03 Jan From Reset to Renewal: Prospects for UK-EU Relations in 2025

2025 offers a decisive window of opportunity for the UK Government to make good on its commitment to a reset in relations with the EU. It is an opportunity that the Government needs to seize.

For the first time in the nearly ten years since then-PM David Cameron began negotiations on the UK’s membership of the EU, there is cause for optimism in what UK-EU relations may bring. In 2024, key elections, particularly in the UK, EU, and US, fundamentally shaped the nature of these relations. New administrations took office in Brussels and London, with Britain voting out its Eurosceptic Conservative party and electing a Labour Government, which pledged a “reset” in relations with the EU. The return of Donald Trump to the White House risks US disengagement from, and hostility towards, Europe, raising the importance of strong UK-EU collaboration at a time where war has returned to the continent.

2025 will therefore offer important moments of opportunity for the new administrations in London and Brussels to get to work. A UK-EU summit, due in the first half of 2025, will be a landmark opportunity for the reset. The Polish presidency of the Council of the EU, which began on January 1, listed engaging the UK, particularly on security issues, as a priority in its programme, helping UK relations remain on Brussels’ political agenda. While elections in Germany and Poland and the ongoing political crisis in France may limit their international focus, in London and in Brussels new administrations both favour a constructive relationship, creating scope for progress.

However, there are important realities for the UK Government to accept before proceeding with an outright reset. First, the UK must recognise that it is more interested in a reset than the EU. Given the mixed record of UK-EU negotiations over the past decade, the EU now simply has more pressing priorities. The newly re-elected Commission of Ursula von der Leyen already has an expansive agenda, covering, among other things: boosting competitiveness and a European defence industry; supporting Ukraine and exploring EU membership for Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans; implementing the green and digital transitions; addressing migratory flows; countering democratic backsliding in Member States; and grappling with a rising far Right.

Similarly, consider the in-tray of Maroš Šefčovič, the Commissioner responsible for liaising with the UK. As Commissioner for trade and economic security, he will have to grapple with potential tariff threats from the incoming Trump administration, as well as applying trade defence instruments against China, recently the target of countervailing duties on electric vehicles. Although the UK Government generally prefers to take the long-view in its policymaking, as part of a potential two-term, ten-year government of national renewal, it would be a mistake to apply this logic to EU negotiations. Put simply, the EU has neither the time nor the political will to pursue complex negotiations with London. The UK cannot expect to be a top priority for the EU, therefore prolonging negotiations will only limit the scope of positive UK-EU cooperation.

Where the first job for the Government is to accept that the UK has a greater interest in a reset in relations than the EU, the second job is to develop a negotiation strategy which accounts for this. Though the UK Government insists its primary mission is boosting domestic economic growth, it remains circumspect on EU-related policies which could improve British economic prospects. To be sure, some of the Government’s plans have clear benefits. A security pact is a strong starting point, not just given the worsening international security environment, but also as a confidence-building step with European partners. A veterinary agreement would boost UK agricultural exports without necessarily limiting scope of other future free-trade agreements. Indeed, the government of Keir Starmer has sought to strike a more constructive tone than those of his predecessors, with his second and third international trips being to Germany and France respectively. These are all good starting points.

However, in other areas, UK propositions for the reset remain vague. Where they are most fleshed out is in saying what they would oppose in UK-EU relations: i.e. no to rejoining the single market, no to joining a customs union, no to youth mobility schemes. Such red lines may respond to domestic political forces which oppose EU engagement, yet they carry risks for Britain’s negotiation strategy. Just as with previous efforts to negotiate with the EU under Starmer’s predecessors, such strong red lines will only serve to preclude a more productive partnership. For example, given the salience of youth mobility to the EU both to some key constituencies of the Labour party and to EU Member States, ducking this issue could come at significant political cost and would fundamentally undermine the scope of any reset. A greater sense of pragmatism and clarity in negotiation objectives is needed.

Lastly, on the domestic front, the Government needs to frame a stronger political narrative of what a reset would mean, lest others define it for them. Domestic support for a constructive relationship already exists. The British public are transparently more open than closed to EU engagement: a YouGov poll in November 2024 found that a majority of Brits support boosting EU trade, including a plurality of 2024 Tory voters and even a plurality of 2016 Leave voters. A BFPG survey of UK public opinion in September 2024 similarly found broad and deep support for boosting EU engagement, with 77% support for cooperating to tackle illegal migration, 75% support for reducing trade barriers, and 69% support for a UK-EU security pact.

Yet the narrative framing of any reset is crucial for building a broad consensus behind its measures. There are lessons to take here from the past decade of negotiations. Former Prime Minister’s David Cameron and his successor Theresa May, failed to sell their visions for UK-EU relations, in large part because they were depicted by political opponents as excessively conceding to Brussels. In contrast, Rishi Sunak’s ‘Windsor Framework’ simplified goods movement across the Irish sea, while provoking comparatively limited political backlash. Without understating the importance of other political factors in the differences of fortunes in the former PMs’ efforts, it is clear that Sunak more successfully sold the framework as a British agreement, successfully reassuring Eurosceptics and some Unionists. To build a domestic consensus behind the strategy, framing matters.

It is essential therefore that the Government not only fleshes out their objectives for a reset, but also use landmark moments like the UK-EU summit to project how re-engaging the EU serves UK national interest. This starts with a realisation of the nature of UK-EU relations and follows with a bold strategy which dares to tackle the key opportunities in the current relationship across the English Channel.