The 2019 General Election has been unusual for a number of reasons, but particularly for the marked differences between the parties’ offerings on a range of issues – including foreign policy. As we at the British Foreign Policy Group have previously summarised, the manifestos from the three largest parties present starkly different approaches to defining Britain’s role in the world, reflecting the breakdown of cross-party consensus on our international footprint. Foreign policy has also been given a unique emphasis due to the extraordinary timing of the annual NATO Summit, being held in the United Kingdom in the last week of the campaign.

To better understand how the evolving foreign policy positions of the parties reflect and will shape the perspectives of their voters, we have undertaken a nationally representative public opinion survey with Opinium during the election campaign, and set out the key findings below.

Global Threats to Peace and Security

When asked which nation, or league of nations, they believe are the biggest threats to global peace and security, a quarter (25%) of Britons identify Russia as the single biggest threat – a clear outlier amongst nations. The next most feared nation is China, with 14% of citizens ranking this as their top concern.

Overall, 57% of Britons place Russia in their ‘top three’ threats, with 40% selecting North Korea, 37% China and 35% Iran. Strikingly, 30% of Britons also identify the United States of America, our enduring partner in a ‘special relationship’, as a threat to global peace and security.

Respondents chose their top three threats, in ranking order. Don’t knows are excluded from the presentation of this graph, but data is not adjusted.

2019 Voting Intention

A few significant trends can be observed in the distinct views of voters intending to support different parties in the 2019 General Election:

• Conservative voters (31%) overwhelmingly regard Russia as the single greatest threat to global peace and security, followed by China (18%) and Iran (17%).
• Conservative voters’ concern about Iran vastly eclipses the concern of other voters – for example, only 5% of Labour voters see Iran as a principal threat.
• Labour voters are also most likely to choose Russia as their greatest concern (26%), but this is closely followed by the United States – with more than one in five Labour voters (21%) identifying our ‘special relationship’ as a special threat.
• By contrast, just 5% of Conservative voters identify the United States as the greatest threat to global peace and security.
• Liberal Democrats are slightly more concerned about Russia than Conservatives (33% to 31%), slightly less concerned about China (16% to 18%), but considerably more likely to see the United States as a major threat (16%).
• Plaid Cymru voters (35%), Green voters (30%) and SNP voters (24%) are vastly more likely to see China as the principal threat to global peace and security than other Britons. Only 6% of Brexit Party voters regard China as the top global threat.
• Brexit Party supporters hold an outside level of concern about Russia, with 42% believing Russia is the single greatest threat. They are three times more likely than Conservatives (15% to 5%) to see the United States as a principal threat.

Only displaying responses for the four most popular threats identified by all voters. Don’t knows are excluded from the presentation of this graph, but data is not adjusted.

Previous surveys have indicated quite significant distinctions in viewpoints on social issues between the older and younger counterparts within the Labour and Conservative party, and in this survey, we were able to examine these dimensions with regards to foreign affairs.

While no disparities are evident between younger and older Conservative voters on the issue of China and Russia, we can see that younger Conservatives are somewhat (9% to 4%) more likely to identify the United States as the premier threat to global peace and security, and older Conservatives are dramatically more likely (21% to 6%) to regard Iran as the principal threat.

Older Labour voters are more likely to see China as the greatest single threat to global peace and security (17% to 13%) than younger Labour voters. While their concern about Russia is evenly balanced between the generations, sizeable distinctions exist in the concern regarding the United States between younger and older Labour voters – with older Labour voters 11 percentage points more likely than younger voters to denote our American allies as the greatest risk to global peace and security (27% to 16%).

It is also important to note that younger Labour voters are more than twice as likely than older Labour voters – and their younger Conservative counterparts – to select ‘don’t know’ and be unsure about the greatest global threats to peace.

Only displaying responses for the four most popular threats identified by all voters. Respondents chose their top three threats, in ranking order. This captures responses for the single greatest threat.

2017 Election Vote vs. 2019 Voting Intention

We are also able to compare and contrast the concerns of voters who supported parties in the 2017 election, with those intending to support the parties now. In doing so, we capture subtle shifts in the evolving nature of global power dynamics, but also in the leadership of each of the parties, and the worldviews of their developing voting bases.

Strikingly, Conservative voters in 2017 and 2019 are almost entirely aligned in the nature and degree of their concerns – although they have become slightly (+2%) more likely to be concerned about Iran.

A little more movement can be observed amongst Labour voters, who have become somewhat less concerned about Russia (-4%), slightly more concerned about the United States (+2%), slightly less concerned about North Korea (-2%) and more likely to be unsure overall – probably because of the youthful nature of their new voters.

EU Referendum Vote

Leave and Remain voters do perceive global threats to peace and security in somewhat different ways, although the distinctions are not especially dramatic:

• Remain voters are more likely to see Russia as the principal global threat than Leave voters (31% to 27%) – with 2019 Conservative Leave voters the least concerned, compared to 2019 Brexit Party supporters, who are the most concerned about Russia of all voters.
• Remain voters are also twice as likely (18% to 9%) than Leave voters to see the United States as the principal global aggressor.
• Leave voters are somewhat more likely (17% to 14%) to regard China as the greatest threat to global peace and security.

Only displaying responses for the three most popular threats identified by all voters. Respondents chose their top three threats, in ranking order. This captures responses for the single greatest threat. Don’t knows are excluded from the presentation of this graph, but data is not adjusted.

UK-Wide Demographics and Geography

Demographics play a significant role in shaping the perception of global threats – with age the most important influence. Overall, we see older Britons much more concerned about the threats other nations pose to global peace and security than younger Britons. Those under 35 years are also more than twice as likely to choose ‘don’t know’ than their older counterparts, who hold more established views.

For example, Britons over 55 years are twice as likely (18% to 9%) to see China and Iran (14% to 6%) as the single largest global threat to peace and security.

No major distinctions can be observed between the views on men and women, although women are slightly more likely to be concerned about North Korea (12% selected this as their highest global threat, compared to 9% of men), and also nearly twice as likely to choose ‘don’t know’.

Social grade plays a large role in shaping knowledge and interest in foreign affairs, and therefore we observe that 21% of C2DE citizens (lower socio-economic) are unsure about the greatest global threat to peace and security, compared to just 12% of ABC1 citizens (higher socio-economic).

Public opinion differs between regions of the UK, with geography – and its intersection with demography – clearly playing a substantial role in shaping views about international risks and power dynamics.

Britons living in Scotland, London and the South East are the most likely to identify China as their greatest concern. Even more pronounced are the distinctions around Russia, with more than 30% of residents in the South East and South West choosing Russia as the single greatest threat to global peace and security, compared to just 19% of those living in London. In turn, 22% of those living in Northern Ireland, 16% of those in London and the North West, regard America as the premier global threat, compared to just 8% of residents in the South East and East Midlands.

Only displaying responses for the three most popular threats identified by all voters. Respondents chose their top three threats, in ranking order. This captures responses for the single greatest threat. Don’t knows are excluded from the presentation of this graph, but data is not adjusted.

The Future of NATO

A majority of Britons (66%) continue to believe that the UK’s membership of NATO will remain important to protecting our national security in the future, with 38% believing it is ‘critically important’. Only 7% of Britons actively believe it is not important, although a relatively sizeable portion of the country – 17% – is unsure.

Support for NATO grows exponentially between age groups. 84% of Britons aged over 55 years believe NATO is important, compared to 63% of 35-54-year-olds and just 44% of under-35s.

Only displaying responses supporting our membership of NATO, and those deeming it critical. Data is not adjusted.

Men and women are relatively equal in their support for NATO, although women are more likely to express moderate or hesitant levels of support, or to be unsure, while men are more forthright in their opinion.

Those in higher social grades are more likely to support NATO than those in lower social grades (68% to 61%), and are also more likely to regard our membership of NATO as ‘critical’ to our national security moving forward (40% to 34%).

The most striking distinctions in support for NATO can be observed between regions – with residents in the South East (77%) and the North East (74%) vastly more enthusiastic than residents in Northern Ireland (58%), London (58%) and the West (57%) and East (50%) Midlands. Looking at cities, only 44% of residents in Nottingham regard NATO as important to Britain’s security in the future, compared to 89% of residents in Brighton.

Only displaying responses supporting our membership of NATO. Data is not adjusted.

Turning to the 2019 General Election:

• the most enthusiastic NATO supporters are Liberal Democrat Voters – with 84% regarding the alliance as important to our national security moving forward, and more than half (55%) describing it as ‘critically important’.
• They are followed in their support by Conservative voters, with 81% believing NATO remains important, and almost half (49%) ‘critically important’.
• This compares to 69% of Labour voters who believe NATO is important, with 38% regarding the alliance as ‘critical’.
• Comparing citizens’ 2017 General Election voting behaviour to voting intention in the 2019 General Election, we can see that Labour voters in 2017 were somewhat more enthusiastic (+3%) about NATO than voters intending to support Labour this year.
• 69% of Brexit Party voters believe NATO is important, but only 27% of them believe it is ‘critical’. At 59%, Green voters are the least enthusiastic about NATO and its relevance moving forward.
• No major differences of opinion can be observed between Leave and Remain voters.

Only displaying responses supporting our membership of NATO. Data is not adjusted.

While party allegiances are clearly important in reflecting citizens’ views on the issue of NATO, they are less important than age. As such, as we can see that both older Labour and Conservative voters are more likely to enthusiastically support our membership of NATO than younger Labour and Conservative voters: 87% of older Conservative voters and 77% of older Labour voters regard our NATO membership as important, compared to 64% of younger Conservatives and 63% of younger Labour voters.

Conclusions

Our membership of NATO continues to hold a high degree of importance to Britons, with a comfortable majority of citizens recognising its value to our national security in the future. Nonetheless, tremendous disparities of enthusiasm can be observed between regions, political parties and – most significantly – age groups. The declining interest between the generations should trouble leaders who wish to continue to defend the rules-based world order, in which NATO has played a critical role. There is clearly a significant task ahead for the next government to persuade particularly younger Britons of the value of multilateralism and its relevance to global peace and national security.

The BFPG will be exploring a much wider scope of issues around foreign policy in a major annual survey of public opinion early next year. Please sign up to our newsletter and follow us on Twitter to keep up with our forthcoming research.