25 Apr India: Elections and Opportunities

Of all the elections around the world this year, there’s no doubt that India’s is the largest. With 969 million voters, the election takes place on seven different days between 19 April and 1 June. We will know the results on 4 June.    

There’s no doubt among experts and the polls that Narendra Modi’s BJP will win, the only question is  by how much. With this apparent certainty baked in, what should the UK’s approach to India be, before and after our own elections?

We need to start with strategic realities.   

First, India is going to be one of the world’s great powers of the 21st century. With a population which now exceeds China’s, and increasing growth rates, IMF predictions suggest India will be the third largest economy by 2027.

India’s economic growth is increasingly matched by a growing ambition on the world stage. Once a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, India now aspires to a more assertive “strategic autonomy”.  India’s role in the (Indo-Pacific) Quad, alongside the US, Australia and Japan, shows how India is using alliances as a key element of its defence against threats from China. It is increasingly engaged in  international climate action, having created the International Solar Alliance and the Green Credit initiative  launched at COP28. India aspires to be a leader of the global south with its diplomacy fast catching up, for example, with its economic engagement across Africa.

Finally, India is a natural ally for the UK. Democratic, English-speaking, and with shared interests in the Indo-Pacific, it is vital that we are on the same side geopolitically.

But how powerful is India’s economy? How democratic its political system?

First, the economy. India’s annual growth at over 7% is among the highest in the G20 and way above the emerging market average. Recent years have been characterised by significant liberalisation and structural reforms and a notable reduction in corruption at the national government level (though performance in the 29 States remains mixed). Infrastructure investment has doubled as a share of government expenditure over the past ten years, with unprecedented development of new highways, airports and railway services. India is of course a digital superpower, not only in its international IT services companies (Infosys, TCS and Tech Mahindra to name but three), but also in the spread of digital services across the country, with the biometric ID Aardhar system facilitating e-government and financial inclusion. Demography is a key positive economic driver, though much labour is in the less efficient informal economy; Modi’s efforts to reduce informality have had some effect, but the task is immense. In the meantime, AI threatens the continued growth of employment in the coveted IT sector. With or without a bilateral FTA (which should never be the sole measure of any relationship), it’s reasonable to assume that continued liberalisation will spur growth in bilateral trade or more broadly.

What about India’s democracy? The reality is that Modi’s BJP is the only strong India-wide party in a country where a number of the 29 states are dominated by regional parties. The opposition Congress Party and sometime “natural party of government” has been weak for many years, despite more recently having built a coalition with smaller parties. Modi is genuinely popular among a significant part of the Indian population, including with many younger voters. But the increased emphasis on Hindu nationalism (and the Hindi language) do not endear him to many educated English speakers, voters in the more prosperous and dynamic (non-Hindu native speaking) South and with many non-Hindus. The run-up to the election has seen a number of controversial administrative and judicial decisions which appear to be unfairly disadvantaging the political opposition, leading to the accusation that the election will be “free but not fair”. The domestic picture is complex – as in many countries – but in global terms India is certainly a democracy.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the UK has sought to persuade India to fall in behind sanctions. India has abstained in votes in the UN General Assembly condemning the invasion and Indian Ministers have put the emphasis on achieving a peaceful solution rather than on defeating Russia. India continues to import Russian oil: Foreign Minister Dr S Jaishankar has accused the West of hypocrisy in continuing to take Russian imports while calling on India to desist. Meanwhile, military contacts and defence imports remain strong. As a result, there have been some strong criticism of India from both left and right in the UK. Some find it hard to understand how democratic India, which champions the international rule of law, can take this approach to a blatant violation of the UN Charter. 

Precisely because India is a democracy, and a major power with whom we need to build closer relations, it’s important to understand India’s perspective on this vital issue for the UK. India makes no secret of the fact that its foreign policy is in the service of its national interest: its economy is dependent on imported oil and its growth is highly sensitive to the oil price. But it’s not just that: one of the values which informs Indian foreign policy (and much else in India) is the importance of building trust in long-term relationships. Russia (and the Soviet Union) have supported India on many occasions, and India is not ready to abandon an old friend. India reacts badly to the thesis that it should be prepared to sacrifice more for European security the West has often been prepared to sacrifice for India. At the same time, some in the Indian foreign policy world will argue that India can achieve more with Russia as a “candid friend”, implying that it expresses a more nuanced view in private.

How can the UK move the dial in the relationship? The UK is also due to hold elections this year. Both major parties have indicated their support for close links with India with Labour criticising the Conservatives’ failure to conclude a Free Trade Agreement. At the same time, Labour has traditionally found it harder to get close to India because (primarily) of attitudes to Kashmir, while within the party there is generally little enthusiasm for “right wing” Modi.

But the reality is that, whoever is in Downing Street, a strong, modern, reciprocal relationship with India must be a priority.  

We should aim to take India into our confidence as much as possible, sharing assessments on Russia, China and other threats. Tone is as important as substance: while I’ve not met anyone in London who views India today through a caricature “imperial” prism, when Brits are perceived as lecturing India on our “values”, it can easily appear as condescending and lacking consideration for India’s own interests. It’s an irony that those who are most concerned to repudiate the UK’s colonial legacy can end up appearing colonial in their approach.

Strategically, we need to recognise that in today’s multipolar world, we cannot afford to regard full adherence to Western values as a necessary condition for being on the right side. India’s position in the world (like that of all of us?) is in flux, but it seems clear that it does not see ending up as Western as the goal. We don’t agree on everything. This should help in a process of approximating on Russia: we can’t expect it to happen soon, but there are strong reasons why India may move closer.

In the economic relationship, the UK is in some ways already the junior partner, but there are plenty of opportunities for us. Of the many promising sectors, infrastructure (including financing), healthcare, higher education and technology are among those ripe for partnerships. Previous generations of Indian businesspeople and entrepreneurs were largely UK-educated; today’s owe more to the United States and it’s strongly in our interest to find ways to redress the balance. Common legal and accounting traditions give the UK a competitive advantage, as does the large UK population of Indian origin, dubbed a “living bridge” by Prime Minister Modi. There’s no shortage of fora linking the two countries (full disclosure: including a number in which the author has been involved), but there will arguably be a need for a strategic reset, in which the UK Government at the highest level demonstrates regular sustained engagement, the City of London identifies creative ways to support Indian development and as wide a range of stakeholders (“soft power” in the broadest sense) are encouraged to see that India, in many ways as much as the US or Europe, is a partner for the 21st century.