05 Jun Effective Parliamentary Scrutiny of Foreign, Defence and Security Policy
National security always contains a strong element of secrecy. Intelligence agencies must inherently be secret, foreign policy must sometimes be devised and conducted in secret, and diplomats must be able to keep secrets. The United Kingdom has traditionally been particularly addicted to secrecy – until the passage of the Intelligence Services Act 1994, the government would not even admit officially that the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) existed.
There were very good reasons for this clandestine approach, and for the first half or two-thirds of the 20th century, there was a general acceptance by the electorate that there were things they did not and could not know. This was encapsulated by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, when he was pressed in the House of Commons in July 1963 for details of the recent defection of double agent H.A.R. “Kim” Philby to the Soviet Union.
“It is dangerous and bad for our general national interest to discuss these matters. It has been a very long tradition of the House to trust the relations between the two parties to discussions between the Leader of the Opposition of the day and the Prime Minister of the day… otherwise, we would risk destroying services which are of the utmost value to us.”
That deferential and trusting consensus was fracturing by the early 1960s and is now consigned to the history books. Gradually, the political and constitutional system of the UK has evolved mechanisms for scrutinising matters of national security, in a safe and secure manner. The Intelligence Services Act established the Intelligence and Security Committee to oversee the work of the Security Service (MI5), SIS and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). A memorandum of understanding with the government in 2014 expanded its remit to include Defence Intelligence, the intelligence functions of the Cabinet Office and the Home Office’s Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism.
In January 2010, following the publication of the UK’s first comprehensive National Security Strategy, Security in an interdependent world (2008), a parliamentary committee, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, was established to scrutinise and keep the strategy under review.
In addition, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs and Defence Committees and others scrutinise mainstream elements of foreign, defence and security policy, though they struggle to engage meaningfully with highly classified information and operations. In November 2015, having traditionally avoided trespassing on the work of House of Commons committees, the House of Lords established its own International Relations and Defence Committee.
The relationship between Parliament and government over scrutiny is always prickly and guarded. Ministers and civil servants would prefer not to answer any questions about anything, ever, while MPs and peers feel that nothing should be off-limits as they hold the executive to account. Generally, the two opposing attitudes meet somewhere along a spectrum, but the relationship is dynamic, acutely sensitive to the personalities of different office-holders and to political circumstances.
However, the Government is now placing this relationship under great strain in two discrete areas, threatening to cause permanent damage to the scrutiny arrangements which have evolved. That is particularly harmful at a time when trust in public institutions and politicians is at an all-time low.
The first issue may seem minor and bureaucratic, but it is an avatar of a much deeper dysfunction. In August last year, the Prime Minister cancelled the appointment of General Gwyn Jenkins as National Security Adviser and surprised Whitehall and Westminster in November by recruiting Sir Tony Blair’s long-serving Downing Street Chief of Staff, Jonathan Powell, to the position.
Powell was appointed with the status of a special adviser rather than a civil servant, and the government has used this fact to tell the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy that Powell will not therefore be permitted to appear as a witness as part of the committee’s scrutiny of his role. There has been an increasingly sharp and short-tempered correspondence between Labour MP Matt Western, chair of the JCNSS, and Pat McFadden, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the minister responsible for the Cabinet Office where the National Security Secretariat is based.
McFadden has offered for the Deputy National Security Advisers, who are civil servants, to appear in Powell’s stead, arguing that it is long-standing practice that special advisers do not give evidence to select committees, leaving the task to ministers and officials. This is true; but Western countered that the Osmotherly Rules, the guidance for officials appearing in front of parliamentary committees, make it abundantly clear that McFadden’s position is not an absolute one:
“When a Select Committee indicates that it wishes to take evidence from any particular named official, including special advisers, the presumption is that Ministers will seek to agree such a request.”
The government has yet to relent, and as of May maintained its refusal to allow Powell to give evidence. Procedurally, this position is untenable. Every National Security Adviser since the role was established in 2010 has given evidence to the committee; it was the government’s decision to break with precedent and appoint Jonathan Powell as a special adviser rather than a civil servant. The government cannot use its own freely taken decision as an immutable bar to scrutiny. The National Security Adviser is Whitehall’s senior national security official – Powell is currently drafting a new national security strategy – and offering to send his deputies is not sufficient to provide the due scrutiny required.
The second issue relates to the Intelligence and Security Committee. This has always been a somewhat anomalous body: although it is made up of parliamentarians, its existence is defined in statute rather than the Standing Orders of either House of Parliament. Its members are nominated by the Prime Minister, though they must be formally approved by Parliament. The ISC conducts its work in private, members being bound by section 1(1)(b) of the Official Secrets Act 1989 and given access to highly classified information, and its secretariat is provided by the Cabinet Office rather than Parliament.
The current chairman of the ISC, Lord Beamish, has said publicly that the governance arrangements and resources of his committee are inadequate and preventing proper scrutiny.
In a press notice, he pointed out that it had been agreed in 2013 that the ISC should move out of the Cabinet Office and “in the meantime appropriate safeguards would be put in place to ensure that those the Committee oversee had no ability to influence or control the Committee’s staff”. He now believes those safeguards have been “comprehensively dismantled”, adding that “an oversight body should not sit within, and be beholden to, an organisation which it oversees”.
Beamish also noted that the ISC’s resources have not increased since 2013, which in real terms means they have diminished, while the intelligence community which the ISC is required to oversee has expanded significantly. The previous government had agreed to provide more resources but officials are now refusing to do so. He emphasised the gravity of the situation: “if the Committee does not receive an increase in resourcing then it will not be able to keep its doors open”. This would be of significant detriment to the scrutiny of the intelligence and security services and other parts of government involved in national security.
Ultimately, governments must govern by consent, and consent is contingent on trust. Yet last year’s British Social Attitudes report showed that 45 per cent of those surveyed “almost never” trust governments of any party to put the national interest above the interests of their own political party, and 58 per cent “almost never trust “politicians of any party in Britain to tell the truth when they are in a tight corner”.
Public trust is vital at the more secretive end of national security, because the electorate is being asked effectively to endorse and support activity about which it cannot be fully informed. A recent article in Intelligence and National Security by Ged Hiscoke, Dr Stephen Ward and Dr Dan Lomas suggests that “the agencies perform comparatively, and consistently, highly in terms of generalised trust, certainly compared to many parts of the government machine”. The authors add the proviso that public awareness of what the intelligence services really do is extremely limited.
Whether it is a matter of maintaining or increasing public trust, the covert nature of much national security policy means that oversight which is rigorous, and seen to be rigorous, is an essential tool. The Intelligence and Security Committee and the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy have performed valuable and diligent scrutiny, generally managing to maintain the delicate balance between robust accountability and sensitivity to classified matters.
That role is more important than ever and should be built on rather than diminished. As the government approaches its first anniversary in office, it should take the opportunity to strengthen scrutiny, before it disappears.
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