
What will be the impact of returning UKIP voters on Conservative foreign policy?
Earlier this year, we surveyed Britons about their views on the UK’s foreign policy activities and objectives.
The Homecoming: what the return of UKIP and Brexit Party voters would mean for the Conservative Party approach to foreign policy
Earlier this year, we surveyed Britons about their views on the UK’s foreign policy activities and objectives. At this time, the Brexit Party – which burst to life in the European elections in May – did not yet exist. In the European elections, nearly 70% of UKIP voters switched their vote to the Brexit Party. As the 2019 General Election approaches, it is unclear whether UKIP voters will remain loyal to this new party, or return to the Conservative Party, as 45% of them did in the 2017 election.
We find that UKIP voters (now largely Brexit Party voters, referred to here as ‘UKIP-BP voters’) are utterly distinct in their views about foreign policy, compared to Conservative voters. This suggests that any homecoming of these voters to the Conservative Party would create a substantial faction within the Tories instinctively hostile to many of the grounding principles of its ambitions for ‘Global Britain’.
1. Less interested or knowledgeable about foreign affairs
Conservative and UKIP-BP voters are 20 points apart in their level of engagement. Just 57% of UKIP-BP voters report being interested in our role in the world, compared to 77% of Conservative voters. Only 37% describe themselves as ‘informed’, compared to 59% of Conservatives.
2. A narrow focus and preoccupation with immigration
Conservative voters are around 10 percentage points more likely to be interested in climate change and international trade than UKIP-BP voters. UKIP-BP voters, however, are distinct in their outsized preoccupation with immigration: at 81%, they are almost 30 percentage points more concerned about this issue than Conservative voters, and more than 50 points more than Labour voters.
3. Hostility to multilateral organisations
UKIP-BP voters are distinctive in their opposition to Britain’s membership of international organisations – nearly 20 points less likely to support the WTO and more than 20 points less inclined to back NATO than Conservatives. They are uniquely hostile to the UN, IMF and World Bank. The only organisation for which their support falls within the median is the Commonwealth.
4. Defence over trade, and de-prioritising aid
UKIP-BP voters are the most likely of any Britons to favour a reduction to UK Government spending on foreign affairs. They preference defence spending (57% prioritise it, versus 44% of Conservatives), while Conservatives are more inclined to prioritise trade. UKIP-BP voters are also more likely to deprioritise aid, with 83% ranking it lowest, compared to 68% of Conservatives.
5. ‘Putting Britain’s interests first’ and anti-interventionism
UKIP-BP voters overwhelmingly favour (76%) the UK being regarded as ‘a country that puts the interests and welfare of its citizens first’. They are significantly less likely to want the UK to lead on global issues such as human rights and climate change, and twice as likely as Conservatives (35% to 17%) to want the UK to be known as a country that does not intervene in foreign conflicts.
Conclusion
Should these voters realign themselves with the Conservative Party, they will bring with them a unique antipathy towards many of the foundational principles of the ‘Global Britain’ ambitions that have been so important to the Party since the 2016 Referendum. The challenges the Conservative Party may face in bringing their base along could be made more acute if this coincides with the exodus of the more liberal, internationalist wing towards the Lib Dems and Labour.
Survey sample: 1,514 British adults aged 18+. Fieldwork conducted online by BMG Research between 8–11 January 2019. The data is based on self-declared voting intention as of the time of the survey.
