Burnham goes to Kyiv, but is the public following?

Andy Burnham chose Kyiv for his first overseas trip as PrimeMinister. He arrived on 24 August, timed to coincide with Ukraine's 35thanniversary of independence, co-chaired his first meeting of the Coalition ofthe Willing alongside Emmanuel Macron and Friedrich Merz, and told theUkrainian people directly that the UK is "behind you today and for as longas it takes."  At the same time, theGovernment, following on from a French decision, confirmed that defence firmMBDA can release classified information on British components for thelong-range SCALP missile, enabling Ukraine to establish its own assembly linesand build low-cost, long-range strike capability of its own.

Choosing Ukraine is a signal of intent by Burnham

The choice of destination was deliberate. Theresa May'sfirst trip in 2016 was Berlin then Paris. Boris Johnson did the same in 2019.Rishi Sunak's first outing was COP27 in Egypt, and Keir Starmer went toWashington for a NATO summit, before he too made it to Kyiv, though only after sixmonths into the job. By contrast, Burnham went straight to Kyiv. Coming weeksafter he hosted Volodymyr Zelenskyy in London as his first international guest,the visit signals continuity in UK policy toward Ukraine, but the choice tomake it his first act on the world stage still tells us something. It demonstratesthe intention that a change of Prime Minister should not mean a change ofcourse, that supporting Ukraine still matters and that resisting Russianaggression in Europe is a strategic imperative at a time when Europeans areincreasingly concerned about United States policy.  If some suggested before his appointment thatBurnham would want to be exclusively a “domestic” Prime Minister, this visit confirmsthat he understands that is not an option.

But has the public has followed him to Kyiv?

The difficulty is that this is not where the publiccurrently sits.  While some pollingsuggests that Brits’ sympathy for Ukraine remains strong, BFPG's 2026 AnnualSurvey found that support for the UK's (generally cross-party) approach to thewar has fallen from 41% last year to 34% this year, while opposition has risento 38%. For the first time, more Britons oppose the government's handling ofUkraine than support it. Set against the UK's nine polled foreign policypriorities, supporting Ukraine ranks just 17%, seventh out of nine. Just 24% of18 to 25-year-olds and 26% of 26 to 35-year-olds support the government'sapproach, against 55% of over-66s, and only 12% of 26 to 35-year-olds seesupporting Ukraine as a top priority at all, compared with 31% of over-66s

Some of that opposition comes from people who think the UKshould do more. Some comes from people who think it is doing too much already.Some of this just reflects war weariness among Britons, as the conflict inUkraine stretches well into its fourth year. On the other hand, although Ukraine has fallen down the list of publicpriorities, national security is firmly at the top – and to many that is likelyto mean strengthening defences against adversaries like Russia.   When asked to rank the three biggest threatsfacing the UK, out of ten options, Russian aggression in Europe came top at36%, the single most widely cited threat. National security is the one issuethat unites Britons across every age and voter group, cited by 47% as a toppriority, nine points clear of anything else.  Even if Ukraine comes to mind less readily, as it falls down the newsorder, it doesn’t mean that the policy prescriptions it calls for have been rejected.  

Foreign policy has both domestic and internationalaudiences.  Just as British foreignpolicy is sometimes out of kilter with public opinion, so international perceptionsof the UK can be some way apart from Britain’s capability and intentions: Burnham’svisit will likely signal more to the Ukrainian’s themselves and the UK’sEuropean allies than it will to Britons.

A single visit will not shift the dial

None of this is to suggest that Burnham was wrong to go toUkraine, quite the opposite. Declining (headline) support shows the need for Governmentto do more to convince the public why supporting Ukraine for, in the words ofthe Prime Minister, “as long as it takes” is necessary. The visit reflects theright instinct, but maybe it addresses the wrong audience. It speaks to Kyivand to Moscow. It does very little to speak to a 27-year-old in Doncaster who doesn’tsees Russia as a pressing threat and does not rank Ukraine among the UK'spriorities.

The extraordinary support shown by Brits for Ukraine in theearly days after the invasion probably reflected as much humanitarian concernfor the victims of aggression as a strategic sense of the threat to thenational security of Europe and therefore the UK. It’s therefore important nowfor the Government and the broader national security community to frame theargument more directly.  This means articulatingthe real threat to vital UK interests and building greater understanding forthe thesis that keeping out of the way isn’t an option.  As our findings on the priority people attachto national security and the recognition of the threat from Russia show, this isone area where Britons are in step with government and are willing to be moresupportive.

This is where the government's task now lies. Kyiv gaveBurnham a strong opening image, but an image is not a strategy for holdingpublic opinion together over years, not months. This means making the threattangible to the audiences least persuaded by it, chiefly the young, and settingout a credible, costed defence plan rather than relying on abstract totals thatfall apart once trade-offs are attached. Neither of those tasks is served by asingle visit, however well judged. Burnham has shown the public what he intendsto do.   But personal commitment won’t buypublic support by itself. He has not yet shown Brits why they should be theones to pay for it, and that argument is still far from made, in London onBudget Day rather than in Kyiv on Independence Day.

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