Burnham goes to Kyiv, but is the public following?

Andy Burnham chose Kyiv for his first overseas trip as Prime Minister. He arrived on 24 August, timed to coincide with Ukraine's 35thanniversary of independence, co-chaired his first meeting of the Coalition of the Willing alongside Emmanuel Macron and Friedrich Merz, and told the Ukrainian people directly that the UK is "behind you today and for as longas it takes."  At the same time, the Government, following on from a French decision, confirmed that defence firm MBDA can release classified information on British components for the long-range SCALP missile, enabling Ukraine to establish its own assembly lines and build low-cost, long-range strike capability of its own.

Choosing Ukraine is a signal of intent by Burnham

The choice of destination was deliberate. Theresa May's first trip in 2016 was Berlin then Paris. Boris Johnson did the same in 2019.Rishi Sunak's first outing was COP27 in Egypt, and Keir Starmer went to Washington for a NATO summit, before he too made it to Kyiv, though only after six months into the job. By contrast, Burnham went straight to Kyiv. Coming weeks after he hosted Volodymyr Zelenskyy in London as his first international guest, the visit signals continuity in UK policy toward Ukraine, but the choice to make it his first act on the world stage still tells us something. It demonstrates the intention that a change of Prime Minister should not mean a change of course, that supporting Ukraine still matters and that resisting Russian aggression in Europe is a strategic imperative at a time when Europeans are increasingly concerned about United States policy.  If some suggested before his appointment that Burnham would want to be exclusively a “domestic” Prime Minister, this visit confirms that he understands that is not an option.

But has the public has followed him to Kyiv?

The difficulty is that this is not where the public currently sits.  While some polling suggests that Brits’ sympathy for Ukraine remains strong, BFPG's 2026 Annual Survey found that support for the UK's (generally cross-party) approach to the war has fallen from 41% last year to 34% this year, while opposition has risen to 38%. For the first time, more Britons oppose the government's handling of Ukraine than support it. Set against the UK's nine polled foreign policy priorities, supporting Ukraine ranks just 17%, seventh out of nine. Just 24% of18 to 25-year-olds and 26% of 26 to 35-year-olds support the government's approach, against 55% of over-66s, and only 12% of 26 to 35-year-olds see supporting Ukraine as a top priority at all, compared with 31% of over-66s

Some of that opposition comes from people who think the UK should do more. Some comes from people who think it is doing too much already. Some of this just reflects war weariness among Britons, as the conflict in Ukraine stretches well into its fourth year. On the other hand, although Ukraine has fallen down the list of public priorities, national security is firmly at the top – and to many that is likely to mean strengthening defences against adversaries like Russia.   When asked to rank the three biggest threats facing the UK, out of ten options, Russian aggression in Europe came top at36%, the single most widely cited threat. National security is the one issue that unites Britons across every age and voter group, cited by 47% as a top priority, nine points clear of anything else.  Even if Ukraine comes to mind less readily, as it falls down the news order, it doesn’t mean that the policy prescriptions it calls for have been rejected.  

Foreign policy has both domestic and international audiences.  Just as British foreign policy is sometimes out of kilter with public opinion, so international perceptions of the UK can be some way apart from Britain’s capability and intentions: Burnham’s visit will likely signal more to the Ukrainian’s themselves and the UK’s European allies than it will to Britons.

A single visit will not shift the dial

None of this is to suggest that Burnham was wrong to go to Ukraine, quite the opposite. Declining (headline) support shows the need for Government to do more to convince the public why supporting Ukraine for, in the words of the Prime Minister, “as long as it takes” is necessary. The visit reflects the right instinct, but maybe it addresses the wrong audience. It speaks to Kyiv and to Moscow. It does very little to speak to a 27-year-old in Doncaster who doesn’t see Russia as a pressing threat and does not rank Ukraine among the UK's priorities.

The extraordinary support shown by Brits for Ukraine in the early days after the invasion probably reflected as much humanitarian concern for the victims of aggression as a strategic sense of the threat to the national security of Europe and therefore the UK. It’s therefore important now for the Government and the broader national security community to frame the argument more directly.  This means articulating the real threat to vital UK interests and building greater understanding for the thesis that keeping out of the way isn’t an option.  As our findings on the priority people attach to national security and the recognition of the threat from Russia show, this is one area where Britons are in step with government and are willing to be more supportive.

This is where the government's task now lies. Kyiv gave Burnham a strong opening image, but an image is not a strategy for holding public opinion together over years, not months. This means making the threat tangible to the audiences least persuaded by it, chiefly the young, and setting out a credible, costed defence plan rather than relying on abstract totals that fall apart once trade-offs are attached. Neither of those tasks is served by a single visit, however well judged. Burnham has shown the public what he intends to do.   But personal commitment won’t buy public support by itself. He has not yet shown Brits why they should be the ones to pay for it, and that argument is still far from made, in London on Budget Day rather than in Kyiv on Independence Day.

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