29 Jun Russian Domestic Instability – What does it Mean and How Much does it Matter?

On Friday 23 June, after an apparent missile strike on a Wagner camp, a column of armoured vehicles controlled by Wagner soldiers descended on Russia. After successfully occupying the city of Rostov-on-Don with little resistance, the tanks moved towards Moscow. They were within two hours of the city before an agreement was reached, brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko. Wagner fighters would return to their field camps in exchange for their safety and Prigozhin would go into exile in Belarus. Just a day after the ’coup’ began, it was over.

While the attack was quickly quelled, it will no doubt impact Russia’s domestic stability and its position internationally. Following our piece by Senior Advisor David Landsman, on the implications of the attempted coup for the UK and its strategic posture set out in the Integrated Review, some of our Senior Research Fellows comment here on what Prigozhin’s attempt could mean in a number of strategically important areas – supply chains, cybersecurity, and of course, militarily.

Senior Advisor Dr Rebecca Harding comments on the implications for supply chain resilience:

Economics and trade measures have been critical in the international response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The goal has been to constrain Russia by limiting its access to foreign currency, revenues from trade and access to technologies and components to starve its military with access to resources and funding. 

As the UK government begins to unpick the consequences of Prigozhin’s mutiny over the last weekend, there is an opportunity to review this ‘deterrence by denial’ approach and its role in further limiting Russia’s military operations, in rebuilding Ukraine economically post-crisis and in improving the UK’s own supply chain resilience. 

The UK’s approach to Africa will be critical to these objectives in two ways. First, the UK needs to ensure that Russia remains committed to the deal allowing grain to be exported through the Black Sea. There was a high probability before the events of last weekend that Russia would at some point quit the deal, but domestic distractions now increase the likelihood further. The grain deal is not just important for global food prices, but it is critical to many nations in Africa, particularly Sudan, Somalia, and the Horn of Africa where food shortages are a real threat to political stability. 

Second, Africa is strategically important for the international community in critical mineral supply chains, with North Africa and the Sahel important suppliers of oil, gold and Uranium. Russian interests in North Africa, notably the Sahel, have been growing over the past few years through the influence of the Wagner group with, according to President Putin, the group being paid over $1 billion to maintain its operations, particularly in Africa. As the Russian government seeks to subsume the group into State-led structures, this means that there is potential for insurgencies in Africa to be more directly associated with support from Moscow. The US is implementing sanctions against the Wagner group in relation to gold smuggling operations in Africa. Supporting the international community’s efforts to constrain Russia’s burgeoning influence in Africa will be an important aspect of ensuring supply chain resilience and furthering “deterrence by denial” objectives.

Senior Advisor Dr Victoria Baines comments on the implications for cybersecurity:

Mercenaries and volunteers have played a role in the cyber elements of this conflict from the outset. Criminals affiliated with the Russian government, whether ideologically or financially, have long been prominent in the execution of sophisticated cyber-attacks and in influence operations. While the overall impact of Russian cyber operations in the context of this war has so far underwhelmed most observers, there is general consensus that the rules of engagement have changed. The IT Army of Ukraine draws on the voluntary service of nearly half a million like-minded supporters around the world, an international hacktivist brigade coordinated on a Telegram channel.

It is entirely possible that supporters of Ukraine will see Prighozin’s public challenge as an opportunity to further undermine Putin’s authority and narrative. This appears to have been the intention of a denial of service attack on RuTube, Russia’s version of YouTube, on Victory Day (9th May). As with kinetic power, cyber operations mounted by Ukrainian affiliates risk retaliation and further escalation. And as we saw with the Europe-wide impact of the attack on Ukrainian communications provider Viasat, the effects of cyber operations are often hard to contain geographically.

The direct implications of Prighozin’s march for the UK’s cybersecurity are less clear. Major organisations including the BBC, British Airways, and Boots are recovering from a global ransomware attack on payroll software MOVEIt by the Russian-speaking Clop cybercrime gang. The UK’s ongoing kinetic and cyber support of Ukraine has already placed it in Russia’s sights. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) reported in April on the heightened threat to the UK’s critical national infrastructure as a result. Should Russia’s position in Ukraine or Putin’s domestic standing weaken further, we may see an increase in disruptive state-sponsored attacks originating from Russia – and its allies – on nations deemed to be hostile; also in less coordinated mischief by Putin sympathisers.

Senior Advisor Professor Jeremy Black comments on the military and security implications:

So much of military history is flawed because it deals with international conflict. And yet, major developments frequently arise from the use or non-use of the military in domestic affairs. Many states experience coups or disorder or rebellions, but not external conflict. A failed military coup can be a transformative occasion, as with Turkey in 2016, and, to a degree, in the lurch toward further fanaticism, Germany in 1944. The use of the military to suppress pressure for reform was decisive in China in 1989, while the need not to turn to the army was potentially important in the shambles of a would-be coup in America in 2021.

And so to Russia. This was not the essentially unopposed return of Napoleon in 1815 (nor his initial coup of 1799), but, as with so many military disturbances, a reminder that armed forces are a coalition and that this poses issues for all states. It can be an issue for democracies as well as autocracies: the former, whether limited or extensive, are scarcely free from the challenge of military disaffection. Moreover, the latter, as with Spain in 1936, opens up divisions within the military as well as between military and civilian authorities.

That the Russian system has only limited control over its military is scarcely news. Doubts about his control, however unrealistic and/or manipulated by foreign powers, affected Stalin in 1937. Moreover, the very structure of force in the Soviet system and in its Russian successor was in part intended to maintain control over the military. This was the logic of espionage oversight of the military, of political commissars, and of the patronage politics that were followed.

There has not been so long a war for the Soviet Union/Russia since the Afghan commitment of 1979-89 and the failure in Ukraine has put major pressures on the Russian military. The march itself, an indicator of broader tensions, is a reminder of the problems involved in deploying a coalition of forces as part of a conflict. Putin is weakened. In analytical terms, the failure in most studies of war to devote due attention to civil conflict is very striking.