Crisis Communication Arrangements Between Nuclear-Armed States
Sahil V. Shah argues that the P5 must turn their shared support for crisis communication into channels that work reliably under pressure.
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Drawing on interviews and his work with the Swiss NPT delegation, Sahil V. Shah surveys leader-level hotlines, military deconfliction lines and the US and Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres, which have stayed in contact through severe confrontation. Coverage elsewhere is patchy. In some cases, such as India’s accidental missile launch into Pakistan in 2022, channels existed but went unused. At the 2026 Review Conference the P5 accepted broad risk reduction language in a draft outcome that was never adopted, and they have yet to agree any new joint measures. The paper's proposals include:
- mapping existing channels
- agreed message templates and acknowledgement procedures
- regular testing and independent backup routes
- cryptographic authentication
This paper forms part of a guest series by academics and experts on nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and risk reduction, written for the British Foreign Policy Group. The papers are published to encourage debate and understanding and do not represent the views of BFPG. You can read them all here.