08 Jan The Trump-Putin Deal: The Worst of a Bad Deal
Following his annual ‘debate’ with media last month, Russian leader Vladimir Putin noted his willingness to meet the incoming President of the United States, Donald Trump. Trump in return has noted on several occasions his willingness to ‘end the war (Russia’s aggression in Ukraine) in a day’. He has brought forward controversial nominees for Secretary of Defence in Pete Hegseth, and Ukraine-Russia Envoy in Keith Kellogg. All three men, Trump, Hegseth, and Kellogg, have been at best critical – and at worst combative – against the Ukrainian President Zelenskyy. They have all been musing on ways to force both Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table, in moves that are likely to cripple Ukrainian capacity to continue its territorial defence and prove damaging to the UK’s national security interest and the interest of our allies.
Key amongst this discussion is the prospect of a deal directly between President Trump and Vladimir Putin, without the involvement of the Ukrainian President. There is specific Trumpian precedence for this in the US-Doha Accord of 2020, where the first Trump administration signed a deal with the Taliban without the Afghan Government being involved, seeing such a deal as a quick, easy foreign policy win. The end result was the collapse of the Afghan government, resumption of Taliban rule, and one of the most disastrous human rights situations in the world. Not a great track record.
The path to such a US-Russia deal is clearer than we realise. Firstly, Putin has no constituency to appeal to, ruling as an autocrat from the Kremlin with only survival as his compass and a flexible rulebook to apply. President Zelenskyy on the other hand is a democratically elected President, with a crucial link to his people and their interests, and while many wish for an end to the war – to do so with significant concessions on land would throw up the entire Ukrainian cause since the first invasion of 2014 and especially since the second in 2022. Thus, Putin-Zelenskyy talks are extremely unlikely to happen directly, especially as Russian escalation through the deployment of North Korean troops proves no intention to provide space for negotiations. Both sides, however, relish the prospect of negotiations with the United States – a chance for Putin to escape relative isolation, and Ukraine to strengthen its much needed support from the west.
With neither side willing or able to talk to each other directly, the opportunity for another ‘hub and spoke’ type deal through the United States emerges. And for President-elect Donald Trump, the chance for double the diplomatic heft and ability to rue European leaders for the inability to make deals. The negotiations with Ukraine would be largely along the lines we have seen so far – make peace or the support stops, hopefully sprinkled in with assurances of defence and reconstruction but likely not with the agreement of NATO Membership or significant enough defence against future Russian aggression.
For Putin, the deal remains open and there is much he would gain from such a negotiation. Firstly, the sheer fact of the negotiation with the United States – the Soviet’s historical rival – is a central one of Putin’s core aims of restoring Russia to it’s Soviet and Imperial power.
Secondly, it is beyond doubt that any deal that is signed by Putin is one he will renege on. Now while this may seem obvious to those who have had any dealings or knowledge of his work before, such as with the Minsk accords, it is seemingly not as obvious to those within the Trump administration who are planning negotiations. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian administration have their hands tied. For them, trust from their allies is one of the hardest fought for currencies, and they cannot risk reneging on any deal. For Putin – this indecision and uneven application of international treaties would benefit him, preparing the ground for a third – and in his mind final – invasion of Ukraine.
The implications for the UK are significant. Firstly it pulls the rug out of one of the only major foreign policy successes that recent UK Governments have had – the isolation and reduction of Russia internationally. Ever since 2014, but significantly since the Skripal poisoning and Boris Johnson’s strong support for Ukraine in 2022 by being one of the first leaders to visit Kyiv, the UK has been at the forefront of combating Russia in Europe. It has been the first in most major weapons exchanges to Ukraine, in throwing out and supporting other countries in emptying out their Russian embassies of covert operatives, and supporting Ukraine at the UN and in NATO. For the United States to sign a deal with President Putin would undermine all of these efforts and threaten a side-stepping of such proportions to quash almost all of UK foreign policy of the past 10 years vis-à-vis Russia.
Secondly, it opens up the thorny question of allegiance to a Trans-Atlanticist or Europeanist foreign policy going forward. Through such rebuttal, the UK would have to take a long hard look at it’s Special Relationship and seek to hedge between European efforts to strengthen Ukraine and force back Russian interference, and a United States so firmly focused on Asia and away from Europe that it is giving free rein to Putin to ‘do whatever he wants’ as Trump famously put it. While the Prime Minister has made clear his ambitions to strengthen relations with both the United States and Europe – such a deal between Putin illuminates the chasm between the UK and the United States on foreign policy, and it requires the Prime Minister – acting as almost ‘Deputy Leader of the Free World’ to make a choice. One which will have long-term implications for the UK, Europe, and Ukraine.
