05 Feb The US-China Balancing Act
The inauguration of President Trump will mean great difficulty for the US-UK ‘Special relationship’. There are significant points of conflict between the Trump Administration and the Labour Government. Administration officials and high-profile supporters have widely-reported dislike for the UK’s ruling party, not least due to their view that Labour Party volunteers ‘interfered’ in the U.S. elections by campaigning for Kamala Harris. Ongoing uncertainty around tariffs and divergence on key issues like climate change are causing further rifts.
In the middle of this uncertainty, the UK is pursuing a reset in its relationship with China, seeking the perceived economic gains that trade and investment with Beijing is thought to bring. Given the broad China hawkishness of the new Trump Administration, a more positive UK-China relationship is likely to cause friction in Washington, and it would be wise for UK policymakers to consider whether possible economic gains from deeper relations with China outweigh the potential damage the already-fraught ‘special relationship’.
The second Trump Administration’s overall position on China is anything but clear cut, with key officials and influential figures having mixed and often irreconcilably different views toward Beijing. Key foreign policy appointees, however, do tend more toward the hawkish side. Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, said that China is “the most comprehensive and serious challenge to US national security”. Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State, has long been highly vocal about his view of China as a threat, calling it “the most potent and dangerous near-peer adversary this nation has ever confronted”. And Mike Waltz, National Security Advisor, has described China as the “greatest adversary” of the United States.
Unpredictability will be the only predictable thing about the second Trump Presidency, due to Trump’s own demeanour and self-described ‘madman’ approach to foreign relations. This should be a core tenet guiding UK policymakers’ approach to engaging with the United States over the next four years. As much as dealignment in policy can cause tensions, it is important to emphasise that, under Trump 2.0, personal grudges and gripes will be just as likely to destabilise relations. Whether this comes from the President himself, or officials and people influential within the Administration, the UK should account for personal whims complicating the ‘special relationship’ as much as policy. Closer alignment on larger, more strategic issues such as China will help to provide insulation against unpredictable disputes, helping shield the UK from any punitive measures arising from the US and its wild card approach to diplomacy.
The thinking in Westminster may be that, given how rocky the relationship with the United States is anyway, it would be just as well to maximise economic gains from engaging with China. The visit by the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rachel Reeves, was hailed as a success by the government for delivering £600m in growth for the UK through agreements secured on the trip. Analysts have questioned the value of deeper UK-China ties when China’s own economy is facing difficulties. Others have described the £600m figure as a “rounding error” in the UK’s £2.6 trillion economy, noting that the UK’s trade with China is small in comparison to that with the United States and European Union.
Debates around the economic value aside, members of the intelligence community have expressed concerns that the UK Government greenlighting China’s new ‘super embassy’ in London could cause doubts in Washington about the UK’s reliability as an intelligence partner. Damaging such sensitive relationships can have long term implications, and our intelligence ties – a critical pillar of UK national security – should not be damaged in pursuit of short-term trade benefits.
This is not to say that the UK’s engagement should be uncritically placatory – this is a specific case where a firm line on China would be beneficial in both managing the UK-US relationship and securing the UK’s own interests. There is much more at stake than the goodwill of the United States, and a clear imperative for the UK to be extremely cautious about China. China represents a much more strategic challenge than any turbulence in the UK-US relationship. Beijing has proven itself time and again to be a risk actor by harassing dissident and diaspora communities within the UK, acquiring and stripping away invaluable British intellectual property, and using deceptive means to build relationships with influential UK figures.
There is a wider debate to be had therefore about how the UK should approach its relationship with China and about how it should, or shouldn’t, approach engagement with the United States on a broader range of issues. But when it comes to China, the UK must think critically about whether it is really worth alienating a major ally in pursuit of closer ties with China.
