13 Mar Playing it straight and narrow in Hormuz has hurt the Special Relationship

President Trump’s long-term objective in the Iran conflict is becoming increasingly clear: controlling energy exports through the Strait of Hormuz, or, to put it differently, establishing American control over the supply of cheap Iranian energy to China.

This would represent the second blow to China’s energy security, following the United States’ extraction of Venezuelan President Maduro last month and the selection and propping up of his successor, Delcy Rodriguez. Over a fifth of Chinese energy consumption is imported, and Beijing has routinely flaunted US sanctions when purchasing oil from Venezuela and Iran. Those days look likely to be at an end.

Ever the controversial decisionmaker, President Trump has gambled that the United States’ international partners and allies would tacitly support his aims, if not his methods, and will eventually come into the fold as the regional and global repercussions begin to affect their national interests. At the same time, China is unlikely to provide military assistance to its satellite supporters, Iran and Venezuela included.

Both have proven true.

The gamble may also pay off in the longer-term. “Swing countries”, those that have traditionally relied on American security guarantees but Chinese economic demand, will be more inclined to rely on America for both, rather than try to play off one against the other. Following these series of dramatic and successful military operations, it will take a very courageous leader to flaunt American hard power, especially after China has come to the aid of precisely zero (0) of its allies.

The only things standing in the way of these objectives were, of course, international law and international stigma, but these are two hurdles that President Trump has never shown much regard for.

So, although President Trump is becoming less clear about Iran’s future, viewed through this prism of American interests, Trump has secured another series of wins, at least as his administration sees them.

Of course, the dust has barely settled in Tehran, and these outcomes continue to unfold precariously. Yet, PM Starmer’s decision to not allow US forces to use the UK’s regional bases, although in line with both British public sentiment and international law, will increasingly become a thorn in the side of the leaders’ relationship.

That is because both sides have a point.

On the US side, the United States military does not need British bases in the region to achieve its aims. But they would of course help logistically and provide legitimacy to the strikes. On the British side, the UK does not want to be drawn into a regional conflict that does not have a clear end goal in sight, flaunts international law, and is becoming increasingly irked by what can at times feel like a one-way relationship. How many state visits will it take to secure some goodwill in the White House, likely goes the thinking in No. 10.

That discrepancy has lent itself to the President remarking that Starmer is “no Winston Churchill” while Starmer has softened his position by allowing US military access for “defensive and refuelling” operations, albeit “after the war had already been won.”

This has prompted many to ask what comes next in the Special Relationship?

The US Energy Secretary Chris Wright recently deleted a tweet about a US Navy ship escorting an oil tanker through the Strait of Hormuz. Although it turned out to be untrue, it may not have been far off the mark regarding intention.

If the US military is able to secure the Strait of Hormuz, as it’s shown an initial willingness to do via destroying Iranian minelayers and drones pestering the passage, then at a certain point, President Trump will start to think of the UK as free-riding on the US military for cheaper global energy. After all, one of Starmer’s flagship policies is lowering the cost of energy. It will not take much of a political leap for Trump to begin pressuring the UK to take a more active role in the Strait’s security to “keep the lights on.”

The ground has already been softened. The United States Ambassador to the UK, Ambassador Stephens, has frequently and consistently criticised the UK’s approach to effectively turning off the North Sea as a massive own goal on energy security. Similarly, Vice-President Vance and Secretary of War Hegseth lambasted their European allies toothlessness in protecting the Strait of Mandeb in the leaked Signal chat group from last year.

Against that backdrop, it is not difficult to imagine Trump pressing London to play a more visible role in securing maritime energy routes. Few themes are more consistent in Trump’s worldview than his frustration with European allies “not pulling their weight” when it comes to security, defence, and energy policy.

These are going to be difficult problems for Starmer to solve, especially after losing the recent by-election in one of the Labour Party’s safest seats to the Green Party.

The events in Iran have also prompted another issue for Starmer.

I recently tuned into the Cypriot national news and there is clear resentment, and near-anger, from the Cypriot political class about the British response to Iranian drones aimed at the UK’s military bases on the island. If those British bases provide little protection, as the need for the French and the Greek governments to send military assets to defend the bases showed (while also giving a pretext for Turkey to do the same in the illegally-occupied North), then a UK presence may no longer create a security layer. Instead, it becomes a giant bullseye, damaging British standing and ability to project power in the region. This may end up especially true at more vulnerable bases that Starmer initially refused American use of for the Iran campaign. Many of these have traditionally relied on an American presence as a form of cost-free security. However, they may not have that luxury if the United States leaves the UK bases to their own devices “if Starmer cares about international law that much,” as those around President Trump have begun to say.

Other governments in the Gulf have taken notice of this rift between the United States and the UK and begun to question the UK’s privileged position through the Special Relationship with the United States, and what that means for hosting the UK’s forces on their own territories.

It seems to have finally dawned on Starmer that all of these moving parts matter. Sometimes the benefits of abiding by international law arrive in the future, while the political and military problems are immediate, especially with such a bellicose President and fragile domestic political coalition. Hence the UK’s current rush to do damage control with the political leadership in the White House. The problem that Starmer now faces, however, is that the President will have already settled on a view on who backed him during this high-stakes gamble, and who did not.

And so far, Trump’s view will likely be that Starmer was a day late and a dollar short.

The views expressed in this article are the authour’s own and do not necessarily represent those of BFPG.