26 Apr The South Korean Election: Implications for the UK
The 22nd General Election in South Korea (ROK), hosted on April 10th, resulted in a landslide victory for the opposition Democratic Party (DP), handing them 175 out of the 300 seats of the National Assembly. President Yoon’s ruling conservative party – People’s Power Party (PPP) – acquired 108 seats, but now faces the arduous challenge of persuading an opposition of near 190 members in the legislative body, to pursue its agenda for the remaining term.
Polls published prior to the election predicted the DP’s win. Concerns around high living costs played a particular role, with the current PPP President’s detachment to rising living costs fuelling an angry electorate. This was coupled with a public perception of the President as stubborn and unyielding, reinforced by his frequent use of vetoes against bills passed by the legislative body, and his lack of direct communication with the South Korean people.
Despite the Presidential office holding the final decision-making call in all national policies of South Korea, the result of this election compels President Yoon to persuade and potentially make concessions to the newly reinforced opposition party. Maintaining his past approach of executing vetoes against bills introduced by the DP would risk reinforcing his obstinate reputation, and possible further electoral repercussions down the line.
What are the geopolitical implications of the election results?
Since assuming office, President Yoon has adopted a markedly different foreign policy approach to his predecessor President Moon. His administration has focused on strengthening the US-ROK alliance, adopting a hawkish approach to North Korea, forging partnerships with countries based on commitment to common democratic values, and exploring economic opportunities in its pursuit of becoming a ‘global pivotal state’. Given that this diverging trajectory was also forged under unfavourable political terrain for the PPP, as the minority party within the previous National Assembly as well, it is unlikely that the recent election outcome will stall the broad direction of travel for future ROK foreign policy. However, a strong DP opposition still poses challenges for progressing foreign policy commitments in President Yoon’s favour.
An example of this will likely lie in the DP’s opposition to the Yoon administration’s growing ties with Poland. The DP opposed the ROK’s recent memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Poland – led by PPP Prime Minister Han Duk Soo – over the export of military equipment and nuclear power plants. Claiming an arms deal with Poland antagonises Russia (considered by the DP as an economic partner with whom to strengthen cooperation, and a route by which to bolster interaction with North Korea), and that investment into nuclear energy industry hampers the nation’s transition to renewable energy, the DP has refused to assess a proposed bill that would usher in the second round of the arms deal. Thus, the ambition of President Yoon to augment South Korea’s presence in Europe, and forge partnerships with democratic countries, now lies at risk.
Another example would be how South Korea establishes bilateral relations with China. Broadly aligning with the US in its Indo-Pacific strategy, and strengthening its trilateral military cooperation with Japan and the US, the Yoon administration has adopted a hawkish approach to China. Seoul’s public announcement of plans to participate in the US-led ‘Chip 4’ alliance, which seeks to isolate China from semiconductor supply chains, further demonstrates this approach. While the administration has yet to take the next step towards participating in the Chip 4, the DP has expressed clear opposition to participation. Indeed, Lee Jae Myung, leader of the DP, has drawn condemnation from former diplomats for his subservient diplomacy to China. With Lee at the helm of leading the majority party in the National Assembly, it is unlikely the legislative body will adopt any PPP commitments directly opposing Beijing’s interest.
How does this impact bilateral cooperation with the UK?
South Korea and the UK have a longstanding diplomatic relationship spanning over 140 years. During President Yoon’s state visit in November 2023, he met with King Charles III and UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, and signed the ‘Downing Street Accords’. The Accords included upgrading cooperation status to that of ‘global strategic partnership’ and adopting a ‘strategic cyber partnership’ – strengthening cooperation across various fields of combating climate change, technology development, and military partnerships through 2+2 Ministerial meetings. Negotiations surrounding the modernisation of the existing FTA between the two countries were also promised, to reflect such strengthening of bilateral cooperation. Undoubtedly, for the UK, South Korea is an invaluable partner, and a key like-minded player when implementing its ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’. Both the UK’s and the ROK’s Indo-Pacific strategies align in seeking to strengthen partnerships with like-minded democratic states and defend the global economic order, prevent non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and counter the growing influence of China.
South Korea’s recent election result is unlikely to directly influence bilateral cooperation with the UK. This is mainly due to the fact that the majority of fields of bilateral cooperation with the UK receive bipartisan support from South Korea – from green growth and sustainable development, to cultivating semiconductor cooperation and cooperation in AI technology.
However, there are a number of potential points of contestation and strengthening cooperation, particularly around international security will be difficult. The DP’s opposition to strengthening ties with Poland reflects their wider stance on Ukraine and Russia. At a time where the UK is urgently seeking more support for Ukraine, it is clear that the DP is unlikely to support such an endeavour, making it unlikely that South Korea will actively align to UK’s committed support towards aiding Ukraine.
Similarly, the DP’s opposition to adopting a hawkish approach to China means that the Yoon administration will have to take a more balanced approach to China. This will continue then to limit ROK’s engagement with regional alliances playing a role in countering China, such as the QUAD and AUKUS.
The UK’s stance on North Korea will also be an ongoing source of tensions. Strengthening sanctions against North Korea and enforcing UN Security Council resolutions against its ballistic missiles programme is likely to invite opposition from the DP, which advocates for dialogue with North Korea. With South Korea expected to commence its term as a nonpermanent member at the UNSC in 2024, the UK and South Korea will have to closely cooperate to herald any UNSC consensus, including on North Korea. The UK’s unique position of having diplomatic ties with North Korea will likely prevent the DP from vocally clashing with the UK, as such a diplomatic position is considered valuable from the DP’s perspective, but nonetheless it’s clear that it could become a point of contention
As such, while the DP’s win will not drastically change its foreign policy direction, the President will undoubtedly grapple with opposition over his foreign policy. For the UK and the ROK’s wider partners this will continue to pose challenges in securing ROK support for key agendas in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
