09 Sep Giving defence the respect it’s due: from National Security Strategy to a Realist(ic) Way Forward

It’s now been a few months since the publication of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and the International Security Strategy. The recent visit to Washington of European leaders along with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine highlights important challenges – less for what’s in those documents, than for how they need to be used if defence is to recover its proper place in national priorities. While President Trump’s meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy went much better than its predecessor, it’s hard to overstate how embarrassing the occasion was as a display of European weakness. Although the choreography was all Trump’s, the US President didn’t create the reality which underpinned it. Rather, like the boy giving his unvarnished thoughts on the Emperor’s New Clothes, Trump’s role was to make the reality stark. Europe, including the UK, has become so weak that it can only stand and wait even when it is convinced (or claims to be convinced) that its own security is on the table. Critiquing Trump’s tactics and style is entirely legitimate but should not conceal the reality beneath.

Both the SDR and the International Security Strategy reflect a serious technical attempt to articulate the complexity of national security drawing on everything from nuclear deterrence to soft power. An elegantly drafted strategy overlays the bureaucratic processing of every Department’s input – and more importantly, resource bid. The conclusion is, broadly, that we need to do more to cope with the new demands, from European Security to the Indo-Pacific, from climate change to asymmetrical warfare and cyber. It presupposes that we are an important player and should have a view on and a strategy for pretty well everything. You’d expect nothing else from a country with a global history, a nuclear power and permanent membership of the UN Security Council. While the political rhetoric predictably emphasises the shortcomings of previous governments and the need to cover the gap, the underlying tone is that a serious country just needs to get a bit more serious.

There are a number of very important audiences for the messages which the reviews deliver: the many competing demands of government itself, industry, Britain’s allies as well as (real and potential) adversaries.

While we can appreciate the skill and effort that has gone into the drafting, no one we care about is really satisfied. The defence world believes that there’s far too little resource to meet the aspirations of the SDR, while at the other end of the spectrum even senior military figures lament that the UK’s ability to achieve impact in international development has been significantly reduced. On the other hand, there is little evidence of an appetite in the country for the significant sacrifices which would be needed to enable a serious strengthening of national security in the round. On the other hand, there’s also not that much confidence that more money would be well spent, hence the Government’s plans for reform of defence management and procurement.

While the strategy documents may be fine as far as they go, there is something missing in the connection between UK strategy and the world as it really is, at home and abroad. To be fair to the present government and the authors of the reviews, this realist element has been missing from UK thinking under multiple governments for many years since the end of the Cold War. We need:

· An explicit concept of the national interest for the new realist world;

· Far greater honesty about the gap between our aspirations and our current resources and organisation;

· A recognition that active public support rather than disinterested acquiescence will be key to achieving sharper national objectives.

Looking back to the Cold War, there was a clear link between national defence and values/ideology: our national interests in defending our country and allies against a real and present threat aligned with broadly accepted values: freedom, capitalism and human rights. There was never unanimity, but most of the time a strong cross-party consensus on the principles.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, without the threat of Mutually Assured Destruction to constrain us, it didn’t take long for the West, led by the US but with the UK close behind and sometimes (in rhetoric if not firepower) out in front, to take advantage of unipolarity to use intervention to put the world to rights. Tony Blair’s 1999 Chicago speech was in reality possible only because of the power of the US to intervene and its willingness to do so, with Wilsonianism and neoconservatism differing little in practice in the way they endorsed interventionism. While neoconservatism never had widespread appeal in the UK, the American cross-party approach was mirrored in the UK, though in a nuanced way, with both right and left ready to support intervention, to project British/Western power and influence and to support human rights respectively. This policy orientation, lacking a clear grounding in national interest, was never as robust as the Cold War “consensus” and began to fall apart most obviously over Iraq and then later with the failure of Parliament to support the then Government’s plan for intervention in Syria.

We certainly need a new approach today – and not just because of Donald Trump. US policy today is as much a function of a changing world as of a new President. The rise of multipolarity on the back (particularly) of the growth of Asia and the relative decline of the West mean that even after Trump/Trumpism, US policy won’t (can’t) revert to the unipolar status quo ante. Wilsonianism and neoconservatism will never be the same again: even if their exponents return to government, their power will be much constrained. It seems inconceivable that the US public will be prepared to support and pay for the old posture. The same applies on this side of the Atlantic.

Today there are as many threats as before, if not more, which the International Security Strategy sets out well. What’s changed is that we won’t be able to address them without a clear underpinning of national purpose: if there isn’t a clearly defined national interest to defend, neither our finances nor public opinion will have the staying power to sustain increased defence expenditure and national effort.

This is admittedly not an easy task for a political and defence establishment not familiar or comfortable with defining “national interest” for a diverse and sceptical population, but it is nevertheless necessary. Not least because it needs to be clear that we need to choose our allies and partners on the basis of national interest rather than aesthetic preferences. A credible UK national security strategy still depends on the relationship with the US, which is why the Government’s so far effective efforts to keep the Trump Administration as close as possible makes absolute sense. Working with European allies, including on defence equipment, is also essential, but the aim must be to strengthen transatlantic ties rather than to imagine that Europe is in any state to substitute for the US. Whatever the long-term impact of increased European (particularly German) defence spending, for the medium term at least, Europe is no substitute. We need to be clear about this too, otherwise our efforts are going to be diluted and in the wrong direction.

Secondly, we need to be honest about where we are now and the size of the gap to be filled and about the cost. We – and our European allies – are still pretending that we are “great powers” in an age of Western dominance. Talk of a “coalition of the willing” is dangerous if we convince ourselves that “willing” is the same as “able”. Unrealistic unipolar-era ambitions reinforced by a misplaced “can do” mindset is even worse. It doesn’t fool either Trump or Putin, nor does it convey to a domestic or allied audience the urgency with which the gap needs to be filled. To question this is not to talk ourselves down, because those who matter already know the reality. By acknowledging the scale and diverse nature of the threats that face us in the context of national interest, and the gap that can be filled, Government and others can begin to craft a narrative that explains the need not only for increased defence spending, but also all the other elements of a “whole of society” approach to national security.

Finally, we need to recognise that there is a huge gap in perception between our political and defence establishment and public opinion. Recent work by BFPG has identified several different and striking facets of this gap. BFPG’s recent survey found that the British public feel safer this year than last. They do support greater defence spending, but not at the expense of domestic priorities. In that respect, the Government’s revealed preferences (modest increases in real defence spending, but not yet) is a better reflection of public opinion than some of the rhetoric about the country moving towards “warfighting readiness”. BFPG research also suggests that young Britons (under 35) care much more about Gaza than Ukraine and are not greatly concerned by the security implications of a closer relationship with China. On the right, there is also a fracturing between consistent supporters of Ukraine and those who believe that security begins closer to home with the need to combat illegal migration. Whatever one’s views, there is little sense here of the settled sense of national interest which informs the “whole of nation” approach to security seen in parts of Central Europe and the Baltics.

The foreign (and defence) policy world has a lot of catching up to do. It’s used to taking the important decisions and only later informing and persuading public opinion. But it’s doubtful that this will work in an age of greater fragmentation, particularly when the need is for more effort and more resources. Perhaps taking the public into our confidence is now the only way forward?