Significantly, for the first time ever, it is set to fall to below 0.1% of GDP for the years 2018-19 and 2019-20 as the Foreign Office faces further cuts²⁷.

FCO: Core Diplomatic Spending




Data: See Annex Table 1

²⁶ Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual Report & Accounts 2017-18, 5th July 2018, pg90: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/722730/FCO1119_FCO_Annual_Report_2018_-_ONLINE.PDF

²⁷ See Annex Table 1

Overseas Representation Spending by Prime Minister (£m)



Data: See Annexe Table 1

While a large proportion of cuts to the UK's diplomatic expenditure happened in the immediate years after 1973, it wasn't until 2000-01 that spending returned to its 1974-75 levels²⁸. Despite New Labour's increase in public expenditure, diplomatic funding as a percentage of current expenditure and GDP remained stagnant, with the Government choosing to prioritise other departments throughout simultaneous budgets.

It is clear that government spending on diplomacy since 1973 has been volatile, falling victim to short term political and budgetary decision-making and has lacked the stability needed for a long-term strategy and foreign policy goals.

This turbulence has been particularly evident over the last few years, where the current Government has cut diplomatic funding in both 2016 and 2017, increased the budget by 20% in 2018, and was projected to cut it by 21% in 2019, wiping out any gains²⁹.

Such a short term and erratic policy distorts spending figures, and gives the Foreign Office little time to plan and invest the gained resources adequately. Strategic and long-term oversight would be curtailed for any department experiencing such disparity in funding, but for a department whose core function is to oversee and establish enduring relationships and insight into its global partners, the Foreign Office has suffered immeasurably.

Every prime minister has been guilty of cutting core diplomatic funding at one point or another during their tenure, and as such, fuelling this unsettling, gradual decline³⁰. Most worrying of all, if the current Government continues with its projected programme of cuts for 2019-20, core diplomatic funding will stand at its lowest level for twenty years, just as Britain leaves the European Union³¹.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ See Annexe Table 1 2015-16, 2016-17, 2017-18, 2018-19 & 2019-20

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ See Annexe Table 1

Tracking a Decade of FCO Departmental Spending: 2009-2019

Reviewing the FCO's annual accounts over the past decade, we can conclude that there has been a decline in the amount of funding the Foreign Office controls directly. In 2009-10 the amount of discretionary spending within the gift of the department, through its central administration and programme expenditure budget, stood at 44.7% of total resource spending. This rose during the Coalition Government to over half (55.4%) of all departmental spending. However, since 2014-15 the amount of discretionary funding available to the FCO has fallen to 37%³².


The collapse in discretionary spending has been met in part by an increase in ODA funds available to the FCO from cross-departmental pools of funding — such as the Prosperity Fund and the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund — which are ear-marked for specific projects. On the whole these additional funds have stabilised the FCO's overall budget and account for nearly a quarter of total departmental spend³³; they in fact mask a depletion in budgetary control³⁴.

Similarly, the FCO's grants to international organisations and the British Council have

not been shielded from government cuts. While the FCO's grant to the British Council is a relatively small funding stream, this did not stop ministers in the Coalition Government from reducing it by 22.2% (£43 million) from 2009-10 to 2014-15. Subsequently, the FCO's funding to the British Council has been marginally increased; however, it is still £29 million below its 2009-10 level³⁵. Analysing the data available, it is clear that the FCO's annual grants to international organisations were consistently an easy target for Coalition Ministers who were tasked with finding departmental savings. By the end of the Coalition Government in 2015 the UK's contributions to international organisations delivered through the FCO grants had been cut by 45% (£122 million) although, on returning to office with a parliamentary majority, Conservative Ministers redressed this shortfall doubling the budget for grants in a year and subsequently increasing it from 2015-16 to 2018-19 by a further 21%³⁶.

The FCO's funding towards peacekeeping operations has also fluctuated over the past decade, initially receiving a £50 million (15%) uplift in 2010-11. The preceding years saw its funding levels modestly recede. While the proportion the FCO spends on peacekeeping is larger than in 2009-10, it is still less than its 2010-11 peak³⁷.

Administration and Programme Expenditure as a percentage of FCO Total Department Spending (Resource DEL)



Data: See Annex Table 9

³² See Annex Table 9

³³ 23.7%, factoring in Prosperity Fund & Conflict Prevention Programme Expenditure together.


³⁴ See Annex Table 9

³⁵ See Annex Table 9

³⁶ See Annex Table 9


³⁷ See Annex Table 9

Conflict Prevention Programme Expenditure as a percentage of FCO Total Department Spending (Resource DEL)



Data: See Annexe Table 9

Programme and International Organisation Grants as a percentage of FCO Total Department Spending (Resource DEL)



Data: See Annexe Table 9

Consideration should also be given to the complicated internal market that exists in Whitehall, defined by a cycle of funding deductions and transfers between departments with overlapping responsibilities. While much of the £412 million cost of setting up the Department for Exiting the EU and the Department for International Trade in preparation for Brexit has come from the Treasury³⁸, the FCO has also been required to transfer

funds to both departments as part of this 'Machinery of Government Change'. This has included the transfer of £2.8 million of funding for its European Union functions to the Department for Exiting the EU, and a transfer of a £0.9 million to the Department for International Trade to cover office space; taken from the FCO's administration and programme expenditure and capital budget respectively³⁹.

³⁸ House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Exiting the European Union, 29 January 2018, pg13: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmpubacc/467/467.pdf>

³⁹ Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual Report and Accounts 2016-17, 6 July 2017, pg37: 2017 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/625651/FCO-annual-report-2017-web-accessible.pdf



Staffing and Resources Analysis

FCO Staffing Levels — An Overview

Analysing the trend in the Foreign Office's staffing levels, the number of FCO U staff has been cut by 928 since 2010 (18.8%). At one point FCO staff numbers would have included MI6 staff (removed in 1992-93), development staff (transferred to DFID in 1997-98), UK Border Agency Staff (removed in 2007-08), as well as staff working at Wilton Park, and at FCO services (removed in 2007-08) which have since been transferred from the FCO's accounts ⁴⁰.

The Use of Locally Engaged Staff


Consecutive UK Governments have favoured the model of UK embassies hiring locally based staff to compensate for cuts to UK staff serving overseas, something which has become common practice for most countries across the world. Initially this was clearly a costing saving decision, and the Foreign Office has argued that it has allowed UK embassies

to protect their diplomatic capabilities whilst suffering from diminished budgets.

Although the growing number of locally engaged staff has brought much value to the UK's diplomatic network overseas — they have a depth of local knowledge, culture and politics, and many are native language speakers — it is impossible to assess accurately the Foreign Office's reliance on them in key diplomatic posts, since it currently provides no data on local staff beyond an overall head count.

However, the Foreign Affairs Select Committee and PCS (the civil servants union) have recorded key differences between the working arrangements of locally engaged staff and UK staff serving in embassies overseas, which should be taken into consideration when assessing their increased role. These include the fact that locally engaged staff do not receive a similar level of security clearance as UK staff; or benefit from full diplomatic immunity. They are contracted to work local office hours, and these conditions limit the type of work and roles local staff can undertake in UK embassies and their utility in a crisis ⁴¹.

UK FCO Manpower



Figures from Foreign & Commonwealth Expenditure Reports & Accounts 1985-2018

⁴⁰ See Annexe Table 4

⁴¹ Foreign Affairs Select Committee, FCO performance and finances 2011-12, 19th March 2013, pg25: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmfa/690/690.pdf>

For the purposes of this report, these known limitations taken together with the incomplete data published by the Foreign Office on locally engaged staff, make it impossible to treat them as the same as UK staff serving overseas. However, this has not stopped the Foreign Office from doing so and using the overall headcount of locally engaged staff to disguise the extent of staffing cuts.

In 1989 there were 7,000 locally based staff in UK embassies, which peaked in 2008 at 10,000. Since then the number of locally based staff has been cut to just 7,496 in 2018⁴². This recent decline without reintroduction of UK nationals has blunted any rebutting argument put forward by Government that cuts to UK staff in diplomatic posts are part of an innovative strategy and are efficiency savings. Rather they reinforce the view that cuts to the diplomatic network are motivated purely by budgetary considerations.

Staffing Cuts by Grade

Turning to the distribution of FCO staff by pay-band and grade, the majority of staff cuts since 1997 have targeted junior roles. The lowest staff grade A1 has seen a 78% reduction in staff, the number of A2 staff has been cut by over 1,000, and the number of B3 staff grade has been more than halved to just 614 since 1997⁴³. These cuts to junior staff were well underway by 2007 when the Foreign Office decided to discontinue the lower pay-bands, between 1995-2006, of nearly one third of A1 and A2 grade staff and 4.8% of B3 staff⁴⁴.

To the untrained eye, the reduction in junior staff over the more senior and experience staff may be welcomed. Realistically however, it has had huge consequences for the workload of UK embassies across the world. The fall in junior staff serving overseas has led to a heavier workload, which in turn has reduced the UK's diplomatic capability, particularly the

“Turning to the distribution of FCO staff by pay-band and grade, the majority of staff cuts since 1997 have targeted junior roles.”

time available for quality research and analysis. Senior grade staff have also had their numbers reduced over the years. Under reforms enacted by Jack Straw running from 2004 to 2007 senior management was cut by nearly 20%, and this included both reducing senior posts in Europe and closing a small number of lower priority posts outside of it. The money raised from these cuts was then used to open new posts in India, Pakistan, China, and increase the UK's diplomatic presence in Iraq and Afghanistan⁴⁵.

Sir William Patey, the former British Ambassador to Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan, has said that there simply is 'not time anymore' for diplomatic staff to travel the country and engage at length with the local populace⁴⁶. This has limited the 'time to reflect' which reveals a depth of knowledge being lost in each and every campaign undertaken, with no meaningful alternative to replace it.

To address this, the Foreign Affairs Select Committee in the past has recommended that the Foreign Office learn from previous diplomatic crises⁴⁷ where important UK interests were at risk in the event of political upheaval, and as such UK embassies should have at least one officer working full-time on internal political affairs: knowing the local language, ideally with previous experience

⁴² See Annexe Table 6

⁴³ See Annexe Table 7

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Active Diplomacy for a Changing World The UK's International Priorities*, March 2006, pg47-48: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272260/6762.pdf

⁴⁶ Sir William Patey, "21st Century Diplomats: The Changing Role of British Diplomats", 22 January 2015, Chatham House: www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/document/2015012221stCenturyDiplomats.pdf

⁴⁷ Namely British policy on Iran 1974-78, and Argentina before 1982. Foreign Affairs Select Committee, *The Role of the FCO in UK Government*, 27 April 2011, pg12 & pg47: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cm/aff/665/665.pdf>



in the country; and time to travel outside the capital. At least one of the team in London covering the country should have served there, and desk officers should be given time to read and study the country⁴⁸. From at least a funding perspective, these recommendations have not been implemented, and resources have not been ring-fenced to supply this strategic safety net.

Geographic Distribution of UK Diplomatic Staff Overseas — A Snapshot

The unifying backdrop of this report remains critical that the Foreign Office has characteristically failed to provide the public with a detailed picture of the geographic distribution of UK staff serving overseas. Even the Diplomatic List, which was regularly issued by the Foreign Office until 2006, failed to set out clearly the UK's diplomatic personnel, lumping them together with

trade, aid, and defence staff and offering little distinction between local and UK staff.

This only changed in 2013 when, for the first time, the yearly Foreign Office accounts recorded a list of the UK embassies and the total amount of UK staff deployed there⁴⁹, before being discontinued again for the most recent Foreign Office accounts report (2017-18⁵⁰). All the same, this snapshot provides an important insight into the recent geographic distribution of the UK's diplomatic corps and where staff cuts have fallen.

Looking at the recent geographical distribution of reductions in UK staff levels, it is clear that the Government has taken a targeted approach rather than implementing cuts across the board. The data available shows that from 2012-13 to 2016-17 the UK diplomatic network was reduced by 270 posts (15%). Central, South, and South-East Asia have faced the brunt of those cuts: losing 166 UK overseas staff, constituting nearly a third of UK staff between them

Table 8: FCO Diplomatic Manpower by Geographical Region (2012-13 to 2016-17)

Region	2012-13	2016-17	Change
Europe	354 (19.8%)	349 (23%)	-5 (-1.4%)
North & Central America	135 (7.5%)	118 (7.7%)	-17 (-12.5%)
South America & South Atlantic	70 (3.9%)	54 (3.5%)	-16 (-0.5%)
Middle East & North Africa	263 (14.7%)	251 (16.5%)	-12 (-4.5%)
West Africa	108 (6%)	77 (5%)	-31 (-28%)
Central Africa	69 (3.8%)	73 (4.8%)	+4 (+5.7%)
South Africa	54 (3%)	35 (2.3%)	-19 (-35%)
Central & South Asia	262 (14.6%)	175 (11.5%)	-87 (-33%)
South East Asia	267 (14.9%)	188 (12.4%)	-79 (-30.1%)
Pacific	30 (1.6%)	23 (1.5%)	-7 (-23.3%)
UK Reps to Multilateral Organisations	172 (9.6%)	171 (11.2%)	-1 (-0.5%)
Total	1,784	1,514	-270 (-15.1%)
<i>Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual Report & Accounts: 2016-17 (pg64), 2015-16 (pg72), 2014-15 (pg28), 2013-14 (pg45) & 2012-13 (pg116)</i>			
Region	2012-13	2016-17	Change
Commonwealth	421 (22.4%)	301 (19.8%)	-120 (-28.5%)
Total	1,784	1,514	

⁴⁸ Foreign Affairs Select Committee, The Role of the FCO and UK Government, 27th April 2011, pg77: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cm/aff/665/665.pdf>

⁴⁹ Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual Report & Accounts 2012-13, 1st July 2013, pg116: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/318816/Annual_Report_2012-2013_-_update_June2014.pdf

⁵⁰ Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual Report & Accounts 2017-18, 5th July 2018, pg49: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/722730/FCO1119_FCO_Annual_Report_2018_-_ONLINE.PDF

“ The reduction in UK staff serving abroad has far reaching consequences for British foreign policy beyond a simple reduction in manpower. ”

(31.3%)⁵¹. Similarly, West and South Africa received equally large cuts, losing 50 staff between them. It is pertinent to mention that the downsizing of resources in Asia has not been met with an increase of resources in other geographic regions. In fact, every region — bar central Africa — saw cuts to UK diplomatic staff over the four-year period for which records are available.

UK diplomatic resources outside of Asia and South and West Africa have remained largely stable, with the percentage of UK staff serving in embassies in North, Central, and South America in this period having remained largely unchanged. However it is Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East that continue to have the largest concentration of UK diplomatic staff, reflecting the UK's foreign policy priorities⁵².

Similarly, a large number of diplomatic staff cuts have previously targeted embassies in Commonwealth countries, which as a collection lost 120 UK staff (28.5%) between 2012-13 and 2016-17⁵³.

The Impact of Cutting UK Diplomatic Resources

The reduction in UK staff serving abroad has far reaching consequences for British foreign policy beyond a simple reduction in manpower. The success or failure of the Foreign Office's strategic objectives, which include the protection of UK citizens abroad, and the projection of influence; and

the promotion of trade and economic ties, all depend upon a fully staffed diplomatic network. For example there is generally a consensus on the need for diplomatic staff in crisis management, whether it is the provision of consular services to UK citizens stranded in a country after a natural disaster — such as the recent hurricanes Irma and Maria in the Caribbean — or the role diplomatic staff play in reporting intelligence on the ground when there is a political crisis.

However, what is not often considered is the important role diplomatic staff play in intelligence gathering, research, and analysis. The institutional memory of regional experts and senior diplomats is key to informing foreign policy decisions and exerting British influence across the world — this is particularly important in countries with long term, unchanging political leaders and establishments.

Staff cuts have also had a detrimental impact on the expertise, analytical capability, and language skills available to the Foreign Office. It was noted at the time of the Arab Spring that the Foreign Office's response was hindered by a lack of expertise and connections to opposition and civil society figures that emerged as leaders⁵⁴. More recently, similar deficits have been found in relation to Russia. Sir Nigel Sheinwald, the former British Ambassador to the USA, has argued that by the time of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, the old cadre of British Cold War experts, with their historic analytical capacity, were simply not there to provide the insight and clarity needed⁵⁵. The immediate scaling down of FCO resources in Russia and Eastern Europe after the Cold War⁵⁶, while a rational financial decision at the time, has left the Foreign Office without vital expertise as a whole generation of diplomats have retired and taken invaluable experience and institutional knowledge with them, resources which are now needed more than ever given renewed tensions with Russia and increased tension in the Black Sea states. The reality is that once this expertise is lost, it is costly — and time-consuming — to regain.

⁵¹ See Table 8

⁵² See Table 8

⁵³ Ibid. See also Table 8 and Annexe Table 3 which demonstrates a sustained decline of resources in key Commonwealth countries

⁵⁴ House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, British Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring, 3rd July 2012, pg20: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmfa/80/80.pdf>

⁵⁵ "Britain's Foreign Office loses direction as cuts loom", FT Online, November 2014: <https://www.ft.com/content/f7e4c1e8-69ab-11e4-8f4f-00144feabdc0>

⁵⁶ See Annexe Table 3 — Eastern Europe & Soviet Union 1972, 1982 & 1990



The Diplomatic Umbrella

The Foreign Office is no longer the prime actor when it comes to the UK's diplomatic engagement abroad. Instead, it is increasingly part of a wider 'diplomatic umbrella' that includes the Department for International Development; overseas intelligence agencies (MI6); the Ministry of Defence; and the newly created Department for International Trade. All of these have staff serving overseas and operating throughout the UK's diplomatic infrastructure.

The number of UK staff from other departments working overseas has grown exponentially in the last decade. In 2006 there were just 850 staff from 22 other government departments working in UK embassies⁵⁷. Ten years later, in 2016, the FCO provided a platform for over 6,000 staff from 29 other government departments in more than half of the UK's overseas posts⁵⁸, an increase of 85%.

While the number of UK FCO staff serving overseas has dropped, the number of development aid staff posted abroad has steadily risen since the establishment of an independent Department for International Development from 47 in 1997-98 to 1,313 in 2017-18⁵⁹. Similarly, the creation of a new Department for International Trade in 2016 has seen an additional 1,386 staff working in overseas posts, of which 146 are UK staff⁶⁰.

Like the Foreign Office, both departments rely heavily on employing locally engaged staff to deliver on their key priorities abroad. In the case of DFID it remains unclear how

many UK staff are currently posted overseas and how many of those employed are recruited locally as this figure is not published in the Department's annual accounts. This undermines the ability to critically evaluate their use of staff.

Similarly, the Ministry of Defence regularly posts military attachés in key diplomatic posts across the world to enhance and foster military relations. In 2010-11 there were 110 military attaches covering 143 countries, in 2017-18 this number has dropped to 85⁶¹.

Given this list of additional diplomatic resources abroad, some might argue that cuts to UK FCO staff serving overseas has been cushioned by the stabilisation-or growth in-staff posted in the wider diplomatic umbrella from other international facing departments. However, this may well be misleading, as it assumes that these resources are strategically coordinated, that staff are pooled appropriately as a common pot of resource, rather than individual departments working as silos; and perhaps most importantly, that the work of FCO staff in embassies can simply be replicated by another department's staff.

Of course, DFID, the MoD and the FCO regularly coordinate efforts to respond to crises abroad and protect UK citizens, as is evident from the cross-departmental response to Hurricanes Irma & Maria which involved personnel from all three departments. Similarly, in the area of economic diplomacy there has also already

⁵⁷ Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Active Diplomacy for a Changing World, The UK's International Priorities*, March 2006, pg42: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272260/6762.pdf

⁵⁸ Future FCO Report, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 9th May 2016, pg14: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/521916/Future_FCO_Report.pdf

⁵⁹ Department for International Development, *Annual Report & Accounts 1998-99*, pg65: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67968/deptreport98-99.pdf & Department for International Development, *Annual Report & Accounts 2017-18*, pg19: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/750989/DFID-Annual-Report-Accounts-2017-18-amended-Oct18.pdf

⁶⁰ Department for International Trade, *Single Departmental Plan*, 9 October 2018: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/department-for-international-trade-single-departmental-plan/department-for-international-trade-single-departmental-plan-may-2018>

⁶¹ Ministry of Defence, *Annual Report & Accounts 2017-18*, pg42: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/727618/CCS207_CCS0318104056-1_MOD_ARA_2017-18_-_Web_PDF.pdf & Ministry of Defence, *Annual Report & Accounts 2011-12*, pg10: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/35009/20121206_mod_annual_report_12.pdf

been successful diplomatic collaboration between FCO, DIT and DFID staff posted overseas. Working together, they recently identified opportunities for UK businesses to invest in £6 billion worth of infrastructure development in East Africa⁶².

However, aside from rapid response to crises, this kind of inter-departmental collaboration is relatively new and not without its teething problems. For example, in the area of trade policy there remains continuing ambiguity over the FCO's role when it comes to trade policy and the relationship between FCO and DIT staff working overseas. One of the Foreign Office's key priorities remains to help establish the UK's independent trade policy, which includes ensuring the UK's transition to becoming an independent member of the World Trade Organisation⁶³. Yet there is currently available very little detail in the public domain on how the FCO is coordinating its work with the Department for Trade and ensuring that they complement rather than replicate work.

There is a similar concern when it comes to the spending of overseas development aid. Taking into account the amount of additional funding the FCO receives from cross-Government Conflict, Stability, and Security and the Prosperity Funds, the Foreign Office is the largest spender of UK aid outside of DFID. While all UK Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending falls under the Government's aid strategy and must meet the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's definition, both the National Audit Office and the International Development Select Committee have raised concerns that there is the potential for divergence in objectives across departments⁶⁴. The Foreign Office in particular has been criticised over its poor ranking when it comes to the transparency of its ODA spend⁶⁵.

The International Development Committee in a recent inquiry, found that a considerable portion of FCO ODA is being spent on administrative costs for overseas FCO posts, where Ministers are effectively using

The Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) building in London. MI6 was previously an agency of the FCO, before becoming its own department in 1992-3.



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⁶² Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual Report & Accounts 2017-18, 5th July 2018, pg31-32: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/722730/FCO1119_FCO_Annual_Report_2018_-_ONLINE.PDF

⁶³ Ibid pg6.

⁶⁴ How the UK spends its aid budget, Institute for Fiscal Studies, 12th October 2018, pg265: <https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/budgets/gb2018/GB8.pdf>

⁶⁵ The 2018 Aid Transparency Index: <http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/the-index/2018>



The UK had a coordinated response to Hurricane Irma, which hit in 2017 affecting an estimated 1.2 million people, including personnel from DfID, the MoD and the FCO.



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development money to plug the funding shortage the FCO is facing. Members of the Committee identified funding intended for development aid to be used instead on diplomatic activity in multiple postings, including: Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, and China. The OECD's criteria for ODA spend allows funds to be used to support diplomats delivering ODA activity; this highlights continued gaps in the FCO's current funding model⁶⁶.

The increasing international engagement of other government departments has enhanced the UK's diplomatic umbrella through a growing number of non-FCO staff posted abroad, however it has also come at a time when the Foreign Office's role and resources have been diminished. This has led to the FCO having to work in a more collaborative manner with DFID and DIT to deliver upon key foreign policy aims and to make up for the shortfall in its overseas network, although with a mixture of success. It has also led to the loss of diplomatic expertise and knowledge of foreign countries that cannot simply be replaced by other international facing personnel.

As the former British Ambassador to Turkey, Sir David Logan has said, "what distinguishes the UK diplomatic service from its foreign peers and from other government departments is superior expertise in foreign countries and regions, and the resources to exploit this effectively on behalf of British interests⁶⁷." This capability is hard to replicate and expensive to replace.

Given the limited quantitative and qualitative data available beyond the total figures of FCO, DFID, DIT, and staff from other government departments abroad, it is difficult to assess the inter-play between various UK staff working abroad on international issues, or identify FCO overseas posts that could be filled by staff from another department. Further information will be needed from all international facing departments if the case is to be made properly for the Foreign Office to be at the heart of a wider diplomatic umbrella, and not simply be seen as cover for the continued under-resourcing of the UK's diplomatic network.

⁶⁶ International Development Committee, Oral evidence: Definition and administration of ODA, HC 547, 25th April 2018, Q159-169: <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/international-development-committee/definition-and-administration-of-oda/oral/82070.html>

⁶⁷ House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, The Role of the FCO in UK Government, 27 April 2011, pg47: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmfa/665/665.pdf>

The Case Against Simply Rolling DFID Back into the FCO

With the 'age of austerity' as its backdrop, the rapid movement towards a wider diplomatic umbrella, has been met by some quarters with scepticism. An increasingly shared departmental responsibility for international affairs can be dismissed as a cost saving measure — rather than a genuine attempt to forge inter-departmental collaboration — when the enduring context involves significant cuts to public spending, and a lack of intrastate investment for coordinating disparate department's foreign policy goals.

There is an established argument that the FCO's current funding crisis should be used as an opportunity to simply roll the Department for International Development and the newly created Department of International Trade back into the Foreign Office. Under this scenario, the 0.7% of the UK's national income which is spent on aid each year could be reallocated to prevent cuts to frontline diplomatic posts as part of a revitalised Foreign Office in full control of aid, trade, and diplomacy.

While this quick fix may gain sympathy amongst those who have historically opposed the creation of separate departments for aid and trade, and may be attractive to Treasury officials who are interested in further departmental budget cuts, it fails to address the long-term foreign policy challenges the UK is facing. This is particularly evident when considering the UK's already reduced diplomatic footprint and the vital role development aid plays in projecting soft power abroad.

There remain many fallacies over the UK's 0.7% aid commitment. For example, it is not commonly understood that a significant amount of the UK's peacekeeping budget and the BBC World Service's funding is covered by this ODA commitment⁶⁸. While some development aid sceptics underestimate the limited room for flexibility when it comes to defining aid within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's existing rules. However, it is undoubtedly clear that the adoption of the 0.7% commitment has allowed the UK to continue to punch above its weight and enhanced its reputation, particularly within the international development community, at a time when its diplomatic infrastructure has fallen into disrepair.

Similarly, those who advocate the transfer of a greater share of the UK's ODA spend from DFID to the FCO are ignoring the clear evidence that the FCO currently has neither the capacity nor the capability to spend it wisely. Instead, a significant portion of this additional money would inevitably be spent on the day to day running of diplomatic posts, as is the case now with some of the ODA responsibilities the FCO holds⁶⁹. While this might provide short-term respite for the FCO's diplomatic network it would not provide the long-term funding solution it so desperately needs. This in turn would lead to the erosion of the UK's development aid capability with no guarantee of the restoration of the FCO's overseas staffing capacity.

Of course, this isn't to say that development aid could not be spent with better value for money or that moves towards a more integrated approach to foreign policy is not desirable; rather, that calls to simply dissolve the independent departments of aid and trade and use it to fund the FCO are ill-conceived. Alternatively, serious consideration should be given as to how the international facing departments can work in closer collaboration beyond the current sub-committee structure⁷⁰ with the Foreign Office providing a much-needed strategic management role. The increased use of specific 'cross-departmental units' in Whitehall, comprised of staff from each of the international facing departments, could go some way to disrupting the natural silos of Whitehall.



Bahn refugee camp, 50km from the Liberia-Ivory Coast border.

⁶⁸ Statistics from the Department for International Development, 75% of the BBC World Service's funding from 2016-2020 is coming from ODA & in October 2017 the UK secured an increase in the proportion of aid spending which can be contributed to peacekeeping missions from 7% to 15%, Spending 0.7% on UK aid – and in the national interest, DFID Media Team, 11 February 2019: <https://dfidnews.blog.gov.uk/2019/02/11/spending-0-7-on-uk-aid-and-in-the-national-interest/>

⁶⁹ International Development Committee, Oral evidence: Definition and administration of ODA, HC 547, 25th April 2018, Q159-169: <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/international-development-committee/definition-and-administration-of-oda/oral/82070.html>

⁷⁰ It is worth noting that the Foreign Secretary does not chair any of the National Security Council sub-committees (the Chancellor currently chairs the Strategic Defence and Security Review Implementation Subcommittee and the Minister for the Cabinet office chairs the Cross-Government Funds Subcommittee).

Comparative Analysis: Germany and France

There is a natural inclination for British policymakers to compare themselves to their German and French counterparts. After all, both countries are historic European powers that have comparable population sizes and economies to Britain. Similarly, both are also members of the G8, NATO, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the two countries remain members of the EU, whilst France, like Britain also has a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. These shared economic interests and support for an 'international rules' based system has led the Foreign Affairs Select Committee in the past to describe Germany and France as our closest 'diplomatic analogues'⁷¹, a view that is broadly supported across Whitehall.

However, when it comes to foreign policy and comparing the role, resources, and budgets of their respective foreign ministries, comparisons need to be undertaken with caution. After all, the structure of the German Federal Foreign Ministry and the French Foreign Ministry are a product of the different political systems under which they operate, with the function and responsibilities of each foreign ministry varying.

France

In the case of France, it has a similar sized diplomatic footprint to the UK, sharing largely the same membership of international organisations, and maintaining its own cultural spheres of influence particularly in North and West Africa.

While the Foreign Office has lost control of both development aid and trade, the French Foreign Ministry has not only managed to keep these core functions but greatly expanded its remit. In addition to development aid (*jointly managed with the Ministry of Finance*) and trade, the French Foreign Ministry is also responsible for payment of international subscriptions, the French tourism agency; cultural programmes abroad, the international arm of French media (*jointly managed with the Ministry of Culture*), international volunteering programmes and France's network of international schools and higher education campuses (*jointly managed with the Ministry of Education*)⁷². It also continues to issue passports and visas, although the budget and resources primarily comes under the Ministry of Interior.

The significant differences between the expanded structure and responsibilities of the French Foreign Ministry and the diminished remit of the UK Foreign Office make direct comparisons difficult. Meanwhile the French Foreign Ministry's budget for external action in 2016-17 was slightly higher than the FCO's total departmental budget that year (£2.67 billion (€3.02 billion) to the FCO's £2.2 billion), and putting aside the separate allocation for development aid, it funds a greater number of programmes⁷³. Similarly, the lack of a publicly available data on the French Foreign Ministry budget makes comparisons relating to specific responsibilities near to impossible.

Turning to their respective diplomatic networks, in 2013 (the most recent figure publicly available) the French Foreign

⁷¹ House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Supplementary Memorandum submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Comparison with the deployed financial and personnel resources of the French and German Ministries of Foreign Affairs: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmfa/271/9042822.htm>

⁷² The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Implementing Agencies of the Ministry: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/the-ministry-and-its-network/implementing-agencies-of-the-ministry/>

⁷³ Budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development 2016-17, French Foreign Ministry: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/the-ministry-and-its-network/events/article/budget-of-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-international-development-2017> & Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual Report & Accounts 2017-18, 5th July 2018, pg139: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/722730/FCO1119_FCO_Annual_Report_2018_-_ONLINE.PDF



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*The hall of mirrors
in the Palace of
Versailles, France.*

Ministry employed 3,099 staff domestically over its estate in Paris and Nantes, with a further 2,905 French staff posted abroad. The Foreign Office in comparison had 4,539 staff in 2013, of which just 1,868 UK staff were posted abroad⁷⁴.

What is evident is that while the French Foreign Ministry and UK Foreign Office roughly had a similar percentage of staff split between overseas and domestic posts in 2013⁷⁵, France had an additional 1,465 staff (32%) of which 1,037 were posted abroad.

This trend is not new, since historical comparative data collected by the FCO and recorded in its annual accounts shows that France has consistently posted more national

staff abroad than the UK. In 1993, the UK had 2,500 staff posted abroad compared to France's 4,637⁷⁶. Given the higher level of national staff France deploys overseas, it also relies on significantly lower numbers of local staff than the UK employing just 5,053 locally engaged staff in 2013⁷⁷.

This analysis suggests that the French Foreign Ministry not only has more responsibilities than its British counterpart, expending a similar sized budget but also posts a higher number of French diplomats abroad. Unlike the UK, France recognises that the purpose of its foreign ministry is to work overseas to increase its influence, prosperity, and security, and it has adjusted its resources to reflect this.

⁷⁴ The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Facts & Figures, French Foreign Ministry: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/MAE_Chiffres_ENGaccess.pdf & For UK Comparison see Annexe Table 4 & 5

⁷⁵ French Foreign Ministry 51% of staff posted domestically compared to the UK Foreign Office's 58.8% in 2013.

⁷⁶ See Annexe Table 5

⁷⁷ See Annexe Table 6



Germany

In the past it has often been considered that Germany has a far more understated foreign policy compared to France and the UK. Its lack of a natural cultural sphere of influence, a casualty of its historical partition occurring physically and ideologically in living memory, has meant that Germany has not taken as prominent role on the international stage in regard to foreign policy. Recently however, this has changed as Germany has invested in its diplomatic footprint and sought to expand its role in multinational institutions, increasing its soft power at a time when more countries are looking for Germany to provide stable western leadership.

Like the Foreign Office in its current form, the German Federal Foreign Ministry is just one actor out of several federal ministries who conduct international affairs abroad. For example, it does not have control of Germany's development aid budget (which resides with the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development); or, for that matter, responsibility for trade (which resides with the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy). Rather, the Federal Foreign Ministry's remit is limited to the funding and running of Germany's diplomatic network; payment of international subscriptions; managing and funding Germany's cultural exchanges, including the work of the German Archaeological Institute and the Goethe Institute which includes German schools abroad; German language promotion, and academic scholarships; and some funding for security and humanitarian aid⁷⁸. Like France, Germany's Foreign Ministry is still involved with the issuing of passports and visas but the prime responsibility and budget sits within the Interior Ministry.

It is clear that the Federal Foreign Ministry's structure and responsibilities offers a closer

template to the UK Foreign Office then the French Foreign Ministry, particularly in relation to its reliance on cooperation with other departments to implement foreign policy goals. However, the Federal Foreign Ministry (in its current form) is not only a relatively younger department than the Foreign Office but operates within a political system that encourages co-operation rather than competition — between departments, and therefore has a longer history of collaboration when it comes to meeting foreign policy goals.

Despite a similar set of responsibilities, the Federal Foreign Ministry's budget is substantially larger than its British counterpart. In 2017, the Federal Foreign Ministry budget stood at €5.2 billion (£4.64 billion) compared to the £2.7 billion of the Foreign Office⁷⁹. While the amount Germany spent on its diplomatic network was roughly similar to the Foreign Office in 2017⁸⁰, over half of its total budget was spent on multinational programmes and funds for bilateral cooperation. This reflects Germany's foreign policy goal to increase its influence in multinational institutions and carve out a larger role on the international stage⁸¹.

Turning to Germany's diplomatic resources, the Federal Foreign Ministry employed 2,919 staff in 2018 with a further 3,111 national staff posted abroad⁸². By comparison the Foreign Office employed 4,003 staff of which 1,744 staff were posted abroad⁸³. As with France and the UK, just under half of the Federal Foreign Ministry staff are posted abroad. Comparisons with the UK Foreign Office's staffing figures also show that Germany had an additional 2,027 (50%) staff in 2018, of which 1,367 were posted abroad.

Historic data collected by the FCO shows in 1994 Germany had 3,202 staff abroad compared to the UK which had just 2,500⁸⁴. Similarly, the even split of German diplomatic

⁷⁸ German Federal Foreign Ministry, Germany's foreign policy budget: <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aamt/auswdienst/haushalt-node>

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ £1.15 billion (1.3 billion euros) compared to £1.21 billion, the FCO's overseas representation spend in 2017-18. See Annexe Table 1 for UK and German Federal Foreign Ministry, Germany's foreign policy budget: <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aamt/auswdienst/haushalt-node>

⁸¹ German Federal Foreign Ministry, Germany's foreign and European policy principles: <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/-/1229790> & Spiegel Online, Former German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel 'The World Is Changing Dramatically': <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/interview-with-former-german-foreign-minister-sigmar-gabriel-a-1229393.html>

⁸² German Federal Foreign Ministry, The Foreign Service – staff: <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aamt/auswdienst/mitarbeiter-node>

⁸³ See Annexe Table 4 & Table 5

⁸⁴ See Annexe Table 5



The Brandenburg Gate, Berlin, Germany.

staff posted abroad means that it relies on a substantially lower number of locally engaged staff in its embassies, employing just 5,622⁸⁵.

Germany's diplomatic network is also supported by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy which posts staff abroad to promote trade and investment (numbers not publicly available) and a further 120 staff from the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development who work overseas on development aid projects⁸⁶. These three key departments collaborate to ensure that Germany's foreign policy priorities are met.

On the face of it there are clear similarities between the UK Foreign Office's current set

of responsibilities and its role within a wider diplomatic umbrella and that of its German counterpart. However, a direct comparison is not possible with the limited data publicly available and without also recognising the different political systems in which the Foreign Office and the Federal Foreign Ministry reside in.

A more detailed analysis of the structure, budget, and resources of the French Foreign Ministry and the German Federal Foreign Ministry would reinforce the fact that both sit within radically different governmental frameworks. As such, direct comparisons remain largely unhelpful, even if they do offer a barometer of where the Foreign Office's funding and resource levels sit in relation to its peers.

⁸⁵ See Annexe Table 6

⁸⁶ The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Structure and organisation: <http://www.bmz.de/en/ministry/structure/index.html> & The German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Trade Policy: <https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Dossier/trade-policy.html>



A Foreign Office Fit for the Future

Despite the protestations of the Treasury, the Foreign Office will require more funding, more diplomatic staff abroad and perhaps just as importantly, a greater role in co-ordinating strategic foreign policy priorities that involve other Whitehall departments.

While the recent announcements of ring-fenced resources for the Foreign Office are glad tidings for any foreign secretary — an additional 50 staff in European embassies, 250 staff in overseas posts over the next two years, and 100 new staff based in the Foreign Office — these ‘additional resources’ have strings attached from the Treasury with the expectation that the Foreign Office will have to make £4.1 million worth of savings in other areas of its diplomatic network⁸⁷.

UK Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt speaking at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London.



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On top of this, Jeremy Hunt used his first major policy speech as foreign secretary to announce that by the end of 2020 the FCO would have an additional 335 staff posted overseas, 328 UK staff posted at home, and a further 329 locally-engaged staff⁸⁸. However, after further investigation he conceded that 450 of the UK staff posts had already been announced by his predecessor⁸⁹. Putting aside the 329 new posts for locally-engaged staff, the actual number of new UK posts announced was only a further 213, split between Whitehall and overseas. Such subterfuge offers little reassurance that the new foreign secretary grasps the extent of the Foreign Office's historic under-resourcing.

Any announcement of additional resources should be considered in the current climate of austerity and the decade's worth of cuts and reorganisations the Foreign Office has endured. As such, when considering the additional 355 UK staff serving overseas⁹⁰, this will only take the total number of UK staff abroad back to its 2012-13 level⁹¹.

In the case of the 50 European based staff, these roles have been funded with cuts to the diplomatic network in Asia, the Americas, and Africa, in reality represents a ‘reshuffle’ of resources, as opposed to additional capacity being made available⁹². In other words this is a sleight of hand, less of an increase and more of a redeployment and a possible snapshot of the Government's future priorities in shoring up existing European trade links at the expense of building new trade links with emerging Asian markets.

⁸⁷ Simon McDonald Letter to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee on additional FCO staff, 26th January 2018: <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-committee/fco-budget-and-capacity-and-annual-report-201617/written/78069.pdf>

⁸⁸ Foreign & Commonwealth Office, An Invisible Chain: speech by the Foreign Secretary, 31 October 2018: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/an-invisible-chain-speech-by-the-foreign-secretary>

⁸⁹ House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Letter from the Secretary of State to the Chair, regarding the Policy Exchange speech, 12 November 2018: <https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/foreign-affairs/Correspondence/2017-19/FAC-PE-speech-17-19.pdf>

⁹⁰ The confirmed additional 250 overseas posts & half of the additional staff announced by Jeremy Hunt at his Policy Exchange Speech on 31st October 2018.

⁹¹ See Table 8

⁹² House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Government Response: The Future of UK Diplomacy In Europe, 27th March 2018, pg5: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfa/918/918.pdf>

Similarly, the additional money the Treasury has made available to the Foreign Office to fund these roles totals at £119.6 million split over two years⁹³, but to put that figure into context, this is the equivalent of just 5.1% of the Foreign Office's total budget and does not take into consideration the £161 million (15.7%) the Foreign Office has lost from its administration and programme expenditure budget since 2015⁹⁴.

It is clear that while these resources may temporarily stop the stagnation of the Foreign Office, alone they will not meet the huge burden the UK faces repairing old relationships and creating new ones in the post-Brexit world.

Going Forward: Foreign Office Accounts

For the Foreign Office to benefit from the on-going debate on the need for an adequately resourced foreign policy, the accounts of the Foreign Office must be made transparent. This requires the Foreign Office to release regular data on the number of UK staff serving overseas, a breakdown of diplomatic posts by geographic regions, a breakdown of locally employed staff by region, regular comparative data on other country's diplomatic networks, and a clearer breakdown on core diplomatic spend. To avoid the risk of revealing vulnerabilities to hostile countries, this data could be produced by grade and not include the specific roles or titles of FCO staff abroad (below senior management).

While few countries currently release such a level of data, it remains the only way to establish an accurate account of the impact the years of budget cuts and neglect has had on the Foreign Office. It would also strengthen the hand of FCO officials and make it easier for them to fight their corner in the continuous spending battles across Whitehall.

Sadly, the Foreign Office accounts published each year are not only diminutive in scope but have lacked consistency on every front.

Influenced often by short-term political considerations, data series have been collected, recorded in one period and then omitted from future accounts. Inconvenient international comparisons have been buried, rather than highlighted to allow individual governments to save face. In turn this has allowed consecutive governments to ignore the systematic cutting of the Foreign Office's resources and denied reasonable scrutiny into its effects.

Serious consideration should be given to the National Statistics Office taking a greater role in overseeing the release of resource data from the Foreign Office. This would ensure impartiality and prevent staffing and resource figures from being misrepresented by sitting governments for political ends.

Furthermore, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee should take a more robust role when considering the regular release of the Foreign Office's accounts. Members of the committee have a duty to challenge the figures released and should be vocal about the need for greater transparency.

“It is clear that while these resources may temporarily stop the stagnation of the Foreign Office, alone they will not meet the huge burden the UK faces repairing old relationships and creating new ones in the post-Brexit world.”

⁹³ Report & Accounts 2017-18, 5th July 2018, pg48:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/722730/FCO1119_FCO_Annual_Report_2018_-_ONLINE.PDF

⁹⁴ See Annexe Table 3



A Global Player: Aspirations and Conclusion

As Britain continues to debate its membership of the European Union the diplomatic resources available to the Foreign Office should concern us all, as the level of these resources will invariably impact on the international relationships and agreements that help maintain our standard of living, our quality of life, and the security of our country. In an era where Britain's standing in the world has never been more in question, its diplomatic arm must be fully equipped to demonstrate that we still have much to offer.

The current Government has made much of the phrase 'Global Britain' which it claims describes Britain becoming once more a global leader on the world stage. Yet it has already fallen into the familiar trap of previous governments: favouring a foreign policy built around resources as a starting point, instead of fitting resources around foreign policy priorities.

Such an approach is doomed to fail and will merely mask the Foreign Office's slow decline at a time when the demand for diplomatic resources could not be higher. Brexit will not just require replenished embassies to strengthen bi-lateral relations, but also the bolstering of resources at a multilateral level where the EU has historically represented or co-ordinated its members. An obvious example will be the need for a permanent UK delegation to attend the World Trade Organisation. The Foreign Office will also need additional capacity to replace the EU's current role in the preparation and co-ordination of its members at the World Bank, the G7, the G20 and at the OSCE conference where the EU normally puts

forward a single statement at the Permanent Council in Vienna⁹⁵.

As the next department spending review fast approaches it seems that a long-term funding solution is the only way to de-politicise the UK's diplomatic resources and escape the short-term thinking of the past that has often left the Foreign Office a casualty in the Whitehall budgetary battles. The success of



⁹⁵ 'Patchwork Power' Europe? The EU's Representation in International Institutions, Sieglinde Gstöhl, College of Europe, 24th April 2018, pg16:
https://www.ies.be/files/repo/conference2008/EUinIA_IV_1_Gstohl.pdf

⁹⁶ The Price of Freedom: A 3% GDP Target For Securing UK International Interests, British Foreign Policy Group, May 2018, pg2:
<http://bfp.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/The-Price-of-Freedom.pdf>

⁹⁷ Ibid, pg6

⁹⁸ Ibid, pg6

the Government's commitment to deliver 0.7% of GNI for development aid, and its NATO commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence, has encouraged analysts to call for a total government commitment of 3% of GDP to be spent on securing the UK's international interests.

As it stands the Government already spends around 2.75% of GDP on international engagement expenditure. But this figure is shared between defence, international trade, exiting the EU, international development, the intelligence agencies, and expenditure on the Foreign Office⁹⁶.

Lifting government expenditure to 3% of GDP would raise an additional £4.9 billion, £1.5 billion of which could be spent on the Foreign Office⁹⁷. Such an increase would still leave the Foreign Office as one of the

lowest spending departments in Whitehall⁹⁸. On a practical level, such investment would probably need to be gradually introduced over a number of years to allow departments to build their capacity efficiently, to make the most effective use of such an increase and coordinate strategically with other departments.

It would be easy to view the Foreign Office's reduced stature, budget, and resources through the lens of temporary austerity. However, this would ignore the historical underfunding of the UK's diplomatic network which has often found itself the victim of the transient funding settlements of Whitehall. It is time for the Government to recognise that a sustainable funding model is the only way to revive the Foreign Office and Britain's fortunes alongside it.



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Calculation of Overseas Representation Spend

Classifications:

(Cash plans - Vote 1 Foreign & Commonwealth Office Chapter in Government Expenditure Reports).

Overseas Representation

(Resource Budget, Foreign & Commonwealth Office Chapter in Government Expenditure reports, 1971-1998).

Administration

(Resource Budget, Foreign & Commonwealth Office Chapter in Government Expenditure Reports, 1999-2005).

Delivering Foreign Policy

(Resource Budget, Foreign & Commonwealth Office Chapter in Government Expenditure Reports, 2006-2010).

Administration and Programme Expenditure

(Resource Budget, Foreign & Commonwealth Office Chapter in Government Expenditure Reports, 2010-2018).

TME: Total Managed Expenditure

(A Treasury budgeting term which covers all current and capital spending carried out by the public sector i.e. not just by central Government departments. It comprises the sum of Departmental-Expenditure Limits (DELs) and Annually Managed Expenditure (AME), less depreciation.)⁹⁹

PSCE: Public Sector Current Expenditure

(A Treasury budgeting term which covers spending on the day-to-day cost of providing services, welfare, grants and administration.)

Definitions

Overseas Representation:

This expenditure includes the cost of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in London, British diplomatic and consular representation in more than 120 countries and 8 official delegations to international organisations and conferences. It covers the cost of staff (excluding those engaged on information work) as well as their office and



private accommodation abroad, and official travel.

The responsibility of the Diplomatic Service for representing and promoting British interests abroad includes the handling of inter-governmental relations; advice on foreign policy; protecting the interests of British nationals abroad; promoting Britain's visible and invisible exports by assisting British commercial organisations and firms and by conducting bilateral and multilateral negotiations on international trade and payments; and representing Her Majesty's Government in international organisations.

Also included in the expenditure figures is the cost of the Passport Offices in London and other centres, and the communications organisation in support of the Diplomatic Service.'

⁹⁹ Finance glossary, House of Commons, please see: <https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/Scrutiny/finance-glossary-0717.pdf>



Government Expenditure Report, Foreign & Commonwealth Office Chapter 1974 pg20.

An FCO memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Committee, describes section A (**Administration and Programme Expenditure**) as:

'Expenditure by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), on its administration, strategic and bilateral programmes, FCO Services, Wilton Park Executive Agency, hospitality and facilities; scholarships, information services and sponsored visits; special payments and assistance programmes to support foreign policy objectives including human rights, good governance, international security and the fight against the illicit drug trade; and on associated non-cash items.'

Foreign & Commonwealth Office Supplementary Estimate 2017-18 Memorandum for the Foreign Affairs Committee: <https://www.parliament.uk/>

[documents/commons-committees/foreign-affairs/2017-18-Supp-Estimates-Memo-AS.pdf](https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/foreign-affairs/2017-18-Supp-Estimates-Memo-AS.pdf)

Considerations

Overseas Development Administration costs calculated with overseas representation until 1974.

Funding for Passport Offices in London transferred to the Home Office in 1983.

Capital Spend

Overseas Representation spend included capital spend until 1995. From 1995 to 2018 capital spend was recorded separately and added to overseas representation spend figures by the author of this report.

Table 1: Overseas representation, £ million

	<i>Cash prices</i>	<i>Real (2017/18) prices</i>	<i>% TME</i>	<i>% PSCE</i>	<i>% GDP</i>
1972-73	100	1,080	0.4%	0.5%	0.1%
1973-74	100	990	0.3%	0.4%	0.1%
1974-75	140	1,150	0.3%	0.4%	0.1%
1975-76	160	1,060	0.3%	0.4%	0.1%
1976-77	165	960	0.3%	0.3%	0.1%
1977-78	166	849	0.2%	0.3%	0.1%
1978-79	181	832	0.2%	0.3%	0.1%
1979-80	192	755	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
1980-81	221	730	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
1981-82	232	693	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
1982-83	260	724	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
1983-84	306	814	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
1984-85	363	914	0.2%	0.3%	0.1%
1985-86	360	859	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
1986-87	404	925	0.2%	0.3%	0.1%
1987-88	465	1,009	0.2%	0.3%	0.1%
1988-89	481	980	0.2%	0.3%	0.1%
1989-90	557	1,054	0.3%	0.3%	0.1%
1990-91	573	1,002	0.2%	0.3%	0.1%
1991-92	633	1,047	0.2%	0.3%	0.1%
1992-93	621	1,001	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
1993-94	618	973	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
1994-95	599	932	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
1995-96	654	987	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%

Table 1 Notes:
Data prior to 1976-77 are approximate estimates and rounded to the nearest 10 sources:

ONS GDP deflators at market prices, and money GDP June 2018 (Quarterly National Accounts)

UK Government expenditure reports, 1969-79 & 1974-75 (Jan 1971) onwards

OBR, Public finances databank

Figures include departmental capital spend

Annexe

Table 1: Overseas representation, £ million

	<i>Cash prices</i>	<i>Real (2017/18) prices</i>	<i>% TME</i>	<i>% PSCE</i>	<i>% GDP</i>
1996-97	587	856	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
1997-98	611	885	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
1998-99	676	967	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
1999-00	550	783	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
2000-01	863	1,202	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
2001-02	717	989	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
2002-03	802	1,079	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
2003-04	759	1,001	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
2004-05	784	1,007	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
2005-06	1,023	1,280	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
2006-07	913	1,109	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
2007-08	992	1,176	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
2008-09	1,084	1,251	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
2009-10	1,105	1,258	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
2010-11	1,086	1,213	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
2011-12	1,121	1,236	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
2012-13	1,073	1,160	0.1%	0.2%	0.1%
2013-14	1,192	1,265	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
2014-15	1,149	1,204	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
2015-16	966	1,004	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
2016-17	951	967	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%
2017-18	1,210	1,210	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%
2018-19	960	946	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%
2019-20	894	867	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%

Table 1 Notes:

Data prior to 1976-77 are approximate estimates and rounded to the nearest 10 sources:

ONS GDP deflators at market prices, and money GDP June 2018 (Quarterly National Accounts)

UK Government expenditure reports, 1969-79 & 1974-75 (Jan 1971) onwards

OBR. Public finances databank

Figures include departmental capital spend



Table 2: Resources and capital DEL spending by department
(£ millions, adjusted for inflation)

	2013-14		2014-15		2015-16	
	RDEL	CDEL	RDEL	CDEL	RDEL	CDEL
Defence	37,724	9,007	35,798	9,156	35,794	8,737
Single Intelligence Account	2,088	529	2,129	577	2,260	598
Home Office	11,733	551	11,993	545	11,185	494
Foreign and Commonwealth Office	2,285	127	1,951	165	2,030	137
International Development	8,262	2,389	7,355	2,778	7,101	2,530
Health and Social Care	111,972	5,697	114,802	5,210	118,234	4,837
Work and Pensions	8,075	251	7,488	263	6,730	195
Education	69,650	4,374	65,215	4,993	66,524	5,630
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy	2,566	10,096	2,568	9,810	2,599	10,605
Transport	4,991	9,062	3,626	9,841	3,149	6,240
Exiting the European Union	8	-	7	-	8	-
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport	1,471	35	1,585	276	1,444	363
MHCLG — Housing and Communities	2,107	3,959	2,142	4,541	2,260	4,002
MHCLG — Local Government	17,496	-	14,314	-	11,186	-
Scotland	27,697	3,101	27,641	3,447	27,382	3,289
Wales	15,357	1,406	14,885	1,572	13,858	1,604
Northern Ireland	10,786	1,003	10,679	1,137	10,565	796
Justice	8,609	291	8,100	310	7,640	277
Law Officers' Departments	617	3	580	4	575	3
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs	1,999	583	1,945	725	1,806	593
HM Revenue and Customs	3,875	232	3,635	245	3,718	237
HM Treasury	-264	-6	135	37	135	-686
Cabinet Office	271	32	442	31	423	-39
International Trade	219	3	293	2	355	2
Small and Independent Bodies	1,425	81	1,338	87	1,403	94

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Annexe

Table 2: Resources and capital DEL spending by department
(£ millions, adjusted for inflation)

2016-17		2017-18		2018-19		2019-20	
RDEL	CDEL	RDEL	CDEL	RDEL	CDEL	RDEL	CDEL
36,027	8,837	34,199	9,704	36,159	8,630	36,322	8,723
2,307	614	2,390	576	2,554	634	2,326	635
11,165	519	10,892	624	10,794	484	10,689	468
2,093	61	2,208	-252	2,316	101	1,297	95
7,539	2,632	7,558	2,713	7,368	2,612	8,012	3,420
119,027	4,634	120,650	5,238	121,672	6,269	121,889	6,538
6,266	297	6,108	432	6,058	251	5,414	220
71,045	5,191	74,879	4,846	67,366	5,105	67,731	4,944
2,001	10,977	1,720	10,464	1,909	10,608	1,950	11,046
2,977	5,512	3,616	6,218	3,705	7,949	3,227	10,201
23	-	57	1	91	1	91	0
1,576	280	1,584	351	1,655	576	1,620	586
2,531	5,201	2,372	6,634	2,775	9,276	2,199	10,437
8,369	-	6,714	-	4,239	-	5,451	-
21,739	3,302	14,966	3,626	15,261	3,841	14,792	4,114
13,552	1,473	13,998	1,825	13,718	1,872	13,571	2,050
10,659	1,023	10,631	1,148	10,656	1,544	10,293	1,436
7,532	424	7,630	412	6,819	524	6,375	405
539	14	567	10	578	16	564	8
1,773	666	1,848	632	1,782	604	1,671	571
3,901	332	3,946	281	3,683	246	3,446	222
162	-2	226	-78	170	221	150	254
458	48	671	116	401	29	292	15
351	6	383	15	349	3	336	4
1,515	104	1,394	177	1,550	304	1,404	364

Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual Report & Accounts: 2016-17 (pg64),
2015-16 (pg72), 2014-15 (pg28), 2013-14 (pg45) & 2012-13 (pg116)



Table 3

	1972	1982	1990	1997	2006
Europe					
Austria	24	24	21	11	27
Finland	27	15	15	12	14
Ireland	11	14	14	14	15
Malta	11	10	5	7	10
Belgium	34	40	31	19	21
Denmark*	28	23	19	15	13
France*	105	86	73	75	97
Germany*	133	131	115	93	119
Greece	33	35	27	30	37
Cyprus	17	15	13	15	18
Holy See	4	2	2	2	2
Italy	74	52	41	45	51
Luxembourg	7	11	8	9	7
Lithuania				5	8
Estonia					13
Latvia					11
Netherlands	32	29	24	29	25
Norway	33	30	18	15	11
Portugal*	38	30	11	25	20
Spain*	53	58	56	60	76
Sweden	34	22	18	16	18
Switzerland	25	32	23	29	30
Turkey	33	35	34	44	63
Czech Republic				20	21
Czechoslovakia	15	17	14		
Slovakia				7	9
Bulgaria	9	11	0	16	21
Hungary	15	17	15	22	21
Poland	24	33	19	28	36
Romania	13	17	13	20	33
Soviet Union	34	43	39		
Russian Federation				64	69
Belarus				5	9
Ukraine					24
Georgia					11
Yugoslavia	21	20	13	11	
Bosnia Herzegovina				5	12
Croatia				11	16
Slovenia				5	7
Serbia & Montenegro					25
Kosovo					7
Total	887	852	681	784	1,027

Table 3 Notes:
Diplomatic Service
List- 1972, 1982, 1990,
1997 & 2006, Foreign &
Commonwealth Office.

*Country & overseas
territories, & East
and West Germany
(1972-1990).

Figures include
development staff,
trade staff, defence
attaches & British
Council staff.

Figures also include
honorary consuls &
locally employed staff.

Annexe

Table 3

	1972	1982	1990	1997	2006
Key Commonwealth Countries					
India	75	77	70	96	106
Pakistan	66	60	32	42	63
Canada	43	42	36	30	30
Australia	46	43	38	36	39
New Zealand	22	18	17	17	17
South Africa	51	42	39	51	56
Total	303	282	232	272	307
Key Trading Partners					
Japan	47	52	41	49	40
China	12	46	38	48	168
United States*	195	183	175	186	199
Saudi Arabia	16	46	29	33	33
Total	270	327	283	316	440

Table 3 Notes:
Diplomatic Service
List- 1972, 1982, 1990,
1997 & 2006, Foreign &
Commonwealth Office.

*Country & overseas
territories, & East
and West Germany
(1972-1990).

Figures include
development staff,
trade staff, defence
attaches & British
Council staff.

Figures also include
honorary consuls &
locally employed staff.

Table 4: UK FCO Diplomatic Manpower

Year	FCO Staff Numbers	Notes	Year	FCO Staff Numbers	Notes
1985-86	8,354		2003-04	6,199	
1986-87	8,033		2004-05	6,275	
1987-88	8,038		2005-06	7,039	
1988-89	8,406		2006-07	7,005	
1989-90	7,982		2007-08	4,626	UK Border Agency, Wilton Park, & FCO Services taken out
1990-91	8,096				
1991-92	8,601				
1992-93	6,765	MI6 taken out	2008-09	4,780	
1993-94	6,565		2009-10	4,931	
1994-95	6,434		2010-11	4,717	
1995-96	6,162		2011-12	4,510	
1996-97	6,050		2012-13	4,771	
1997-98	5,971	50 jobs transferred to DFID	2013-14	4,539	
1998-99	5,638		2014-15	4,393	
1999-00	5,570		2015-16	4,212	
2000-01	5,667		2016-17	4,420	
2001-02	5,790		2017-18	4,523	
2002-03	6,106		2017-18*	4,003	*forecast for the end of the financial year

Table 4 Notes: Foreign & Commonwealth Accounts & Expenditure Reports 1985-2018. *Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2017-18.

Table 5: UK FCO Staff Serving Overseas

Year	Number	Comparative		
1989	2,790			
1990	2,839			
1991	2,710			
1992	2,600			
1993	2,600	France	Germany	Italy
1994	2,500	4,637	3,202	2,746
1995	2,530	4,851	3,653	3,089
1996	2,472	4,851	3,551	2,833
1997	2,415	4,275	3,468	
1998	2,350	6,000	3,600	
1999	2,336	5,516	3,315	
2000	2,295	5,669	3,361	
2001	N/A			
2002	N/A			
2003	N/A			
2004	N/A			
2005	N/A			
2006	N/A			
2007	N/A			
2008	1,824			
2009	1,885			
2010	1,946			
2011	1,866			
2012	1,891			
2013	*1,868			
2014	*1,727			
2015	*1,670			
2016	*1,546			
2017	*1,617			
2018	1,744			

Table 5 Notes:
Foreign & Commonwealth Accounts & Expenditure Reports 1989-2018.

2018 staffing number reflects up to date figure in Foreign & Commonwealth Accounts 2017-18.,

*Freedom of Information Request Response from the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 23 May 2018, REF: 0501-18: 'We do not centrally hold a breakdown of how many FCO UK-based staff were overseas between 2008 to 2012. We are only able to provide information on our total FCO UK-based headcount data for that period.'

These are the headcount numbers for our staff overseas as of 31st March each year:

Year	Number of Staff	Year	Number of Staff
2013	1868	2016	1546
2014	1727	2017	1617
2015	1670	2018	1730

Annexe

Table 6: UK Diplomatic Network Locally Employed Staff

Year	Staff		Year	Staff	
1994	7,100		2007	10,000	
1995	7,400		2008	10,000	
1996	7,440		2009	9,000	
1997	7,600		2010	9,000	
1998	7,810		2011	8,575	
1999	7,810		2012	8,685	
2000	7,841		2013	9,500	France: 5,053
2001	N/A		2014	9,200	
2002	8,100		2015	9,200	
2003	9,860		2016	8,268	
2004	10,000		2017	8,366	Germany: 5,622
2005	10,000		2018	7,946	
2006	9,600				

Table 6 Notes:
Foreign & Commonwealth Accounts & Expenditure Reports 1989-2018.

Germany: "The Foreign Service – staff", Federal Foreign Ministry-Online: <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aamt/auswdienst/mitarbeiter-node>

France: "The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs : Facts & Figures", French Foreign Ministry-Online: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/MAE_Chiffres_ENGaccess.pdf

Table 7: FCO Staff Numbers – Paybands

Year	SMS (SCS)	D7 (Grade 6)	D6 (Grade 7)	C5 (SE0)	C4 (HE0)	B3 (E0)	A2 (A0)	A1 (AA)	Total
1995	460	98	564	392	970	1589	1483	291	5,847
1996	456	100	571	376	949	1550	1430	260	
1997	450	85	581	362	925	1490	1327	236	
1998	443	94	565	372	925	1396	1282	244	
1999	449	95	578	346	977	1114	1236	263	
2000	445	126	601	482	1153	1129	1042	328	
2001	447	154	628	492	1179	1256	1057	378	
2002	469	179	659	540	1255	1287	1154	341	
2003	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
2004	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
2005	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
2006	419	1026 (both)		1865 (both)		1543	1192 (both)		
2007	418	272	742	392	920	970	814	140	
2008	415	302	788	404	972	976	843	122	
2009	415	325	770	381	1017	980	843	133	
2010	395	325	714	401	968	920	833	107	
2011	395	360	700	403	968	850	791	54	
2012	409	410	754	438	1117	849	759	64	
2013	404	407	782	446	1165	734	653	18	
2014	382	430	792	443	1133	715	555	19	
2015	365	424	744	461	1102	689	491	19	
2016	413	428	830	482	1180	670	451	45	
2017	422	447	866	503	1283	614	400	56	4,591
Change	-38	349	302	111	313	-975	-1083	-235	-1,256

Table 7 Notes: Foreign & Commonwealth Accounts & Expenditure Reports 1994-2018

Table 8: UK Staff – Diplomatic Embassies Overseas (* = Less than 5)

	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017	
UK Delegation						
Brussels (UKRep)	76	83	81	84	75	
Brussels (NATO)	17	14	16	15	14	
Geneva (UKMis)	18	18	16	16	21	
New York (UKMis)	36	33	35	35	36	
Paris (OECD)	*	4	4	4	5	
Strasbourg CoE	*	3	3	4	4	
Vienna (OSCE)	10	9	8	8	9	
Vienna (UKMis)	8	18	9	9	7	
Total	172				171	(-1)
Europe						
Amsterdam	*	1	1	1	0	
Athens	10	11	10	8	10	
Belgrade	9	9	9	8	8	
Berlin	20	17	18	16	18	
Berne	*	4	3	3	3	
Bratislava	*	2	2	2	2	
Bucharest	8	7	6	6	7	
Budapest	6	5	5	3	5	
Chişinău					2	
Copenhagen	6	6	7	7	9	
Dublin	11	8	6	5	9	
Dusseldorf	*					
Gibraltar	*	5	3	3	4	
Helsinki	*	4	4	5	5	
Holy See	*	2	2	2	2	
Kiev	11	9	10	11	11	
Lisbon	*	6	4	3	3	
Ljubljana	*	1	1	2	2	
Luxemborug	*	1	1	1	1	
Madrid	14	13	12	11	11	

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Table 8: UK Staff – Diplomatic Embassies Overseas (* = Less than 5)

	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017	
Milan	*					
Minsk	*	3	3	3	3	
Munich	*	2				
Nicosia	9	8	8	8	9	
Oslo	7	5	5	5	5	
Paris	26	23	26	22	27	
Podgorica	*		2	1	2	
Prague	6	4	4	3	6	
Pristina	6	7	5	4	4	
Reykjavik	*	2	3	2	2	
Riga	*	5	7	5	6	
Rome	11	10	10	11	11	
Sarajevo	8	5	6	7	5	
Skopje	*	3	3	3	3	
Sofia	6	6	5	6	6	
Stockholm	10	10	10	11	9	
Tallinn	7	4	4	3	7	
Tbilisi	*	6	6	5	4	
The Hague	10	7	7	7	8	
Tirana	*	3	2	2	2	
Valletta	*	3	2	7	8	
Vienna	15	14	15	12	12	
Vilnius	*	3	5	6	6	
Warsaw	7	7	6	6	8	
Yerevan	*	3	2	2	2	
Zagreb	*	4	3	4	5	
Moscow	35	32	34	31	30	
St Petersburg	*	2	2	2	2	
Yekaterinburg	*	2	2	1	1	
Istanbul	15	17	18	22	23	
Ankara	16	18	23	18	21	
Total	354				349	(-5)

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Table 8: UK Staff – Diplomatic Embassies Overseas (* = Less than 5)

	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017	
North & Central America						
Washington	47	41	40	36	37	
Anguilla	*	2	2	2	2	
Atlanta	*	1	1	1	1	
Belmopan	*	2	2	2	2	
Bridgetown	*	4	3	3	3	
Calgary	*	1	1	1	1	
Castries	*	1	1			
Chicago	*	2	2	2	2	
Denver	*	1	1			
Grand Cayman		2	2	2	1	
Grand Turk		4	4	2	1	
Guadalajara						
Guatemala City	*	2	2	3	3	
Hamilton	*	3	2	3	5	
Havana	*	5	4	4	3	
Houston	*	1	1	1	1	
Kingston	8	9	9	8	6	
Los Angeles	*	2	3	2	2	
Mexico City	16	16	16	12	13	
Miami	*	1	1	2	2	
Monterrey	*	1	1			
Montreal	*	1	1	1	1	
Montserrat				2	2	
New York	*	4	3	2	2	
Ottawa	9	9	10	9	11	
Panama City	*	4	3	4	3	
Port Au Prince		1	1	1	1	
Port of Spain	*	5	3	3	3	
San Francisco	*	2	2	2	2	

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Table 8: UK Staff – Diplomatic Embassies Overseas (* = Less than 5)

	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017	
San Jose	*	3	3	2	2	
San Salvador	*	2	2	2	2	
Santo Domingo	*	2	2	3	4	
Seattle						
Tegucigalpa			1			
Toronto	*	2	2			
Tortola	*	2	2	2	2	
Vancouver	*	1	1	1	1	
Total	135				118	(-17)
South America & South Atlantic						
Ascension	*	1	1	1	1	
Asuncion	*	2	2	2	2	
Brasilia	15	16	15	16	10	
Buenos Aires	11	12	11	11	10	
Caracas	7	7	5	5	5	
Georgetown	*	2	2	2	2	
La Paz	*	2	2	2	2	
Lima	*	4	4	4	2	
Montevideo	*	3	3	3	3	
Quito	*	2	2	2	2	
Rio de Janeiro	*	5	4	3	2	
Santiago	6	5	6	5	5	
Sao Paulo	*	4	3	2	2	
St Helena	*		2	2	2	
Stanley	*	4	3	3	3	
Tristan da Cunha	*	1	1	1	1	
Total	70				54	(-16)

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Table 8: UK Staff – Diplomatic Embassies Overseas (* = Less than 5)

	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017	
Middle East & North Africa						
Abu Dhabi	15	14	12	6	8	
Algiers	11	9	8	7	7	
Amman	26	30	24	37	37	
Al Khobar	*	2	2	2		
Alexandria	*	1	1	1		
Baghdad	21	25 (+ Erbil)	27 (+ Erbil)	24	20	
Bahrain	6		8	7	7	
Beirut	12	13	11	12	11	
Cairo	22	17	19	17	18	
Casablanca	*	1	1			
Doha	11	11	17	9	8	
Dubai	16	11	14	20	21	
Erbil				11	15	
Jedda	*	2	2	4	5	
Jerausalem	14	10	9	10	9	
Muscat	13	10	10	10	10	
Kuwait	12	9	9	6	6	
Rabat	11	11	9	11	12	
Riyadh	23	20	16	18	20	
Sana'a	11	12	11			
Tehran			1	7	6	
Tel Aviv	10	11	9	10	11	
Tripoli	15	19	1			
Tunis	8	10	14	21	19	
Total	263				250	(-13)

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Table 8: UK Staff – Diplomatic Embassies Overseas (* = Less than 5)

	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017	
West Africa						
Abidjan	*	1	2	2	2	
Abuja	23	26	26	25	23	
Accra	11	10	7	5	5	
Bamako	*	2	3	2	3	
Banjul	*	1	1	1	2	
Conakry	*	1	3	1	2	
Dakar	*	2	2	2	2	
Lagos	9	8	6	4	3	
Luanda	6	5	5	4	4	
Monrovia	*	1	1	1	1	
Nairobi	48	39	31	25	25	
Nouakchott		1	1	1	1	
Yaounde	*	3	3	4	4	
Total	108				77	(-31)
Central Africa						
Addis Ababa	18	22	20	19	20	
Asmara	*	1	1	2	2	
Dar es Salaam	6	5	7	6	6	
Freetown	6	7	7	6	3	
Goma	*	1	1	1	1	
Juba	*	5	4	7	5	
Kampala	11	8	8	8	8	
Khartoum	12	12	9	10	8	
Kigali	*	3	4	3	3	
Kinshasa	6	5	5	5	6	
Mogadishu		5	7	8	10	
Windhoek	*	1	1	1	1	
Total	69				73	(+4)

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Table 8: UK Staff – Diplomatic Embassies Overseas (* = Less than 5)

	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017	
Southern Africa						
Antananarivo	*	1	1	1	2	
Gaborone	*	2	2	2	2	
Capetown	*	3	3	1	1	
Harare	11	10	10	8	7	
Johannesburg	*	6	5	1	0	
Lilongwe	*	2	2	3	2	
Lusaka	*	2	2	2	2	
Maputo	*	2	2	2	2	
Pretoria	25	19	17	17	16	
Victoria	*	2	2	2	1	
Total	54				35	(-19)
Africa Total	231				185	(-46)
Asia & Pacific Central & South Asia						
Ahmendabad			1	1	1	
Ashgabat	*	2	2	2	2	
Astana	7	5	5	4	4	
Baku	9	8	8	8	9	
Bangalore	*	3	2	1	0	
Bishkek	*	3	3	3	3	
Chandigarh	*	1	1	1	1	
Chennai	*	3	2	1	1	
Colombo	9	8	7	7	5	
Dhaka	19	18	15	12	12	
Dushanbe	*	3	2	2	2	
Hyperabad		2	1	1	1	
Islamabad	59	56	62	58	45	
Kabul	77	64	39	42	39	
Karachi	6	3	3	3	3	
Kathmandu	*	3	2	6	6	

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Table 8: UK Staff – Diplomatic Embassies Overseas (* = Less than 5)

	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017	
Kolkata	*	2	2	2	3	
Mumbai	6	6	4	1	1	
New Dehli	41	39	36	27	28	
Port Louis	*	2	2	2	2	
Tashkent	*	5	4	4	4	
Ulaanbaatar	*	3	3	4	3	
Total	262				175	(-87)
South East Asia						
Bandar Seri Begawan	*	3	2	2	2	
Bangkok	19	15	14	12	11	
Beijing	60	72	64	50	46	
Chongqing	6	5	5	2	3	
Guangzhou	9	8	8	5	5	
Hanoi	11	8	9	5	5	
Ho Chi Minh	*					
Hong Kong	20	20	20	15	15	
Jakarta	24	19	19	16	15	
Kuala Lumpur	14	11	11	8	8	
Manila	9	9	8	9	9	
Osaka	*	2	2	1	0	
Phnom Penh	*	3	3	2	3	
Pyongyang	6	5	5	5	5	
Rangoon	9	10	7	8	6	
Seoul	14	18	15	10	11	
Shanghai	10	12	12	6	5	
Taipei	7	7	5	4	5	
Singapore	15	13	14	10	11	
Tokyo	23	21	22	18	19	
Vientiane	*	2	3	2	2	
Wuhan				2	2	
Total	267				188	(-79)

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Table 8: UK Staff – Diplomatic Embassies Overseas (* = Less than 5)

	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017	
The Pacific						
Auckland	*	1	1	1	1	
Canberra	12	11	11	9	10	
Honiara	*	2	2	2	2	
Melbourne	*	1	1	1	1	
Pitcairn			1	1	1	
Port Moresby	*	2	2	3	2	
Suva	*	3	3	2	2	
Sydney	*	2	2			
Wellington	7	7	5	5	5	
Total	30				24	(-6)
Commonwealth Countries						
Nicosia	9	8	8	8	9	
Valletta	*	3	2	7	8	
Belmopan	*	2	2	2	2	
Bridgetown	*	4	3	3	3	
Calgary	*	1	1	1	1	
Castries	*	1	1			
Kingston	8	9	9	8	6	
Montreal	*	1	1	1	1	
Ottawa	9	9	10	9	11	
Port of Spain	*	5	3	3	3	
Toronto	*	2	2			
Vancouver	*	1	1	1	1	
Georgetown	*	2	2	2	2	
Abuja	23	26	26	25	23	
Accra	11	10	7	5	5	
Banjul	*	1	1	1	2	
Lagos	9	8	6	4	3	
Nairobi	48	39	31	25	25	
Yaounde	*	3	3	4	4	
Dar es Salaam	6	5	7	6	6	
Freetown	6	7	7	6	3	
Kampala	11	8	8	8	8	

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Table 8: UK Staff – Diplomatic Embassies Overseas (* = Less than 5)

	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017	
Kigali	*	3	4	3	3	
Windhoek	*	1	1	1	1	
Gaborone	*	2	2	2	2	
Capetown	*	3	3	1	1	
Johannesburg	*	6	5	1	0	
Lilongwe	*	2	2	3	2	
Lusaka	*	2	2	2	2	
Maputo	*	2	2	2	2	
Pretoria	25	19	17	17	16	
Victoria	*	2	2	2	1	
Bangalore	*	3	2	1	0	
Chandigarh	*	1	1	1	1	
Colombo	9	8	7	7	5	
Dhaka	19	18	15	12	12	
Hyperabad		2	1	1	1	
Islamabad	59	56	62	58	45	
Karachi	6	3	3	3	3	
Kolkata	*	2	2	2	3	
Mumbai	6	6	4	1	1	
New Dehli	41	39	36	27	28	
Port Louis	*	2	2	2	2	
Bandar Seri Begawan	*	3	2	2	2	
Kuala Lumpur	14	11	11	8	8	
Singapore	15	13	14	10	11	
Auckland	*	1	1	1	1	
Canberra	12	11	11	9	10	
Honiara	*	2	2	2	2	
Melbourne	*	1	1	1	1	
Port Moresby	*	2	2	3	2	
Suva	*	3	3	2	2	
Sydney	*	2	2			
Wellington	7	7	5	5	5	
Total	421				301	(-120)
Total UK Diplomatic Staff	1784				1514	-270

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Table 9: FCO Total Departmental Spending

	2009 – 2010	%	2010 – 2011	%	2011 – 2012	%	2012 – 2013	%
Resource DEL								
Administration and Programme Expenditure	949	44.7	984	44.8	1049	48.3	1065	49.6
Programme and International Organisation Grants	271	12.8	270	12.3	174	8.0	163	7.6
British Council	193	9.1	187	8.3	179	8.3	165	7.7
Net Funding for NDPBs	6	0.3	6	0.3	5	0.3	6	0.3
Conflict Prevention Programme Expenditure	110	5.2	106	4.9	132	6.1	123	5.8
Peacekeeping	358	16.9	408	18.6	402	18.5	361	17.8
BBC World Service	240	11.3	238	10.9	233	10.6	267	12.5
Prosperity Fund Programme Expenditure								
FCO Total Resource DEL	2,127		2,200		2,175		2,150	

Notes:

Foreign & Annual Commonwealth Office Annual Report & Accounts: 2017-18 (pg139), 2016-17 (pg121), 2015-16 (pg125), & 2014-15 (pg127)

Annexe

Table 9: FCO Total Departmental Spending

2013 – 2014	%	2014 – 2015	%	2015 – 2016	%	2016 – 2017	%	2017 – 2018	%	2018 – 2019	%
1112	51.7	1031	55.4	853	43.7	904	44	939	42.5	870	37
156	7.3	149	8.0	301	15.5	331	16.1	377	17.1	383	16.3
157	7.3	150	8.1	157	8.1	162	7.9	171	7.8	164	7
6	0.3	6	0.4	6	0.3	4	0.2	6	0.3	7	0.3
145	6.8	144	7.8	281	14.4	339	16.5	404	18.3	497	21.2
329	15.3	382	20.6	356	18.3	318	15.5	311	14.1	373	15.9
248	13.6										
										57	2.5
2,153		1,826		1,953		2,058		2,208		2,351	

Notes:

Foreign & Annual Commonwealth Office Annual Report & Accounts: 2017-18 (pg139), 2016-17 (pg121), 2015-16 (pg125), & 2014-15 (pg127)

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