07 Nov The UK and Trump: Time to Get Real(ist)
We now know that we will soon be living with a second Trump Presidency. We also know that it’s the outcome a strong majority of Brits told pollsters they didn’t want to see. There were hints of this concern scattered in our recent BFPG public opinion survey, though it was interesting to note that young people were surprisingly less hostile to Trump than their elders, just as more younger Americans voted for Trump than for any Republican candidate in years. But we weren’t consulted in the vote and, given the importance of the US to our vital interests, the only questions now are how we live with Trump, and how we can achieve – or modify – our security and prosperity goals in the light of his Presidency.
If we are going to take a realist approach, which recognises the relative weight of the UK and the US as well as a distinction between our vital and secondary interests, here are a few thoughts first on general principles and then on specific policy areas.
We shouldn’t assume that Trump II will look like Trump I. The incoming President will this time be able to draw on his previous experience of Government and we should certainly expect him to form his Administration more quickly and efficiently. With a Senate majority now in the bag, confirmations should also be dispatched quickly. It may be easier to find credible interlocutors in this Administration, which would certainly help with developing policy. There has been much talk of a second term being used to exact revenge on enemies of the past few years, but most of them will presumably be domestic, so for us there is all to play for.
We should be open to finding nuance in (some of) Trump’s positions. As a general rule, just because there’s something you very strongly don’t like about someone, it doesn’t mean that they are all bad and you can’t work with them at all. And we should also recognise that there is a fair measure of bipartisanship in US foreign policy, from China to the need for Europeans to pay their own way in defence.
If we are to get real about Trump, here are six points with which to start:
One. Trump is not alone in the US in believing that Europe has been freeloading on American security. Strengthening European defence is a top priority. Trump is unlikely to pull the rug from under NATO, but the more European Allies commit, the less he will be tempted to soft pedal. He will be impressed by more investment in real capabilities and in NATO, not by the EU playing with the architecture of supposed “strategic autonomy”. The UK should use its efforts to work with European Allies in NATO, rather than support separate EU political structures which are unlikely to deliver the hard security which can convince the US to remain engaged.
Two. Although increased investment in defence will take time to bear fruit, a sense of urgency is vital. Even so, it will come too late for the Europeans to backfill if the US substantially disengages from Ukraine. We don’t know how Trump will seek to engage with Putin. Keeping America from “forever wars” is likely to be a guiding principle (not unreasonably), though it’s a fair guess that he won’t set out on a course of action which risks leaving him and the US humiliated. This may provide leverage to argue for sustaining the commitment. That said, the brutal reality is that Europe cannot sustain a conflict in Ukraine without the US and, if Trump presses for a compromise, the UK – already on a different page from many Western European Allies – has no interest in being an outlier in an argument it won’t be able to win.
Three. Our ongoing commitment to AUKUS, providing European support to US vital interests in the Pacific, is an essential if we want to keep the US on side in NATO. This means resisting any temptation to reduce the commitment to AUKUS. Presumably the UK’s close relationship with the Australian Labor Government should be a positive here.
Four. On strategic issues, we should – as they say – take Trump seriously, seeking to leverage his personal interest in the UK and take advantage where we can. A Trump II team that is more realist and less neocon than parts of Trump I may create valuable opportunities. A return to the Abraham Accords, albeit in much more tense times, could certainly be a benefit.
Five. Trade is going to be tough and the UK Government would be wise to chart the kind of nuanced path it has already set out upon. While missing no opportunity to talk about a reset with the EU, the new Government is (I’d say quite interestingly) talking up the forthcoming entry into force of the UK’s accession to CPTPP while pressing ahead with other Free Trade Agreement negotiations. This offers a way forward: work with the EU where there is a tangible benefit to growth on offer, but engage with the US where there is a realistic chance of reaching some kind of trade agreement, most likely around defence and technology. We have no interest in being dragged into any US tariffs directed at the EU. And on China, while we may not need to follow Trump all the way, we will need to compromise if we touch up against vital US interests.
Six. On climate, we can assume that Trump will reverse many of Biden’s policies. By itself, this need not affect our own policies. But it’s quite possible that our European neighbours, faced with economic pressures and opposition parties hostile to additional “green” measures, may take the opportunity to revisit the trajectory of their own policies. If the UK’s position then appears on the extreme end of the scale, we will need to decide whether we can afford – economically as well as politically – to be exposed.
Realist geopolitics isn’t very popular in the UK, perhaps because we haven’t quite given up the sense that the world is somehow our responsibility. It will be uncomfortable if it becomes the policy of our most important ally and successor in the self-appointed role of global guardian, but in the end being forced into a more realist approach might actually do us some good. Plenty of work ahead.
