27 Jun Prigozin’s March on Moscow – What we can Say with Certainty
I’m not a Russia expert, so will not speculate on what the weekend’s developments mean for Putin, Russia or Ukraine. We don’t know precisely what happened- and whoever does know isn’t telling. Even if, as it appears, Western intelligence services were aware of at least some aspects of Prigozin’s plans in advance, they could not have been sure how events would play out. After over a year of unprecedented intelligence-based media briefing, Western leaders’ restraint over the weekend was certainly wise: any suggestion that the West was encouraging Prigozin would have been highly counterproductive.
It is likely that the current lack of clarity will last for some time, as it seems clear that there are multiple Russian players whose behaviour cannot easily be predicted. Even without the weekend’s events, there have been a wide range of scenarios for the war in Ukraine, dependent on multiple factors including Russian capabilities, Western support to the Ukrainian forces and the weather, with Ukraine’s resolve one of the few constants.
But, however events unfold, there are some important questions for the UK’s foreign and defence policy for the future which can’t – and don’t need to – wait for an outcome to the power struggles in Moscow. More importantly, they are questions which shouldn’t be just for the Government and the foreign policy community, but for wider public debate.
While the specific outcomes may be unclear, the broader context is not. But, as often, the medium and long term seem clearer than which of the many scenarios might unfold in the coming days. The war in Ukraine will not end tomorrow. For Ukraine to continue resisting Russian attack, it will need substantial ongoing Western support, not only military but for every aspect of the country’s economy and infrastructure. As the conference held in London last week confirmed, post-war reconstruction will be an immense long-term task, to which the UK has already made a substantial commitment. Support for reconstruction will not be confined to the West, with (notably) China, the Gulf States and others poised to play a significant role.
But – when we get to it – reconstruction will be against a backdrop of a Russia which is likely to remain highly problematic for the West for the foreseeable future. You don’t need to be an expert to predict that one of the least likely scenarios is a Russia united under a pro-Western leadership willing to abandon all its claims on Ukraine. Managing the world’s largest nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council will be on the agenda for a long time to come. I mention the UN primarily because it’s worth remembering that a majority of its members, representing a majority of the world’s population, however much they dislike Russia’s violation of a neighbour’s territorial integrity, are far from being unconditionally ‘on the Western side’. There is a massive diplomatic task ahead.
In terms of defence, diplomacy and economic measures, the Western to-do list will be full for many years. The sheer physical size of Russia and Ukraine point to the scale of the problem, at a time when China’s ambitions will continue to stretch the West. And if Prigozin’s move to Belarus (assuming it endures) means that the Wagner Group is free to focus more on its activities in Africa, the risk of increased destabilisation would have wide implications for UK interests, including (though by no means only) on migration flows.
What is UK strategy to be in this situation? As far as political posture is concerned, it is not in dispute. We are not merely ‘on’ the Western side, but have from the beginning been a leading advocate of and contributor to the defence of Ukraine.
As we have noted before, there is a remarkably strong British consensus for this position, which is reconfirmed by the findings of our latest public opinion survey to be published in the coming days. The UK will want to remain fully engaged both on defence, non-military support for Ukraine and reconstruction, especially where (it is surely not indelicate to say) it brings potential commercial opportunities to British companies too.
Supporting Ukraine, defending against future risks from Russia (while presumably leaving open the door to a better relationship when that is possible), strengthening our engagement in the Pacific through AUKUS and other initiatives, protecting our interests in Africa against the risk of a Wagner Group which focuses more of its attention there, building supply chain resilience in a more dangerous and less globalised world, all together amount to a massive agenda. It’s a costly one too if we want to do all of it, and requires a long-term (re)building of capabilities across the spectrum, from military strength to Russian language skills.
The blueprint is in the Integrated Review and the recently published refresh, on which we have commented previously. The refresh remains the most up-to-date attempt to take into account the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We now await the promised Command Paper, together, in due course, with future budget allocations, to see how the Government aims to deliver the objectives set out in the review.
We are already seeing a lively debate about the need for increased resources for defence, with the number of military men and women having fallen substantially as threats increase. This is where the comprehensiveness of the Integrated Review could be as much a challenge as an advantage. In business, a strategy is as much about what a company doesn’t intend to focus on as much as it is about its active priorities.Government is different to the extent that it is harder to focus – you can’t decide to put all your efforts into say health and leave education to someone else. The same surely applies to foreign and defence policy: we have equities that we can’t abandon.
But that still doesn’t mean that a medium-sized power like the UK doesn’t have to make choices. While budgets have generally declined since the end of the Cold War, rhetorically we haven’t been good at accepting that we can’t be everywhere at the same time. As we write this piece, King’s Fund has published a report to the effect that the performance of the NHS compares poorly with its analogues in many other developed countries. Whatever the political choices on health, it is clear that there will continue to be pressure for greater resources at a time when the UK national debt has exceeded 100% of GDP for the first time in the lifetime of most people in the UK.
This suggests that, however strong the British people’s support for Ukraine and for defending ourselves against Russian and other threats is, the time is long overdue for a realistic and open reassessment of our international posture. If the pressures on the UK are effectively as great as though we were at war, we need to admit this and make our calculations accordingly.Should we focus on doing better in selected areas where we can have the biggest impact? It is the case that the UK remains one of the world’s richest nations. We could afford more – but we need to take a conscious decision and prioritise, both within our foreign policy priorities, as well as between international and domestic activities.It’s a long time since we have been forced to take such tough decisions, but the time is now. And in our view, it’s time for the foreign and defence policy establishment to take the British people with them. BFPG’s research will continue to make a contribution to the debate.
